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AN 



INTRODUCTION 



Speculative Philosophy 



Jir*d Logic. 



By Jl. V E R A., 

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES, 

Formerly Professor of Philosophy in the University of France. 



(Reprint from the Journal of Speculative Philosophy .) 



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ICULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 



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IN THE NINTH VOLUME OF THE 

JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY 

WILL APPEAR, BESIDES OTHER MATTER, THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES, IF SPACE 

PERMITS : 

I. Interpretation of Kant's Critic of Pure Reason (continuation), by Simon 
S. Laurie, F.R.S., of Edinburgh. 
II. Chapters from the Rational Psychology and other Writings of Herbart, 
i translated by H. Haanel. 

III. Schopenhauer — another Extract from the Parerga and Paralipomena. 

IV. Aristotle's De Anima, translated and accompanied with a Commentary 

by Prof. Thomas Davidson. 
V. From Hegel's History of Philosophy, the articles on " The Sophists" 
and "Socrates," together with the continuation of the article on 
"Aristotle" published in Vol. V. of this Journal, by the Editor. 
VI. Shakespeare's "Twelfth Night," "Measure for Measure," "Winter's 
Tale"— Essays by D. J. Snider. 
VII. On the Philosophy of Religion, by the Editor. 
VIII. Kant'.s Ethics, by J. B. Edmunds. 
IX. Philosophemes, by A. Bronson Alcott. 
X. Fichte's Critique of Schelling, translated by A.E. Kroeger. 
XI. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" with Commentary by the Editor. 
XII. Kant's Anthropology, translated by A. E. Kroeger. 
XHI. Spinoza— an Essay on his Life and Writings, by A. E. Kroeger. 

XIV. Trentowski on the Genealogy of Ideas and their Nature, translated by 

I. Podbielski. 

XV. Edward Zeller on the Theory of Cognition, translated by Max Eber- 

hardt. 
XVI. Trentowski's Analysis of the Sources and Faculties of Cognition, 
translated from the Polish by E. Podbielski. 
XVII. The Fragments of Heraclitus, translated from the Greek, with Com- 
mentary, by Thomas Davidson. 
XVIII. On the Niobe Group, by Thomas Davidson. 



INTRODUCTION 



ijtttuMttif Jbjitj ani J?|Himft{p| + 



BY 
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IX THE UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES, 

Formerly Professor of Philosophy in the University of France. 



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1873. 



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to 



PREFACE. 

This book was written some fifteen years ago during my 
stay in England. Events having called me back to my na- 
tive country, and, being engaged in other publications and 
my professional duties, I did not meet with, nor seek for, an 
opportunity of publishing it. ~Now this opportunity has been 
kindly afforded me by my honored and valued friend Mr. 
Wm. T. Haeris, to whom Hegelianism is greatly indebted 
for having boldly set up its banner, and, by his and his fel- 
low-workers' labors and perseverance, opened to it a new and 
wide field on the young and vigorous American soil. 

7 r ^ object in writing this book was not to expound the He- 
gelian doctrine, but, as it is indicated by its title, to pave the 
way to the right understanding of it, and to enable the mind 
to reach the region of the Hegelian speculation and to grasp 
the Hegelian idea — I mean the idea as it has been conceived 
and demonstrated by Hegel in the concrete and systematic 
unity of its nature and existence. I make this statement in 
order that the reader should not expect to find in this book 
that which it is not intended for, and also to remind him that 
a book, and more especially a philosophical book, cannot be 
rightly appreciated and fully understood unless taken as a 
whole, i.e. here with the Hegelian doctrine in general, and, if 
I am allowed to speak of myself, with my other writings. 

A. Vera. 

Montreux (Suisse), August, 1872. 



ANALYSI S. 



Chapter I. — Preliminary View and Outlines of Formal Logic. 
Chapter II. — Formal Logic abstractly Considered. 
Chapter III. — Legitimate Logic; Science; Thought. 
Chapter IV. — Ideas. 
Chapter V. — The Idea in Itself and ivithout Itself. 



INTRODUCTION 

TO 



Preliminary Remarks. 

That there is a Logical science is admitted on all hands, 
and that this science is of paramount importance for purely- 
speculative as well as for practical purposes is a point upon 
which all men seem to agree. For although in practical 
life men are mostly guided by opinion, by interest, by pas- 
sion and caprice, yet there is not one who is not anxious to 
strengthen and develop his logical powers — " the faculty of 
reasoning" as it is generally termed — either to apply it to 
the peculiar object of his industry, or to outdo the adversa- 
ries whom every one has to meet and to contend with in the 
struggles of life. This it is which, with Mathematics, makes 
Logic the most popular amongst abstract sciences. For 
every one feels, as if by instinct, that to act rightly one must 
think rightly, and consequently that the science which in- 
quires into the rules of thought must be worthy of the atten- 
tion of all rational beings ; and as there is neither science nor 
art, nor any practical avocation, which is not founded upon 
thought, and does not require the normal exercise of the lo- 
gical faculties, the conclusion naturally drawn therefrom is 
that Logic is a science embracing within its boundaries the 
whole range of human knowledge and activity. 

Bat if Logic, when considered in its abstract notion, takes 
so high a standing even in popular opinion, it little answers 



6 Formal Logic, 

the general expectation when considered in its present shape 
and as embodied in the various logical treatises ; and this 
accounts for the fact of Mathematics having seen the number 
of its worshippers increased, and the field of its researches 
and application becoming more and more enlarged, whilst 
Logic has fallen into neglect and decay, and if still taught in 
colleges and schools it is more owing to the tradition of the 
scholastic curriculum than to the earnest desire of becoming 
acquainted with it; and this in spite of its intrinsic and 
acknowledged importance, not only with respect to other 
sciences in general, but to Mathematics itself, mathematical 
knowledge supposing the existence and the application of 
Logical laws. The fact is that this science, the object of 
which is to strengthen and develop the rational powers of 
the mind as it is now constituted, seems rather to have been 
intended to mislead and vitiate them. For its theories con- 
sist of nothing but an aggregate of empty formulas, of arbi- 
trary rules, and artificial proceedings, which are neither 
consistent with themselves nor with the things to which they 
are applied ; and it is only by false teaching and false habits 
of thought, and by a distortion of facts, that we are brought 
to think that concrete objects, either physical or metaphysi- 
cal, are apprehended by our mind through, and according to, 
laws as they are laid down by Logic. For if the matter be 
truly investigated it will be seen that they are apprehended 
and known in spite of and in contradiction to them. 

The failures of Logic have long been felt by philosophers, 
and several attempts have been made, since Ramus, to re- 
model this science. But I do not hesitate to say that all 
attempts have failed, and not only failed but are merely an 
inferior reproduction of the theories they propose to over- 
throw and replace. For there is nothing in Bacon's Organon 
or Descartes' philosophy,* as far as the fundamental princi- 
ples of Logic are concerned, which could not be found in the 
Aristotelian Organon; and those who have seriously attended 
to these matters, and whose judgment is not biassed by na- 
tional prejudices and vanity, will agree, I trust, with me in 
saying that the Aristotelian Organon surpasses all subse- 

* Discours sur la Methode et Regies pour Hen conduire ses Pense'es. 



Formal Logic. 7 

quent logical theories by the range and accuracy of its inqui- 
ries, and "by the scientific character with which it is stamped. 
As to Bacon's Organon, the long cherished delusion that he 
had discovered a method and logical proceedings unknown 
to Aristotle and ancient philosophers has been exploded by 
modern criticism and a more accurate knowledge of ancient 
philosophy. 

The common failure of all logical theories — of the Aristo- 
telian as well as others, but more especially of the latter than 
of the former, as will be shown in the course of this inquiry — 
the error which has precluded the authors of these theories 
from establishing Logic on a sound and firm basis, and which 
vitiates, as it were, the whole structure, is to be found in the 
very principle from which they start, in the very notion they 
form of Logical Science. For they have, one and all, consid- 
ered Logic as a formal science, as a science whose business 
it is to analyze and describe the merely subjective forms of 
thoughts, i.e. forms that possess a value and meaning as far 
as the mind is concerned, but which have no objective bear- 
ing or consubstantial connection whatever with the things 
the mind apprehends and knows through them. 

This is the view philosophers have generally taken of Lo- 
gic, and starting from this notion they have curtailed it, and 
stripped it, as it were, of all substance, leaving nothing but 
a mere form, which, for the very reason that it has been sev- 
ered from its substance and considered apart from concrete 
and real objects — either experimental or metaphysical — is 
anything but a rational form and organon of truth. Indeed, 
from Aristotle down to the present time, it would seem that 
Logicians, instead of enlarging and completing the field of 
researches marked out by the Greek philosopher, have ex- 
erted all their ingenuity in compressing it into a narrower 
compass by cutting off some of its essential branches and 
reducing it to its minimum. Hence the arbitrary and super- 
ficial distinctions of Metaphysical and Logical Truth, of 
Reason and Reasoning, of Logic as the science of mere Possi- 
bilities and Metaphysics as the science of eternal and abso- 
lute Realities — distinctions which, whilst breaking asunder 
the unity of the mind and knowledge, and with the unity of 
knowledge the unity also of things, have made of Logic a 



8 Hegel's Logic. 

sort of caput mortuum, wherein the mind is unable to derive 
any rational guide or real criterion either for practical or 
speculative purposes. 

Such is even at the present moment the position of Logical 
Science, though it is more than half a century since the reno- 
vation of Logic was accomplished by one of the most extraor- 
dinary thinkers that ever existed. I mean Hegel. 

When Hegel's Logic appeared* it was hailed in Germany 
by the philosophical world with admiration ; nay, with en- 
thusiasm. It was felt that it would do away with old Logic, 
and inaugurate a new era not only for Logic and Philosophy, 
but for Science in general. For Logic being a universal sci- 
ence, there is no province of knowledge to which its influence 
does not - extend ; there is no theory, nor thought, relating 
either to God, or to Nature, or to ourselves, which does not 
involve some logical notion or law ; and consequently the 
renovation of Logic must needs carry with it new mental 
habits and criteria, new methods and principles, in all prov- 
inces of science. 

That Hegel's Logic, when better known, when a blind at- 
tachment to old formulas and a sort of mechanical use of them 
shall have given way before rational and demonstrative prin- 
ciples, will supersede old Logic, does not leave a shade of 
doubt in my mind. And the objection raised by some against 
the Hegelian philosophy, namely, that this philosophy which 
once held sway has now been falling off; that his disciples are 
scattered and discouraged, and hardly acknowledge the doc- 
trine of their master ; that consequently this doctrine a fait 
son temps, and that it was a transitory phase of the human 
mind, a bold but sterile attempt to explain the absolute laws 
of the Universe, — this objection has, in my opinion, very lit- 
tle, if any, value. To those who assume that the Hegelian 
philosophy has lost its influence, may be opposed the con- 
trary assumption. It may be said that what it has lost in in- 
tensity it has acquired in extent, and that its influence which 
was formerly confined to Germany is now spread all over 
Europe and beyond the seas, as is attested by private and 
public accounts, and by publications relating directly or in- 

* It was published in Nuremberg in 1812. 



Hegel's Logic. 9 

directly to the Hegelian philosophy.* Moreover, were the 
objection correct as to its influence being on the wane, the 
inference which some would draw therefrom against its in- 
trinsic worth and its future action and development does not 
follow at all from the premises. The same has happened to 
the Hegelian philosophy as to that of Plato and Aristotle, 
and what must happen to all comprehensive and profound 
systems, and, we may add, to all great historical events. 
There is a reaction and there is a stop. There is a reaction 
brought about by various causes, namely : by the past ; by 
old habits, interests, and tradition ; by ignorance, indiffer- 
ence, and the difficulty of embracing the full and real mean- 
ing of a theory; and also by impatience and disappoint-^ 
ment at not seeing ideas immediately realized. But this is the 
eclipse and not the evanescence of the planet. Plato's and 
Aristotle's philosophy was followed, or, as the anti-Hegelian 
would say, superseded, by the Stoic, the Epicurean, &c. &c. ; 
yet this did not prevent the former from reviving as vigor- 
ously — nay, more vigorously, perhaps, than when it first came 
forth from the brain and mouth of their immortal authors. 
For, setting aside the Alexandrian school and the Roman 
philosophy, which are chiefly developments or reproductions 
of Platonism and Aristotelianism, the influence and doctrines 
of the latter were never more widely spread, or more indispu- 
tably established, than in the middle ages and at the renais- 
sance ; and even at the present day, in spite of the disdainful 
attacks and pompous promises of Bacon and Descartes, Greek 
philosophy stands as the foundation of all serious philoso- 
phical training, and there are few works upon which of late 
years more attention and labor have been bestowed by dis- 
tinguished thinkers, commentators, and editors, than upon 
Plato and Aristotle. Therefore the momentary obscuration 
of these great luminaries, far from being a symptom of de- 
cline, is the test of their power and vigorous youth, as it 
shows how vital is the spirit that lives in them, which, like 
the phoenix from its ashes, comes out from among the ruins 

* Mr. Bemusat, in the paper " Un Voyage dans le JSford de V HaUe," published 
in the Reveux des deux Mondes (1st October, 1S57), says, "Italy has her Hegelian- 
ism. It is the necessity of our time — c'est la necessite du temps. 1 " 1 It would be 
more correct to say — it is the necessity of the human mind. 



10 Definition of Logic. 

that time and generations heap up to obstruct their passage, 
breathing an ever new and immortal life. 

That Hegel belongs to the family of these extraordinary 
and divine-born thinkers, and that his theories will stand 
the proof of time, cannot, in my opinion, have the slightest 
doubt in an unprejudiced mind that will give the subject suf- 
ficient attention. For his marvellous speculative power, the 
vast and profound grasp of his mind embracing all provinces 
of science, and the faculty — unequalled by any other thinker, 
not excepting Plato and Aristotle — of systematizing knowl- 
edge, and deducing and connecting ideas, assigns him one of 
the highest places among philosophical geniuses. 

CHAPTER I. 

§ 1. Definition of Logic. 

Nothing, perhaps, shows better the unsatisfactory state 
and the inadequacy of Logical Science than the various and 
conflicting opinions as to its object and the exact limits of its 
province. For to some it is a system of rules, a method for 
forming clear ideas, and for guiding Reason ;* to others it is 
the Science of Argumentation and Reasoning, which faculty 
they carefully distinguish from Reason.f Kant considers 
Logic as a formal science, the science of the necessary forms 
or laws of thought, and, according to his own expression, of 
the general use of the Understanding, independent of all par- 
ticular object or subject-matter, supplied either by Reason 
or by Experience.^ There are those who exclude from Logic 
ail questions relating to Ideas, their origin and their objec-. 
tive meaning ; there are others, on the contrary, who not only 
attribute them to Logic, but who go so far as to include 
in it the Problem of Certainty, besides other miscellaneous 
matters, as the problem of probability, of miracles, &c.§ 

This divergence of opinion, and this uncertainty as to the 
precise object and limits of its province, which would be a 
source of error in any other science, by misleading judgment, 
and by producing false consequences and applications, is 

* Descartes and Watts. 

t This is the view more commonly taken of Logic. 

X Kant's Logic, published by Jaesche. 

I The Logic of Port Royal, for instance. 



Definition of Logic, 11 

much more so in a science which is held out as the organon 
of inquiry, as the method by which truth is to be discovered 
and tested. For the confusion and error that creep into this 
the universal science will, for this very reason, invade all the 
other branches of knowledge. 

The difficulty of forming a correct notion of Logic, of 
its limits and real bearing, arises from various causes, but 
ohiefly from the absence of a systematic knowledge, and of 
a, close inquiry into the nature of Form, and of Logic itself. 
In fact, where there is no system, i.e. where there is not a 
whole, and where the parts and the whole are not rationally 
adjusted and connected together, there is only a desultory 
and fragmentary knowledge ; and a particular science which 
is not systematically arranged, and is not the part of a whole, 
must necessarily mistake its object, its limits, and the rela- 
tion in which it stands to other sciences. And so it is with 
Logic. For this science is handled irrespectively of the rela- 
tion in which it stands to other sciences, or, when started, the 
question is answered in a vague and superficial manner, as, 
for instance, that Logic being the Science of Reasoning, and, 
.as reasoning is needed in all sciences, Logic must necessarily 
bear upon all sciences ; but, what is the nature of this rela- 
tion, how far and in which way Logic is connected with other 
sciences, which is the limit that separates and which is the 
nexus that unites them, — this, the most important point, Lo- 
gicians do not state ; or if, to give a more accurate definition 
of Logic, they add that it is the Science of the Form and 
Method by which we dispose our thoughts in order to attain 
Truth, here too we are left in ignorance as to the nature of 
this Form and Method, and of this relation to the objects of 
Thought; whether, for instance, there is between the object 
— finite or infinite, physical or metaphysical — and the Form 
a community of essence, or whether the Form is a mere sub- 
jective organon, a contrivance for the better arrangement of 
our conception ; whether the Form is eternal or temporal, 
and, if temporal, how eternal objects can be known through 
it; thus overlooking or leaving unanswered the questions 
that are most important, and without which no correct notion 
of Logic can be formed. 

Let us, then, in order to arrive at the right conception of 



12 Outlines of Formal Logic, 

Logic, inquire into the nature of this science, by pointing 
out, in the first place, the principles upon which old Logic is 
founded, and the inadvertence and misconception which have 
"brought forth these principles. Logic must he established. 

§2. Outlines of Formal Logic. 

That Logic is a universal science is a point on which all 
philosophers agree. In fact, whether Logic be the Science of 
Forms, or the Science of ^Reasoning, the unity of the mind as 
well as the unity of science requires that there should be a 
universal science, extending to all departments of thought 
and knowledge. But if, on the one hand, it is a universal 
science, it must, on the other, have its own peculiar object, 
its own peculiar field of researches ; it must, in other words, 
be a particular Science. For were it a universal Science only 
it would be the only Science, and all other sciences would be 
but different parts and divisions of Logic. The question, 
therefore, is how Logic can be both a universal and a particu- 
lar science, to what extent and in what sense it embraces all 
other sciences, so as the latter may be considered as various 
branches of Logic, and in what sense it constitutes a science 
sui generis, having a distinct and limited object. 

Now, when we analyze thought, we find two elements in all 
thoughts, namely, the Thing itself — either merely thought, 
or signified externally by words — and the manner in which 
the various things are disposed and connected in and by 
thought ; there are, in other words, what has been called the 
Matter or Contents, and the Form of Thought. For instance, 
if in the proposition "Man is mortal" we do not consider in any 
way what relates either to man or to mortal — whether there is 
a man or what it is, whether there is a mortal thing and in what 
mortality consists, &c. — but only the way in which these two 
and all similar terms are or may be connected, we will have 
the general Form of this proposition. Again, by the same 
analytical process we will discover in an argument the same 
elements, i.e. the Terms and the Form, through which this 
relation is apprehended by the mind ; and if we apply this 
process to the various forms through which we apprehend 
truth, we would obtain the fundamental principles upon 
which old Logic stands ; so that we would have, on the one 



Outlines of For?nal Logic. 13 

hand, the matter of Thought and the Sciences — such as Meta- 
physics and Natural Sciences — which inquire into the mat- 
ter, and, on the other, the Form of thought, and the Science 
which inquires into the Form, namely, Logic. 

The question is now this : are these the rational and real 
boundaries of Logic ; and how can Logic, or any other Sci- 
ence whatever, be constituted if all matter of knowledge is 
excluded therefrom ? And even granted that Logic is the Sci- 
ence of Form, is the Form such as it has been conceived by 
old Logic the truly rational Form ? In order to place these 
points in a proper light, let us draw the outline of Logic such 
as it has been realized to the present day. 

As there can be no thought without some defined forms, 
there must be some general elements of thought. These ele- 
ments have been called by some logicians Terms, by others 
Categories or Concepts, by others Genus and Species. 

Now if, from terms or categories, or whatever name they be 
called, according to what we have stated, we subtract their 
oojectme and material value — be these derived from experi- 
ence or from Reason — there will be only left their magnitude 
or quantity, and Logic will be the Science of the Quantity 
of Thought* Hence the relation — or, to speak more proper- 
ly, the confusion — of Logic and Mathematics. For Terms, 
when stripped of their contents, are like numbers and geo- 
metrical figures, and their combination may be compared to 
a numerical proportion or to concentric circles. f 

According to this criterion, the essential character of terms 
will be what logicians call Comprehension and Extension, 
which are a certain number — a sum — of characters belonging 

* If, for instance, from the term man we take away the real existence and the 
qualities of man, the only character or entity which can possibly remain in man 
will be his quantity, i.e. man considered as a whole, or as a part, or as an indi- 
vidual. 

t Euler, for instance, compares syllogisms to three concentric circles, the mid- 
dle circle playing the part of middle term — [Letters to a German Princess). Plouc- 
quet identifies Logic and Reckoning, and, after having converted syllogism into 
calculation, he concludes by the following words: "Posse etiam rudes mechanice 
totam logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quideni, ut nulla for- 
midine in ratiociniis suis errandi, torqueri vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si cal- 
culo non errant." It must be said that Leibnitz had already set the example to 
this superficial and illogical manner of treating Logic by submitting syllogism to 
combinatory calculation, by calculating the number of combinations into which 
the proposition may be adjusted in syllogism. (See Leib. Op. T. II. p. 1.) 



14 Outlines of Formal Logic. 

to each term. Let us take, for instance, the term Tree. Tree 
is a genus and a species. It is a genus if we consider the in- 
ferior narrower terms — oak, fir, apple, &c. — it contains ; it is 
a species if we consider the superior or wider terms — organic 
matter, being, &c. — in which it is contained. The aggregate 
of the former character constitutes its extension, the aggre- 
gate of the latter its comprehension. Hence follows, 1°. that 
the Comprehension and the Extension are in inverse ratio, 
and consequently that whilst the one increases the other di- 
minishes, the Comprehension increasing in a series of terms 
from upwards downwards, and the Extension from down- 
wards upwards ; 2°. that if we picture to ourselves the whole 
series of terms, we shall see that at the one end of the series 
— the upper end — there is a term having the widest Exten- 
sion but no Comprehension, and at the opposite end — the 
lowest end — there is a term possessing the widest Compre- 
hension but no Extension. 

Now terms, considered singly and apart from all connec- 
tion between them, are but indeterminate elements which 
do not constitute any positive thought. This property they 
acquire by their mutual association, and by reflecting, as it 
were, a part of themselves upon each other. Indeed, their 
own constitution points to this association. For as each term 
possesses both Comprehension and Extension, each term 
points to the term of which it forms either the Comprehension 
or the Extension. 

ISTow the most elementary and fundamental connection of 
terms is the Proposition. The proposition is nothing but the 
development and (as it were) the actual position of the rela- 
tion of terms — of the relation virtually implied in each term 
separately considered ; in other words, the proposition is 
the actual affirmation of the twofold elements contained in 
each term. In the terms "man" and "mortal," for instance, 
there is a certain number of characters, some of which consti- 
tute their Comprehension and some their Extension. With 
regard to the term " mortal," man is a part of its Extension ; s 
and with regard to the term " man," mortal is a part of its 
Comprehension : so that these two terms, as parts of a whole 
— of the whole series of terms and thought — stand in a re- 
ciprocal and inverse relation, which relation is affirmed by 
the insertion of the copula is. In the proposition, " Man is 



Outlin es of Fo rm al Logic, 15 

mortal," man, being the species, constitutes a part of the Ex- 
tension of mortal ; and mortal, being the genus, constitutes 
a part of the Comprehension of man. 

Now, as the Proposition evolves itself out of Terms, so like- 
wise the Syllogism evolves out of the Proposition. And as 
a series of Terms virtually contains a series of Propositions, 
so a series of Propositions virtually contains a series of Syl- 
logisms. Nay, Syllogism is already contained in Terms, 
and, like the Proposition, it is but the actual development of 
the elements involved in Terms. For each term possessing 
Comprehension and Extension, i.e. being so constituted as to 
form, on the one side the Comprehension, and on the other 
the Extension, of other terms, not only points to a Proposi- 
tion, but to a Syllogism. The terms "man," "mortal," "plant," 
"white," "good," &c, possessing each of them these twofold 
sides, may be combined in a syllogism ; and they may more- 
over, each in its turn, be a middle term, a major and a minor 
term, in different syllogisms. 

On these considerations, the fundamental principle of the 
Syllogistic theory, the principium de continenti et de con- 
tento — a term that contains and is contained — rests. For 
each term by its Extension — as genus — contains, and by its 
Comprehension — as species — is contained; so that each term 
is, in its turn, a middle term, a major and a minor extreme. 

In the syllogism, 

"All created beings are mortal : 
Man is a created being ; 
Therefore," &c, 

man is the minor extreme. In the syllogism, 

"All men are mortal : 

The Europeans are men ; 

Therefore," &c, 
man is become middle term. In another syllogism it would 
become major extreme, and so it should be with the other 
terms/- Thus the whole series of terms is a series of proposi- 

* The principle of u De continenti et de contento''' is more specially applied by 
logicians to the middle term, which contains the minor extreme, and is contained 
in the major extreme. But if we take a larger view of the matter, and consider a 
series of syllogisms, we shall see that not only the middle term of a single syllo- 
gism, but all terms, contain and are contained. Let us take A, B, C, and sup- 
pose B to the middle term ; B would contain and be contained. But B may be 
also a major or a minor extreme, and A or C a middle term, in another syllogism. 



16 Is Aristotle the Founder of Formal Logic? 

tions and syllogisms, and these latter are only a development 
of the elementary theory of terms realized as genus and spe- 
cies, or as quantities either containing or being contained in 
other quantities. 

Isow the complex of these forms and operations constitutes 
Method, which, as we have stated, is a mere subjective orga- 
non of knowledge, an ensemble of rules guiding the mind in 
the discovery of Truth, but being neither Truth itself, nor 
having any objective relation with it ; so that when we rea- 
son, define, divide, &c, we perform operations which lead the 
mind to the knowledge of things, but which possess no exist- 
ence whatever without the mind, nor bear in any manner 
upon the nature of the things themselves. Now the condi- 
tion of all thought and knowledge is that these should not 
deny or (as it were) destroy themselves. Consequently, to 
the above rules and principles must be added the principle 
of Contradiction, called also (by Kant) the "principle of 
Identity," which may be enunciated as follows : " A thing 
must be identical to itself," or "A thing cannot be other than 
itself at the same time and in the same respect" — a principle 
which is held out as the highest criterion of knowledge and 
truth. 

These are the main features and principles of old Logic, of 
the Logic which claims Aristotle for its founder — with what 
reason we shall see hereafter — which has been for ages and 
is still officially taught, and forms the frame-work of all logi- 
cal writings published until Hegel's Logic, whatever may 
be the difference in their external arrangement and some 
secondary points. 

§ 3. Is Aristotle the founder of Formal Logic? 

Though this question has only an historical and extrinsic 
value, yet, owing to the greatness of the name, to the influ- 
ence which his writings exercise, and will exercise in future 
ages, and to the fact that his logical disquisitions are and 
will be the starting-point of all logical studies, it is import- 
ant for the guidance of the student, as well as for historical 
truth and for science's sake, to bring this point to its proper 
light, and to see what is Aristotle's true notion of Logic. 

That Aristotle did not clearly perceive either the object of 
Logic, or the link which connects this with other sciences — 



Is Aristotle the Founder of Formal Logic? 17 

with Metaphysics, for instance ; that there is a tendency in 
his theories to rednce all logical principles and operations to 
the empty formulas and figures of formal Logic, I will rea- 
dily admit. But it does not follow therefrom that the Greek 
philosopher considered Logic as a mere science of subjective 
forms, absolutely separating it from what has been subse- 
quently called Ontology and Metaphysics. For the most 
cursory glance at his writings will convince the reader, that, 
pursuing, like Plato, the unity of knowledge, he applied him- 
self to connecting Logic with Metaphysics, by placing them 
on a common ground, and by attributing to them the same 
order of researches. Thus, after having, in his Logic, laid 
down the Categories as principles of Thought, in his Meta- 
physics he considers them as attributes of Being. It is the 
the same relation he has in view when in both the same writ- 
ings he examines the principle of Contradiction, or when he 
introduces in his Analytics as well as in his Book of the Soul 
his theory of the Intellect, which is intimately connected with 
his theory of Being or Essence — Entelechia. Indeed, within 
the limits of Logic we find Aristotle occupied in defining and 
enlarging the object of this science, and inquiring into the 
material and objective meaning of its laws. For after having 
analyzed the Proposition in its general and indeterminate 
form, he analyzes it in its more determinate and more objec- 
tive meaning (in his theory of Modal) ; and after having 
considered the middle term as Species, and in its quantitative 
relation with the extremes {First Analytics), he considers it 
from the point of view of Cause and Essence {Second Ana- 
lytics), connecting here also Logic with his ontological theo- 
ries, and pointing out the essence of things as the absolute 
middle term or principle of demonstration, in which the de- 
monstration and the thing demonstrated, the form and the 
matter of thought, are intimately blended and raised to the 
identity of their nature. 

This is Aristotle's real conception of Logic, as it is proved 
by his writings; and those who appeal to him to justify the 
separation of Logic and Metaphysics, do it either from obsti- 
nacy, or from ignorance and want of an accurate and com- 
prehensive survey of his writings. 

Bo 



18 Formal Logic. 



CHAPTER II. 
§ 1. Formal Logic abstractly considered. 

But, whatever be Aristotle's conception of Logic, the ques- 
tion mnst be decided on its own merits, and independent of 
all extraneous argument and historical antecedent. We will,, 
therefore, examine the logical theories first in themselves and 
abstractly considered, and then in some of their most impor- 
tant applications. 

And to begin with Terms, we must ask what they are, and 
what is the precise meaning attached to them. If they are 
anything, they are only Ideas, as it will be shown in the 
course of this inquiry. But formal Logic excludes Ideas from 
its province, and removes all questions relating to Ideas 
either to Psychology or Metaphysics. We must then inquire 
what they are, and what they can be if they are not Ideas. 
Now the only thing which is left for them to be is to express 
either certain qualities or certain quantities, or genera and 
species. But, according to formal Logic, Terms and their re- 
lations, or rules, as they are called, cannot be qualities ; for, 
as qualities belong to the nature of things and constitute a 
part of it, this would bring Logic on the ground of Ontology. 
Thus, for instance, the logical element would become a qua- 
lity of man, of being, of mortal, &c. If terms are not quali- 
ties, are they genera and species f If so, they cannot be genera 
and species, such as the latter exist in nature, or such as we 
can conceive them to be, namely, endowed with the power of 
generation, or other kindred, real qualities ; for they would 
cease thereby to be logical elements. If, then, they are genera 
and species, they are genera and species of another and 
peculiar kind. They are, and can only be, quantities of 
different magnitude, connected, as all quantities are, by the 
relation of more or less; or, as we have already stated, of two 
quantities, one of which is contained in the other. — A, B, 
C, D, &c, if they represent neither Being (Fns) nor Quality. 
must represent Quantity, unless they are = 0. Thus formal 



Formal Logic. 19 

Logic is, as we have already stated, the Logic of Quantity* 
But the science of Quantity is Mathematics, and thus either 
Logic would be a part of Mathematics, or Mathematics a 
part of Logic, or Logic and Mathematics would be one and 
the same science under different names. This is the point 
where the two sciences meet, and which has led some to con- 
sider them as one and the same science, or to borrow from 
Mathematics the method for philosophical inquiries, and 
consider it as the absolute method of knowledge. In fact, if 
A, B, C, B, &c, are mere quantities, they are numbers, or 
numerical symbols, and their relation is of a quantitative 
kind. Thus B, genus, will contain A, species, as 2 contains 
1 ; and C, being a genus with reference to B, will contain B 
which is become a species, as 3 contains 2, &c. And if we 
apply the same criterion to syllogism,' we shall arrive at the 
same result. Suppose A, B, C to be the three terms of a syl- 
logism; suppose A to be the major, C the minor extreme, 
and B the middle term. According to the fundamental prin- 
ciple of the syllogistic theory, B is a middle term because it 
is so constituted as to contain C, and to be contained in A. 
Now, this is nothing else than a numerical proportion ; that 
is to say, C is in B as B is in, A, or 2 : 4 : : 4 : 8. What 
prevents the student from perceiving the identity of the two 
formulas is either that the principle is represented in logical 
treatises by letters, to which no precise definition is attached, 
or that when the principle is enunciated by words, as in the 
following formulas, " that what belongs to the whole must be- 
long also to the part of this same whole," or "tohat belongs to 
the genus must belong also to the species of this same genus"; 
here, too, what is meant by whole and part, by genus and 
species, is left in the dark. Had these terms been carefully 
analyzed and their possible meaning inquired into, it would 
have been perceived that they can only represent quantities 
and numbers. But what conceals the inanity of the rule is, 
above all, the example attached to it. For as the example is 
borrowed from concrete and real objects, one is led to think 
that the rule is embodied in the example. However, such is 
not the case. For if you strip the terms of all quality, i.e. of 
what does not belong to the province of Logic, the only thing, 
the only entity and reality left, will be this quantity. Thus 



20 Formal Logic. 

when the example, 

All men are mortal. 
Europeans are men : 
Therefore, &c. 

is quoted, one thinks that he has to do with something ra- 
tional and some reality. But it ought to be borne in mind 
that formal Logic does not in any way concern itself with the 
reality of things, so that whether man, mortal, European, 
&c, exist either separately or conjointly, whether they 
possess such and such a quality or not, these are matters 
excluded from its province ; and the only point left to its 
investigation is that if these terms or tilings exist, if they 
possess such and such a quality and relation, they may be 
combined according to certain laws or rules of quantity. 

In order to place the matter beyond doubt, let us analyze 
the above example. 

In the theory of Proposition it is taught, that in the uni- 
versal affirmative proposition the attribute is taken particu- 
larly, or distributed ; i.e. such a part of the attribute is taken 
as belongs to the subject. In fact, the attribute being a 
Genus, and the Genus containing several species or parts, the 
only part of the genus that can be taken is that which be- 
longs to the corresponding species. Thus in the proposition, 
""All men are mortal," mortal being taken particularly, we 
have only a part of mortal, the part belonging to all men, or 
to man; i.e. we have two species, or two equal quantities, 
4 = 4. Now, what takes place in the propositio major takes 
place also in the propositio minor. Here the middle term, 
which was the subject, or species, in the major, becomes 
attribute or genus in the minor premise, and consequently is 
taken particularly as the attribute of the major premise. But 
liere the part of the attribute being determined by a smaller 
subject, "European," we have another identical proposition 
differing from the first only in this, namely, that it contains 
a smaller quantity, say 2 = 2. Thus we have two proposi- 
tions identical : 

4 = 4 
2 = 2. 

The middle term being taken particularly in the minor 
premise, cannot be what it was in the major premise where 



Formal Logic. 21 

it was taken universally ; so that if we consider the quanti- 
tative value of the terms, either in each proposition separate- 
ly, or in the two propositions jointly, we have two identical 
propositions, i.e. a syllogism in which the middle term 4 + 2 
is equal to the two extremes 4 + 2, which means that there 
is no middle term nor any syllogism at all. In fact, as the 
attribute of the affirmative proposition must be taken parti- 
cularly, the middle term can neither contain nor be contained, 
and consequently the fundamental principle of the syllogis- 
tic structure falls to the ground. When therefore, to justify 
the rule, an example is brought forward objectively and ma- 
terially correct, its correctness is independent of the logical 
rule, and rests upon other grounds. That all men are really 
mortal, and that Europeans being men are also mortal — these 
and similar propositions are derived either from experimen- 
tal or from metaphysical knowledge, and their truth and ne- 
cessity are founded upon the quality and nature of terms, 
and nowise upon their quantity. 

It will perhaps be said that to consider in Proposition and 
Syllogism the quantity only, and not to comprehend the qua- 
lity therein, is to take a narrow and erroneous view of formal 
Logic ; and that, in order to form a correct notion of the sub- 
ject, one ought to embrace and combine both quantity and 
quality. Thus in the propositions, " Man is mortal," " The 
rose is red," &c, "mortal" and "red" ought to be considered 
with reference both to quantity and to quality ; for with refer- 
ence to quantity they constitute a genus which embraces the 
species, and with reference to quality they constitute a cha- 
racter or attribute inherent in the subject. Consequently, in 
syllogism the relations of the three terms must be consid- 
ered not only with reference to their quantity, but to their 
quality also ; so that, if we consider the middle term as a 
quality common to the extremes, we shall see that these lat- 
ter must, as a consequence, be connected together ; and thus 
the syllogistic theory will be justified. 

That in terms and proposition the Quality should be taken 
into account, I am far from denying; indeed it is Quality 
which, in logical as well as in all other scientific researches, 
ought to be more carefully investigated and defined than 
quantity, as it is quality that comes the nearest to the very 



22 Formal Logic. 

essence of things ; and it may be affirmed that had Logicians 
given a closer attention to the quality of logical laws and ope- 
rations, they would have formed a different notion of Logic, 
and rested it on a broader and higher basis. But of this more 
fully hereafter. Here I will confine myself to pointing out 
the failures and inconsistencies brought to light by the con- 
sideration of quality in logical theories as they now stand. 
In fact, by contrasting quantity and quality as they are 
combined in proposition, we shall easily perceive that they 
are at variance and cannot be reconciled with each other. 
For, according to quantity, it is the subject that would be 
contained in the attribute ; and according to quality, it is the 
attribute that would be contained in the subject. According 
to quantity, the attribute or genus would contain several sub- 
jects or species; according to quality, it is the subject or the 
species that would contain several attributes or genera : and 
in order to see the bearing of this inconsistency, and how far 
it vitiates the whole logical structure, let us throw a retro- 
spective glance over its various parts, and examine them in 
their mutual relation. 

It is plain that the syllogistic theory rests entirely on the 
theory of Terms. For, as I have shown, the combination of 
Terms in Proposition and the combination of Propositions in 
Syllogism is made according to the elementary constitution 
of Terms. Now, we are taught in the theory of Terms that 
these are constituted in such a manner as to form a sequence, 
a progression in which the lower and narrower term — the 
species — is contained in the higher and wider — the genus ; 
which means, if it means any thing, that the genus is superior 
to the species, and consequently that the genus, rather than 
the species, ought to be the principle of demonstration. But, 
contrary to our expectation, we find in Syllogism the species 
furnishing the middle term and playing the principal part. 
Why it should be so, is not stated. It may be said that the 
Species, being something intermediate between the indivi- 
dual, or the inferior species, and the genus, is the only term 
that can supply the middle term. But then the theory of 
Terms falls to the ground, and with the theory of Terms the 
theory of Syllogism, as a syllogism cannot be made up unless 
the Species is contained in the genus. This is not all. For 



Formal Logic. 23 

if, in a syllogism, taken singly, it is the species that stands 
higher than the genus, then we find that in a series of syllo- 
gisms it is the genus that retains the higher rank. Thus, 
when the species requires demonstration, it is the genus that 
is brought forward. For instance, supposing that the major 
premise of the syllogism, 

All Europeans are mortal. 
The French are Europeans, &c, 

should be demonstrated, the middle term of the new syllo- 
gism would be the genus, all men ; and if we want to prove 
•this second argument, we must bring forward some still higher 
genus — all corporeal beings, or all created beings, for in- 
stance. Thus in the theory of Terms the genus is superior to 
the species, in the theory of Syllogism it is sometimes subor- 
dinate and sometimes superior to the species ; it is subordi- 
nate in a single syllogism and it resumes its former rank in 
a series of syllogisms : all this not according to any fixed 
rule or to rational Logic, but to the arbitrary proceedings 
and requirements of formal Logic. 

To give another instance of the manner in which this sci- 
ence is dealt with in some of the most popular books, I 
will conclude these remarks by quoting a passage from Dr. 
Whately's Logic, which embodies, as it were, the common 
method of similar treatises. After having defined Logic as 
the science of Reasoning, and not of Reason — which means 
that Logic has nothing in common with Metaphysics — the 
author, when arrived at the theory of Terms, states that, 
amongst the terms, there are some which express the Essence 
of things. (JSTow, what is Metaphysics but the science which 
inquires into the essence of things ?) Then he goes on to say 
that the term which expresses the whole essence is the Spe- 
cies, and that the genus and the Differentia express, the 
former the material, the latter the formal and distinguishing 
part of this essence ; adding further that, in reality, it is not 
the genus that contains the Species but the Species that con- 
tains the genus, and that when the Genus is called a whole, 
and is said to contain the Species, this is only a metaphori- 
cal expression signifying that it comprehends the species in 
its more extensive signification ; so that man is a more full 
and complete expression than animal, though less extensive 



24 The Principle of Contradiction. 

than animal : and the theory is wound up by saying that if 
man is more full and complete than the genus animal, the 
individual is, in its turn, more full and complete than the 
species man* This passage shows how fallacious, inconsist- 
ent, and artificial, formal Logic is. For it is plain that if the 
Individual is more full and complete than the Species and 
the Genus, the Individual ought to be the principle of demon- 
stration. But, then, what becomes of Syllogism, and of the 
universal proposition which is the perfect form of demonstra- 
tion, nay, the only demonstration, and that upon which, as it 
were, turns the whole Logic ? Besides, what mean the words 
that the Genus is the material part of the essence of things \ 
In the Aristotelian theories these words have a meaning, 
whatever be the value of these theories. For, according to 
Aristotle, all things consist of Matter and Form, and the Ge- 
nus, being more indeterminate than the Species, expresses 
the Matter. But these considerations belong to Ontology and 
Metaphysics, and those who distinguish between Reason 
and Reasoning, and pretend that Logic has no connection 
whatever with Metaphysics, are debarred from introducing 
these expressions and theories into the province of Logic. 
Again, if the Genus comprehends only metaphorically the 
Species, then the subject of the major and the subject of the 
minor premises will be also contained only metaphorically 
in their attributes, and thus Syllogism will become a combi- 
nation of metaphors. But what is still more startling is to 
find first stated that the Species expresses the icliole essence^ 
and a few lines below that the Individual is more full and 
complete than the Species. JSTow, can anything be possibly 
conceived more full and more complete than the whole 
essence f 

§ 2. The Principle of Contradiction. 

As everthing must be identical to itself, and cannot be con- 
ceived to be other than, or contrary to, itself, it follows that 
every proposition or thought in accordance with this crite- 
rion is true, and every proposition or thought at variance 
with it is false. And, as a consequence of this principle, it is 
thought that there cannot be any intermediate term between 



* See Whately's Logic, pp. 129-31. 



The Principle of Contradiction. 25 

two opposite attributes, and that one of them must be neces- 
sarily affirmed and the other necessarily denied of the same 
subject. Such is the famous principle of contradiction, and 
exclusi tertii, which Logic holds out as the supreme and ab- 
solute test of truth. Now, I do not hesitate to affirm that it 
is this principle which begets the most obstinate and invete- 
rate errors, and sets up a barrier against a comprehensive 
and really rational knowledge. And here, too, we lind Logic 
falling into the same inconsistencies we have met with in the 
theories we have just examined; for after having laid down 
the principle, Logicians lose sight of it, and set forth theories 
quite at variance with it. How can, for instance, the theory 
of Division be reconciled with the principle of contradiction, 
when we find, as a fundamental rule of Division, that the 
genus must be divided into irreducible species, i.e. species 
the attributes of which are repugnant to each other. For it 
is plain that the opposite species coexist in the genus, and,, 
therefore, that one and the same subject may involve oppo- 
site qualities. White and black coexist in the genus Color y 
rational and irrational in the genus Animal ; so that Color, 
Animal, &c, are the tertium quid, the medium comprehend- 
ing the contradiction. In fact, I do not know of any princi- 
ple more at variance either with experimental or with specu- 
lative knowledge than the principle of contradiction ; and its 
being received as a criterion of truth can be explained only 
by its not being properly understood. Let us, then, define 
its meaning — the meaning which is, and the meaning which 
must be, attached to it. 

A thing, it is said, cannot be other than itself; i.e. can- 
not possess any quality contrary to another quality; to 
which it is added, that it cannot possess it at the same 
time and in the same respect. Thus, if a thing is white 
it cannot be black, and if a body is light it cannot be 
heavy, at the same time and in the same relation. This is 
the construction generally put on the principle of contra- 
diction, and in this sense I admit it is correct; but i" must 
be added that it has no scientific bearing — nay, it is puer- 
ile. For no one in his right mind would contend that a 
thing is not white while it is white ; that the light is not 
the light, or the shade is not the shade ; but the question 



26 The Principle of Contradiction. 

is whether the contradiction is a necessary law of things, 
a necessary principle governing the whole as well as the. 
parts, and without which neither the whole nor the parts 
could possibly exist. For it little matters to know that the 
living is living whilst it is living, or that such and such indi- 
vidual is living ; the important and decisive point being to 
determine whether, besides life, there is death, and if death is 
equally necessary, equally beneficial, equally conducing to 
the beauty, strength and harmony of things. Again, it 
would be puerile to say that man is not laughing whilst he 
is laughing, or that he is not sleeping whilst he is sleeping; 
but here, too, the question is whether mere opposition coexists 
and must coexist in man. 

This is the truly scientific and rational meaning of the 
principle of contradiction, and when viewed in this light the 
fallacy of the construction put upon it by formal Logic will 
become manifest. For it will be seen that identity and non- 
contradiction, far from being the test of truth, are the reverse 
of it ; that difference, opposition, and contradiction, constitute 
the universal law of things, and that there is no being, noth- 
ing on earth or in heaven — to use the Hegelian expression — 
that escapes this law. In Nature all is opposition and strife, 
and no being can be observed or conceived — from the imper- 
ceptible and obscure insect that crawls upon the earth up to 
the vast masses that revolve in space — which could exist 
without the presence and stimulus of conflicting elements, 
tendencies, and forces. In Mathematics we have opposition 
in numbers, in lines, in planes, in solids — the opposition of 
unity and duality, of even and odd, of entire and fractional 
numbers — of straight and broken, of horizontal and perpen- 
dicular lines — of centre and circumference, &c. In Morals 
we meet with the opposition of liberty and law, of antagonis- 
tic tendencies and motives. In Metaphysics, and other pro- 
vinces of thought, we find the opposition of cause and effect, 
of substance and accident, of infinite and finite, &c. Finally, 
man is, as it were, made up of elements the most conflicting 
— body and soul, joy and grief, love and hatred, smiles and 
tears, health and sickness, &c. ; of all mortal beings, he- is 
the one in whom the contradictions and the struggles are the 
most intense ; and he who will cast a deep and impartial look 



Applied Logic. 27 

into the nature of the Universe will see that, far from the ab- 
sence of contradiction constituting the fundamental law of 
things, the more comprehensive, multifarions, and intense, 
the contradiction in a being, the higher its nature, the fuller 
its life, beaut}^, and perfection. 

§ 3. Applied Logic. 

If the principles and rules laid down by formal Logic are, 
abstractly considered, arbitrary and fallacious, it is evident 
that they must be equally so when applied to other provin- 
ces of knowledge, and that in general they must beget confu- 
sion of ideas, false habits of thought — or pervert and curtail 
the natural and real notions of things. And to begin with 
the principle of contradiction, if, as I have demonstrated, 
the Universe is, so to speak, an aggregate of contradictions, 
Logic, which teaches that the principle of contradiction is 
the test of truth, must set the mind in opposition to the very 
nature of things. In fact, if this principle should hold good, 
we could say, "Man is a being possessing the faculty of 
laughing" ; but it would be illogical to say, " Man is a being 
possessing the faculty of weeping.'" And if in common 
things, and matters of fact, the contradiction is admitted in 
spite of and against the principle of contradiction, it must 
be borne in mind that it is not so in speculative questions, 
and in matters of a far higher importance, but remote from 
common use, and above the reach of general appreciation. 
For here, misled and blinded by this principle, we refuse to 
acknowledge the very contradiction which not only we have 
acknowledged in other instances, but with regard to which 
we should consider as not being in their right mind those 
who would not acknowledge it. And it does not require a 
great strain of thought to trace to this principle the origin of 
most of our erroneous opinions and theories. Thus, in politi- 
cal and social science all absolute theories are founded on 
the exclusion of contradiction. For if men be equal, and 
there is no natural inequality between them, it follows that 
the present organization of society, in which inequality is 
recognized and sanctioned, is against nature; and, conse- 
quently, those who claim equality of rights, a common level 
of power, of classes, and education, are the legitimate organs 



28 Applied Logic. 

of truth and nature. The opinion that absolute forms of 
government — either monarchical or democratic — are more 
perfect and rational than mixed, has no other foundation, 
all absolute forms excluding contradiction. Similar instances 
maybe discovered in other branches of knowledge, in ethical > 
in physical and metaphysical sciences. Thus those who con- 
tend that man is a mere sensitive being, and that sensibility 
constitutes his whole nature, if consistent,. will teach, in Eth- 
ics, that Sensation and Pleasure are the only principle and 
criterion of morals ; as, on the contrary, those who contend 
that what they call Reason constitutes man, will hold out 
Duty and Good as the only legitimate motives of action. 
Again, in Metaphysics, those who hold that man is absolute- 
ly free, and those who hold the opposite doctrine, namely, that 
necessity is the universal law of things, both rest their doctrine 
on the principle of contradiction. In short, were we to admit 
this principle, we should, if consistent, either mutilate the na~ 
ture of things, — suppress, as it were, the half of the universe, 
and substitute arbitrary, narrow, and distorted notions for 
comprehensive and concrete reality, or evade the difficulty by 
inconsistencies or by mere verbal contrivances : for instance, 
that the straight and the broken lines may be considered as 
identical, their difference being so small that it may not be 
taken into account ; or that the unity can be neither multiplied 
nor divided, and then making up the sum or the fractional 
number of unities, or parts of unities, added or divided ; or 
that shade and cold are not realities, but mere privations 
of light and heat, as though privation could exist without the 
real principle that produces it ; or that the Absolute is free 
from all contradictions, holding, at the same time, that God 
is merciful and stern in his justice — that he is the God of 
peace, and the God of war— that He is the principle of life, 
and the principle of death — that He is absolutely free, and the 
absolute and immutable law ; — thus admitting and denying* 
at the same time the very same thing we have denied or ad- 
mitted in other instances and in another form, and throwing* 
thereby all thought and knowledge into the most inextrica- 
ble confusion. So much for the present on the principle of 
contradiction. 
Let us now examine the value of logical theories in 



Applied Logic. 29 

their application either to experimental or to speculative 
science. 

With regard to the first, it will be easily seen that it is 
only by a surreptitious process, and by giving to its princi- 
ples a higher bearing than they intrinsically possess— in fact, 
by overstepping its own boundaries — that Logic pretends to 
bring about experimental knowledge. For we have, on the 
one hand, the universal proposition laid down as the neces- 
sary condition of all demonstrative and strictly scientific 
knowledge, and on the other we have facts, individuals, sin- 
gle and isolated phenomena. If, then, the universal proposi- 
tion (whether it be the conclusion as in the inductive, or the 
major premise as in the deductive argument) is considered as 
a mere form of thought, as a form having no objective or any 
^onsubstantial relation to the thing to be demonstrated, logi- 
cal argument, when applied to experience, is nothing but a 
delusion. If between man as individual and man as a species 
there is only a subjective and formal connection, when I pre- 
tend to prove that such a man is really mortal because all 
men are mortal, or that all men are mortal because of such 
and such a man being mortal, I am only connecting together 
words or forms which do not affect in any way the nature of 
the thing I demonstrate, and consequently in reality and ob- 
jectively I prove nothing. The argument, therefore, cannot 
be really conclusive, unless it be admitted that between the 
individual and the universal, the fact and the principle, 
there is a community of nature, an objective and consubstan- 
tial connection — a connection similar to that of cause and 
effect, of substance and accidency. But such a connection is 
beyond and above the reach of formal Logic — nay, it is the 
very connection that formal Logic expressly disclaims, as we 
have already noticed, and shall see more fully hereafter. 

Passing now from inductive to deductive argument, and 
from experimental to metaphysical knowledge, we shall find 
here also Logic falling short of what it promises to accom- 
plish, namely, to establish truth and principles by a correct 
and rational demonstration. 

The supreme object of Metaphysics is, strictly speaking, 
the knowledge of the Absolute ; and the Absolute, for the 
very reason that it is the Absolute, is the ultimate and most 



30 Applied Logic. 

evident principle of demonstration. This is the meaning of 
the expressions, " God is the light of intellect ; He is the 
Ideal of the Universe, the Thought, and the Being, and that 
nothing can exist or be conceived witliout Him." Now, all 
these and similar definitions of the Absolute necessarily im- 
ply the idea that the Absolute is also the absolute principle 
of demonstration, or, to use the more popular expression, 
that God is the Foundation of all demonstration. But it is 
not so with formal Logic ; for were we to follow the rules laid 
•down by it, the Absolute would be of no avail in syllogism 
and demonstration. In fact, the part the Absolute could 
fulfil in a syllogism would be either the part of minor or the 
part of major term, or that of middle term, or that of two of 
them. This is the circle of supposition we can form with 
regard to the Absolute. Now, it is evident that the Absolute 
cannot be the minor term, as the minor term is always de- 
monstrated, and the Absolute is supposed to demonstrate 
and not to be demonstrated. Nor could it be the major term, 
as the major term is not the middle term ; and it is the mid- 
dle term that plays the highest part in syllogism. Nor is the 
middle term any better ; for the middle term being the spe- 
cies, is contained in the genus and is inferior to it : so that 
neither the major term for not being the species or the mid- 
dle term, nor the middle term for not being the genus or the 
major term, can constitute the absolute term of demonstra- 
tion. It only remains, then, that the Absolute should be the 
union of both terms — of the species and the genus, or of the 
middle and major terms — so that when we say, for instance, 
God or the Absolute is the Perfect Being, or possesses all per- 
fections^ "God" and "all perfections" should be so intimately 
and so inseparably connected that one could neither exist 
nor be conceived without the other. But this supposition 
must likewise be rejected. In fact, are the two terms of the 
proposition absolutely identical ? then there is in reality only 
one term, and their distinction is only a verbal one. Are 
they really and materially distinct? then, if united, their 
union must be effected by a third term, which, for the very 
reason that it unites them, would be superior to fchem, and 
in this case neither of them, but this third term would be the 
absolute. 



Applied Logic. 31 

Besides, in all propositions concerning the Absolute, the 
distinction or division into genus and species must be done 
away with as not being applicable to this province of knowl- 
edge. For instance, in the proposition, "The eternal and 
imperishable things are the principle of the temporary and 
perishable," which of the two terms would be the species, 
and which the genus ? Shall we say that temporary things 
constitute the genus of the eternal f But this would be sim- 
ply absurd. Shall we say, then, that it is the eternal things 
that constitute the genus of the temporary? But this would 
be in opposition to the fundamental rule of Logic, that the 
subject of a proposition should be the species, and the attri- 
bute the genus. 

Finally, whether absolute propositions like these, "The 
Absolute Being is the source of all perfection," or " The Ab- 
solute Cause is the principle of all things," or "The Beautiful 
and the Good are the principle of all beauty and all good" 
— whether, I say, all these and the like propositions consist of 
genus and species or not, whether their terms be identical or 
different, they cannot supply the principle — the propositio 
major — of any demonstration, as it may be easily ascertained 
by trying to combine them in syllogism.* 

The point the above remarks establish is that formal Logic 
cannot be reconciled with the principles which constitute the 
foundation — the major principle of all demonstration, and 
that no legitimate conclusion can be drawn from them. 

If, now, we take up the counterpart of the question, or, so 
to speak, the question by the other end — by the conclusion— 
and show that no metaphysical knowledge or principle can 

* It may be said that the following argument — 

The absolute cause is the principle of all things. 

God is the absolute cause: 

Therefore God is the principle of all things — 

is logically and formally correct. But in reality it is no argument at all; nay, 
it is at variance with the rules of Logic itself. For— even granted that the terms 
• v God" and "absolute cause" be distinct, inasmuch as Causality may be consid- 
ered as an attribute of God — absolute cause, which is an attribute of God, could 
not be the middle term or the principle of demonstration, and God the minor 
term and that part of the proposition which is demonstrated. Eather the reverse 
would be the case; I mean that it is the propositio minor that ought to take the 
place of the propositio major. But, then, from a propositio major like this, "God 
is the absolute cause," no conclusion can be drawn. 



32 Applied Logic. 

be obtained through syllogism (in the conclusion), we shall 
complete the demonstration. 

It has already been observed that all attempts to prove by 
syllogism, and on a priori argument — which, strictly speak- 
ing, is the only metaphysical and speculative demonstration* 
— the existence of God, have failed. The reason of this fail- 
ure is very simple. Neither God, nor anything — attribute or 
perfection — appertaining to God, can be syllogistically de- 
monstrated. For God, being the Absolute, demonstrates all, 
and is demonstrated by nothing ; consequently, the Exist- 
ence or the Being of God, who is tlie Being, cannot be demon- 
strated by any other Being ; in other words, there cannot 
possibly be any middle term, or principle, by which God, or 
God's nature, could be demonstrated ; for a principle demon- 
strating God would be something more perfect and higher 
than God, and thus God would not be the Absolute principle 
of demonstration. Thus all proofs of this kind are either 
mere verbal contrivances or circles, as maybe ascertained by 
analyzing the famous argument drawn from the idea of the 
Infinite of Perfect Being when presented in the syllogistic 
form. And, to place the matter beyond doubt, let us exam- 
ine this argument, upon which, as Kant has already observed, 
hang all speculative proofs and certainty of the existence 
of God. 

The point to be demonstrated is the Existence of God, and 
the gist of the proof, nay, the whole proof, rests on the Idea 
of the Infinite or the Perfect Being. For it is out of this 
Idea and by analytical process that the three terms of the 
argument must be evolved. Now it may be seen at a glance, 
as it were, that a syllogism so constituted can be but a circle. 



* The really Metaphysical and Speculative proofs of the Existence of God are 
those deduced from a primordial and pure idea — the idea of the Infinite, of the 
Absolute, of the Perfect Being, &c— considered in itself and apart from all ex- 
perimental data. Inductive arguments, as for instance those known under the 
name of physical proofs, are not strictly demonstrative. Indeed they presuppose 
the Metaphysical proof, and the absolute notion upon which this proof is found- 
ed. In fact, from the apprehension of finite causes or effects, or of the beauty, 
proportion and harmony of the Universe, it would be impossible for us to raise 
our mind to the contemplation of an Absolute Cause, of an Absolute Finality, &c, 
were it not that these notions preexist in the mind, and are — consciously or un- 
consciously — suggested by it. 



Applied Logic. 33 

In fact, in affirming the Infinite, either we affirm a Reality, a 
Heal Being, or a mere subjective representation, a certain 
form of thought possessing no objective entity, no being cor- 
responding to it. In the latter case there is no syllogism at 
all, for there is no more connection between the real existence 
of God and the Idea of the Infinite than between bear the 
animal and Bear the constellation. If, on the other hand, in 
affirming the Infinite we affirm a Reality, we affirm thereby 
the existence of the Infinite, or of the Infinite Being, and in 
this case the conclusion is contained, not virtually or im- 
plicitly, but actually and explicitly, in the major premise. 
In fact, when we state in the major premise that the "Infi- 
nite is the Being that possesses all perfections," we admit — 
and cannot but admit — at the same time, that the Infinite 
exists, otherwise there would be no meaning in the propo- 
sition.* 

This completes the demonstration ; for it shows that Logic 
is, so to speak, refused admittance into the domain of Meta- 
physics by both ends of the argument, namely, by the major 
premise and by the conclusion. By the major premise, from 
its being unable to avail itself of the Absolute as a principle 
of demonstration, as I have shown in the first instance ; by 

* The argument is this : 

The Infinite or the Perfect Being must possess all perfections. 
The Existence is a perfection : 

Therefore the Perfect Being exists, or the Existence belongs to the Per- 
fect Being. 

It will be observed that this syllogism is fallacious and inconclusive even ac- 
cording to the rules laid down by Logic, or according to the rational com- 
bination of terms ; for it is a Syllogism of the 2d Figure with two affirmative 
premises, whilst we are taught that one of them must be negative. Now, even 
granted that in this particular case the two premises might, by exception, be 
affirmative, the conclusion could not be legitimately drawn from them; for the 
conclusion would be either, " The Perfect Being exists," or "The Existence 
belongs to the Perfect Being." In the first case, the subject of the conclusion 
would be the Major extreme, whilst it ought to be the Minor extreme; in the 
second case, it is only by inverting the natural position of terms, and putting 
language and thought to torture, that the conclusion would be obtained. For 
If the Existence be a perfection or an attribute of God, it must fill the place of 
the attribute and not that of the subject. 

The remarks contained in this note and text equally apply to all speculative 
proofs of the existence and attributes of God — nay, to all argument which at- 
tempts to demonstrate the absolute, the ideas, and essence of things. 

B 3 ' 



34 Reason and Reasoning. 

the conclusion, as it is unable to demonstrate the Absolute, 
as I have shown in the second instance. 

§ 4. Beason and Reasoning. 

This impotency of old Logic to reach Metaphysical knowl- 
edge has brought out the well-known and fallacious distinc- 
tion between Reason and Reasoning. Unable to remodel 
Logic, in order to make it available in the highest field of 
scientific research, and feeling, at the same time, that there 
must be some connection between this universal organon of 
knowledge and metaphysical science, some philosophers, to 
solve the difficulty, have resorted to the above distinction, 
setting forth that there is the same connection and the same 
difference between Metaphysics and Logic as between the 
principle and the consequence, between affirming a principle 
and deducing consequences therefrom. Metaphysics, accord- 
ing to this opinion, inquiring into the absolute principle and 
ultimate causes of things, whilst Logic deduces consequences 
by applying them to secondary causes or effects and to par- 
ticular objects. 

The preceding investigation would suffice to show how 
clumsy and inadmissible this opinion is, as they establish 
irreversibly, I think, that not only Metaphysics and Logic — 
as this latter stands at present — are two distinct provinces 
of knowledge, but that they are irreconcilable ; and, conse- 
quently, that this deduction of consequences by Logic out of 
Metaphysical principles is a bare assumption — nay, a mere 
delusion. However, in order to place this latter point in a 
more prominent light, let us grant, for a moment, that it may 
be so, and that we have here two sciences, one of which 
supplies the principles, and the other the consequences — the 
former being the product of a faculty called Reason, and the 
latter of a faculty called Reasoning. 

Now if this theory possess any meaning, it means this, 
namely, that in syllogism Reason suggests the major prem- 
ise, and Reasoning the minor premise as well as the relation 
of the latter to the former, from the perception of which rela- 
tion it brings forth the conclusion. But then the Reasoning 
faculty would stand higher than Reason, and perform opera- 



Reason and Reasoning. 35 

tions more important and more complete than the latter, 
which is contradictory to and against the supposition. For 
we suppose — and must admit — that the faculty which reveals 
to us the ultimate principle of things is the to yjyefiiopixdv — 
the governing power to which all other faculties stand sub- 
ordinate, as the soldier is subordinate to the general and the 
menial laborer to the architect. Now the above distinction 
inverts, so to speak, the rules, and sets forth Reason as a 
subordinate faculty. In fact, when we say that Reason pro- 
pounds the principles and Reasoning deduces the conse- 
quences therefrom, we say, in reality, that the knowledge of 
Reason, or obtained through it, is confined to principles and 
forbidden to overstep these boundaries, whilst Reasoning 
embraces both principles and consequences. For, to deduce 
consequences from principles, the Reasoning faculty must 
apprehend both, and the principles more distinctly than the 
consequences and previous to them, as the latter are drawn 
from the former. Let us consider a syllogism. 

All virtue comes from God. 
Justice is a virtue : 
Therefore, &c. 

It is quite plain that all the terms and propositions as well as 
their relation must be perceived by one and the same facul- 
ty. Were they perceived by different faculties, one of which 
stops, as it were, at the major premise, whilst the other takes 
up the operation at the minor premise, without perceiving 
the principle as distinctly as the first faculty — nay, more dis- 
tinctly, from the very fact that it draws inferences from it — 
the argument could never be made up. And the correctness 
of these remarks will become more manifest if we take the 
three terms of which syllogism consists and put them in this 
form, 

ABC, 

A being the minor, C the major, and B the middle term. For 
it will be seen that B, whose function it is to connect A and 
C, must be apprehended by one and the same faculty. But 
the B of which C is affirmed in the major proposition, is the 
same B which is affirmed of A in the minor. Consequently, 
it must be the same faculty that brings forth and affirms B 
in the two propositions. Again, the C of the major proposi- 



36 Reason and Reasoning. 

tion is the C of the conclusion, and here also we have the 
same faculty perceiving C in both propositions. Lastly, if 
it be one and the same faculty which affirms B and C in the 
three propositions, it must necessarily be one and the same 
faculty that affirms B and C of A in the minor premise and 
in the conclusion. In other words, syllogism is a mental 
operation by which the connection of three terms is demon- 
strated. Now, even supposing that the performing of such 
operation should require the working of different faculties — 
that there should be, for instance, a faculty which supplies 
the terms and another faculty which supplies the proposi- 
tions — there must be, at any rate, a superior and more com- 
prehensive faculty by which all these elements — faculties, 
terms, and propositions — are connected together in the unity 
of syllogism. Hence it follows that the distinction between 
Reason and Reasoning which is to be the line of demarcation 
between Metaphysics and Logic vanishes before a close 
investigation of the matter, and consequently that either 
Metaphysics is a part of Logic or Logic a part of Metaphy- 
sics, or, if there be any distinction between them, it is a 
distinction of a different kind and founded upon other prin- 
ciples. 



Preliminary Remarks to Legitimate Logic. 37 



chapter ni. 
§ 1. Preliminary Remarks to Legitimate Logic. 

We may now dismiss old Logic as artificial, arbitrary, and 
inadequate for the attainment of truth, and turn our attention 
to legitimate and rational Logic and to the principles upon 
which it must be firmly established. 

First of all, it ought to be borne in mind that if there be a 
logical Science, it must be an absolute Science, or a part or 
division of the absolute Science. And by absolute Science*, 
I mean a Science which inquires into, and is adequate to, the 
absolute and eternal nature both of thought and things. For 
neither thought which is not the right thought of its object, 
nor the object which is not rationally thought, is science. 
Nor is it science if it is thought which is not an absolute, 
but a limited, transient, and accidental thought. Thus in 
dividing, defining, classifying, in deducing Ideas, or in affirm- 
ing the Infinite and describing its attributes, either thought 
grasps and defines the inward and immutable nature of 
things, in which case there will be science, or it performs 
mental operations which are not necessarily and inwardly 
connected with the nature of things, in which case there will 
only be the shadow of science, nay, mere delusion and phan- 
toms of the imagination. 

This shows how unfounded is the division, generally ad- 
mitted, of Truth into logical and metaphysical truth, a sister 
distinction to that we have just exploded between Reason 
and Reasoning. For it will be easily perceived that if Logi- 
cal truth, whatever it may be, is not an absolute truth, it is 
no truth at all. If, on the contrary, it is an absolute truth, it 
possesses in its own sphere and attribution a worth and im- 
portance equal to that of Metaphysical truth — indeed it is 
itself a metaphysical truth. In fact, if there be an absolute 
Science, this Science must be Logic. All sciences presuppose 
Logic, whilst Logic presupposes none. All sciences avail 
themselves of logical processes and notions ; nor could they 
attain their own peculiar object without bringing them into 



38 Preliminary Remarks to Legitimate Logic. 

action, as it were. Even taking Logic as it now stands, it is 
easy to see that all sciences — Mathematics, Physics, Ontolo- 
gy, &c. — borrow from it a part of their own subject-matter. 
And by borrowing I mean this, namely, that all Sciences 
make, and cannot but make, Logical principles and sub- 
stance (if I am allowed the expression) a part of their own 
substance, like the plant that borrows from surrounding ele- 
ments strength and life. And as earth, air, and light, consti- 
tute an integral part of the plant's life and nature, so Logic 
must be considered as a necessary and essential element of 
all Sciences, and consequently of all Thought and Being. In 
fact, it would be irrational and inconsistent to admit that 
Logic is the universal organon of truth, that there is no 
being that can be apprehended or understood unless it goes 
through some logical process, and to refuse at the same time 
to Logic all objective and consubstantial connection with the 
very being known through it. Indeed, if we look closely into 
the subject, we will perceive that, by taking this view of 
Logic, we admit that there are two Logical sciences, a Logic 
eternal and absolute, according to which things are made, 
arranged, and thought ; and a Logic finite, accidental, and 
arbitrarily contrived for our special use and purpose. But 
then we must give up Logic — and, with Logic, Science — as 
useless and deceptive, and as holding out expectations it is 
absolutely unable to fulfil. For we use it in the expectation 
of attaining through it the real knowledge of things, and act- 
ually find that our knowledge has no other foundation, nor 
any other object, but our own transitory notion, and the ne- 
gative and limited conceptions of our mind. 

In order to arrive at a correct view of Logic we must, there- 
fore, view it as a Science in the strict sense of the word, viz. 
as a Science of Knowing and Being, whose principles consti- 
tute at once the principles of thought and the principles of 
things ; so that if we were, for instance, to realize it as the 
Science of Form, we should not consider the Form, as old 
Logic does, namely, as a merely subjective Form, but as a 
Form embracing the twofold sides of existence — the subjec- 
tive and the objective, thought and the thing thought — in the 
unity of its nature. 



On Science in general. 39 

§ 2. On Science in general. 

As Logic, whatever be its importance, constitutes only a 
part of the Absolute, or of the Absolute Science, we cannot 
form a clear notion of Logic unless we give an insight into 
Science in general, its conditions, its bearing, and the part it 
plays in the constitution and the existence of the Universe. 

(a) Is there an Absolute Science t 

If there be an absolute Science, this must be the Science of 
the Absolute, and, vice versa, if there be an Absolute, there 
must be an absolute Science. For an Absolute without an 
absolute Science is no absolute, and an absolute Science 
without an absolute object is not an absolute Science. The 
absolute Science and the Absolute, the absolute thought and 
the absolute object of thought, are therefore reciprocally and 
inseparably connected, or, to speak more properly, are the 
two sides of one and the same being. The question now 
is whether the Absolute is within the reach of the human 
mind ; and as it is a question of vital importance, and bear- 
ing upon Logic as well as upon Science in general, I will 
dwell at some length upon it. 

The opinion respecting the capability of the human mind 
to attain absolute knowledge may, I think, be divided into 
three heads. 

First, there are those who entirely refuse to the human 
mind the power of reaching the Absolute. The Absolute, if 
it exist, they argue, is a Deus absconditus; it is a Being into 
whose ineffable and inscrutable nature no human eye can 
penetrate. In fact, is not man an imperfect and finite being? 
How, then, could he comprehend the Perfect and the Infinite ? 

Secondly, there are others who steer an intermediate 
course. These do not say that we are refused all knowledge 
of the Absolute, but that our knowledge does not extend be- 
yond its existence. We know that the Absolute is, but we 
are not allowed to know what it is, and to have an insight 
into its nature, its attributes and perfections. 

Finally, others go one step farther, and admit that we are 
capable of apprehending both its existence and some of its 
attributes, as, for instance, that it is Infinite, All-powerful, 
All-wise, &c, without being able to reach the very length, 



40 On Science in general. 

the essence of its nature, nor to determine clearly and in a 
positive manner what these attributes are ; and consequently, 
according to this tenet, we would know that the Absolute is 
All-wise, Omnipotent, &c, without comprehending what om- 
nipotence, all-wisdom, &c, are. 

Although these doctrines seem, at first sight, to stand on 
different ba^es, and to represent different opinions, they start 
in reality from the same point of view — the inadequacy of 
the human mind for the attainment of absolute knowledge ; 
and lead to the same result — the negation of Science, or 
Skepticism. Indeed the two latter, though apparently more 
comprehensive and more condescending, as it were, towards 
the human mind, labor, when compared with the former, un- 
der the disadvantage of inconsistency ; and the third, which 
seems to conciliate matters and to hit upon the right solu- 
tion is the most inconsistent of the two. In fact there is no 
inconsistency in affirming that man's mind is utterly inade- 
quate for absolute knowledge. There may be error, but there 
is no inconsistency ; whilst in the other two opinions error is 
coupled with inconsistency, as they state both, and the latter 
more explicitly than the second, that man can reach the Ab- 
solute, and then they take up, so to speak, the opposite thesis, 
in the same proposition, and state that he is unable to reach 
it ; and although the inconsistency does not appear in the 
expression, it is not the less involved in the real meaning. 

The second doctrine teaches that we are allowed to know 
that God is, but we are forbidden to advance a step farther. 
If we were to trace the origin of this doctrine, we should find 
that it arises from a superficial view of the subject, and from 
an application equally superficial and erroneous of the ana- 
logical and inductive process to absolute knowledge. Here 
is a tree, or an animal, or myself. As I can affirm that a tree 
is, or that I am, without knowing the nature of the tree or 
my own, so likewise can I affirm that God is, although I may 
be unable to comprehend His attributes and nature. 

Now this manner of arguing is erroneous and deceptive 
even within the sphere of experimental perception. For the 
perception of the existence of all objects which come within 
the pale of experience is inseparable from the perception of 
some of their qualities ; as, for instance, that the tree occupies 



On Science in general. 41 

a portion of space ; that it has color, leaves, &c. ; and its 
existence is made known to me through some of these quali- 
ties. Nor am I conscious of my existence save by apprehend- 
ing myself either as a thinking, or as an active, or as a sen- 
sitive being. Now this connection between the existence and 
the attributes of a being is still more intimate and inseparable 
in God. For when we say that God is, we do not mean that 
He is like anything finite, or falling under the senses, but 
that He is in such a manner as is conformable with the per- 
fection of His nature. Consequently, the affirmation of the 
existence of God involves already the apprehension of the 
manner in which God exists, that is to say, of a part or aspect 
of the Divine nature. Besides, when we state that God is, 
either the word God is a mere word, an empty sound, and 
then the proposition means nothing ; or it has a meaning, 
and then it means that the Absolute, or the Perfect Being, or 
the Ens realissimum, etc., is; i.e. it expresses some essential 
and necessary attribute of the nature of God. In fact, in God 
the Esse essentia^ and the Esse existential, to use the expres- 
sion of Schoolmen, are more intimately blended than in finite 
beings ; so that in God to be and to be such is one and the 
same thing. Nor could He be if He might be otherwise than 
He is, and, vice versa, were He otherwise than He is, He could 
not be. Consequently, to apprehend that God is, is to appre- 
hend, in a certain manner, what He is ; and to pretend that 
we can apprehend that God is, and then to say that we are 
not allowed to know what He is, is to deny in the second 
part of the proposition what we have admitted in the first. 

With respect to the third doctrine, it will be easily seen 
that it is still more inconsistent and arbitrary ; for it 
states that we are allowed to apprehend a part only of the 
Absolute, and then it adds that even this part is known to 
us negatively; which means, in reality, that we do not know 
it at all. 

With regard to the first part of the proposition, namely, 
that we know, or are capable of knowing, a portion, a certain 
number of the attributes of the Absolute, but not the whole 
of His nature, — it will be observed that those who hold this 
doctrine break asunder artificially and arbitrarily the unity 
of the Absolute, and, after having thus disfigured, nay, an- 



42 On Science in general. 

nulled the absolute, say, this part of the absolute we can 
know, and this other part we are not allowed to know. But 
how can they say that there is a part, a sphere in the abso- 
lute which is beyond the reach of the mind, if the mind has 
no notion of it? If, on the contrary, the mind has some no- 
tion of it, how can they say that it is beyond the reach of 
the mind ? Besides, is it not one and the same mind that 
apprehends in the one and the same absolute both the part 
which is known and that which is supposed to be unknown ? 
If so, how could I affirm that the part supposed unknown in 
the absolute belongs really to the absolute, and constitutes 
the highest sphere of its nature and existence, if I have not 
actually, or am not allowed to have, any knowledge of it? 
The fact is that the absolute cannot be so dismembered ; for, 
such is the unity of its nature, that of the Absolute, more 
than any of other being, it may be truly said, that, if we can- 
not know all, we can know nothing of it. 

But even granted that it would be rational to admit that 
we know only a part of the Absolute, — if the knowledge we 
possess of it is merely a negative one, such a knowledge is, 
in reality, no knowledge at all. In fact, to possess a negative 
knowledge of a thing, is not to know what this thing is, but 
what it is not. For instance, to have a negative knowledge 
of the triangle is not to know what the triangle is, but that 
the triangle is not a square; or to have a negative knowledge 
of a tree is not to know what the tree is, but that the tree 
is not a mountain; or to have a negative knowledge of the 
good is not to know what the good is, but that the good is 
neither the evil, nor the beautiful, nor any other thing. 
This manner of arguing seems, at first sight, quite plausible ; 
for although I do not know, one would say, what a man is 
doing at the present moment, yet this I perfectly know, that 
he is neither writing, nor reading, nor sleeping, &c. All the 
strength of the argument lies in the assumption that we are 
able to know what a thing is not without knowing in any way 
what it is. Now it is quite plain that we cannot state what 
a thing is not unless we know in some manner what it is — 
unless, in other words, we possess some positive knowledge 
of it. For I must know in a positive manner what a man is 
to affirm that he is neither writing nor sleeping, &c. ; nay, I 



On Science in general. 43 

must know that writing and sleeping are parts of his nature. 
And this connection of positive and negative knowledge is 
still more inseparable in matters eternal and absolute. To 
say that the Infinite is not the Finite requires that I should 
have some positive notion of what the Infinite is. And it is 
by comparing the positive notion of the Infinite with the Fi- 
nite that I am enabled to draw the conclusion that the former 
is not the latter. Had I not some positive notion of the Infi- 
nite I could neither affirm that the Infinite is, nor that it is 
or is not in such and such a manner. 

The fact is that we cannot consistently conceive two 
Sciences, an absolute science and a science which is not ab- 
solute — not any more than we can admit two Reasons, the 
human Reason and the Divine Reason, as substantially dis- 
tinct. For by admitting two Reasons we would not only 
admit that one Reason knows what the other does not know 
— a difference which exists within the limits of the human 
Reason and between man and man — but that what is knowl- 
edge and truth [to the one is not, or may not be, knowledge 
and truth to the other. For if the Reason which apprehends 
mathematical or any other truth, in man, is not the Reason 
which apprehends the same truth in God, or if the Reason 
by which man apprehends God is of a different genus and 
substance from that by which God apprehends himself, all 
human knowledge is a mere delusion. Indeed all relation be- 
tween God and man is at an end if God's and man's Reason 
does not flow from one and the same principle. And this 
would strike at the very root not only of Science but of Re- 
velation also ; as where there is not a community of nature, 
some identical faculty between the master and the disciple, 
there can be no teaching possible, let this take place either 
through an inward inspiration from mind to mind, or by word 
of mouth. Therefore the only solution of the problem — the 
solution which alone will be found, upon an impartial and 
close examination, consistent with science, religion and truth 
— is that the divine and the human reason, springing from one 
and the same source, are, as to their essence, one and the same 
reason.* 

* See also on this question my book, lately published, "The Problem of the 
Absolute." 



44 On Science in general. 

(b) Nature and Characteristics of Science. 

To the uncultivated and unscientific mind Science appears 
as an accident, and a kind of superfluous luxury which is not 
required by any inward want or necessity of human nature. 
This is the point of view of purely sensitive life belonging to 
the undeveloped and elementary stage of existence, either 
national or individual — to what we might call the state of 
childhood and nature. Here the satisfaction of physical 
wants appears as the law of life. For, to quote the argument 
in its popular and crude form, there is necessity in eating 
and drinking, and in removing all unpleasurable sensation ; 
but there is no necessity in learning. 

However, man soon feels that physical life is not the su- 
preme object of his existence, that there are wants of a higher 
order and more cognate with his own nature than physical 
wants, and that the satisfaction of the former is a duty as 
imperative, nay, more imperative, than the satisfaction of the 
latter. For it is this that makes him what he is, a being who 
by his mind holds sway over the inanimate and brute crea- 
tion, adapting it to his spiritual as well as to his material 
wants, elevating thereby the latter to a higher dignity, and 
imparting to them such beauty and perfection as they would 
never have possessed had not the mind stamped them with 
its own perfection. Here man -acknowledges Science and 
reverences it. He acknowledges that Science is an object of 
paramount importance either as a moral and intellectual ne- 
cessity, or as a source of the purest enjoyment, or as a means 
of conquering the blind and unruly forces of Nature. Now 
this acknowledgment is nothing else than the actual expres- 
sion and manifestation of the idea of Science. In fact, the 
idea or notion of Science is, like the ideas of the Infinite, of 
the Beautiful, of Justice, of Number, &c, a primitive, objec- 
tive, and necessary attribute of the mind ; or, more exactly, 
it is a notion that springs from its very essence, and is more 
intimately inherent in it than any other notion, principle, or 
law. For it may be truly said that the mind is more abso- 
lutely and more irresistibly attracted towards Science than 
matter towards its centre ; as a mind not possessing any de- 
sire for knowledge would be a sort of contradictio in termi- 
nis — it would be a mind which is not a mind, an understand- 



On Science in general. 45 

ing which is not an understanding. But this desire for knowl- 
edge, this inward and inextinguishable longing after truth, is 
nothing but a movement of the Intellect towards its natural 
object and nourishment, stimulated, as the Intellect is, by this 
very Idea of Science ; so much so, that were the Idea erased 
from the Intellect, the longing also would thereby be extin- 
guished. 

If it be so, if Science rests on a primary notion or law of the 
mind, to determine the nature and essence of Science we have 
only to describe the essential feature and characteristics of 
this same notion. 

First of all, the notion of Science and the notion of abso- 
lute Science are inseparable, or, more accurately speaking, 
are one and the same notion. All relative and Unite knowl- 
edge conceals under various forms, and more or less visibly, 
an infinite knowledge, from which it emanates and with 
which it is connected by necessary and inward bonds. Thus 
it may be truly said that the natural and predominant aspi- 
ration of the mind is not towards limited but absolute knowl- 
edge — an aspiration that rises with the rising of our intellec- 
tual activity. That world-embracing curiosity, that vague 
but profound and ardent desire for universal knowledge 
which is fermenting as it were in the innermost recess of our 
soul, is nothing else than the aspiration, still obscure and 
indefinite, after absolute science, of which subsequent in- 
quiries are the greatest satisfaction and actual realization. 
This aspiration, or want, or whatever it be called, may 
be traced in every mind ; and the only difference between 
them in this respect is the difference arising from the various 
degrees of their development, or from the influence which 
external and accidental causes — moral, social, and physical — 
exercise upon this development either to promote or to im- 
pede it, as well as from their application to the multifarious 
objects of knowledge and practical activity. And if we close- 
ly examine into the nature of beings, and the constitution of 
the Universe, such differences, far from surprising us, will ap- 
pear as a necessary condition of this existence. Thus all men 
virtually possess the same faculties and instincts, all are en- 
dowed with the same natural aptitude for all social functions. 



46 On Science in general. 

But the unity of the Universe as well as the unity of human 
nature is divided into particular and individual beings, and 
split as it were into fragments ; the necessary consequence of 
which division is that in some beauty, in others morality, 
most predominates ; that one is possessed of a peculiar apti- 
tude for mechanical labor, and another for some liberal or 
intellectual avocation. So it is with science. There is but 
one Science, as there is but one Intellect ; and particular sci- 
ences constitute as many degrees, or stages, of the absolute 
Science. They are so many radii that spring from a central 
focus, from which they derive life, light, and nourishment. 
The natural philosopher who studies matter and its laws 
well knows that his investigations and results possess but a 
limited and relative importance, and are subordinate to a 
superior knowledge, where their justification and ulti- 
mate reason are only to be found. He knows it, or he must 
know it. And if he be not aware of it — if, in consequence of 
a defective intellectual training he concentrates his attention 
and inquiries within the limited sphere of nature, seeking in it 
the ultimate solution of the problem of science, he is certainly 
mistaken in seeking the centre of knowledge where it is not 
to be found. Yet he thereby explicitly acknowledges that 
there is such a centre ; he acknowledges, in other words, the 
existence and necessity of an absolute Science, and it is such 
a science he endeavors to realize. And so it would be with 
Mathematics and with any limited science that would set 
itself up as the ruling power of Intellect and as the Science 
of sciences. This high pretension would not be in keeping 
with the limited object of this investigation, but this would, 
at the same time, bear testimony to the existence of a higher 
object and a higher visual power than their own. Science 
and absolute Science are therefore, in the strict sense of the 
word, identical, and particular sciences are only sciences, inas- 
much as they are parts of the absolute Science, coincide with, 
and are justified by it. Now, as there cannot be two Sciences, 
the second essential character of the really scientific knowl- 
edge is unity. The unity of Science is not the mathematical 
or quantitative unity, but the higher and absolute unity of 
qualities and essences, something like the unity of the human 



On Science in general. 47 

body, or the unity of the Universe*; namely, a whole in which 
the various qualities and essences, the conflicting elements, 
forces, and principles, are so harmoniously adjusted as to 
converge towards one and the same centre, and melt, as it 
were, into a common result ; in other words, Science is essen- 
tially a System. 

There are those who object to systematic knowledge on 
the plea that a system, i.e. a doctrine, which would be, so to 
speak, the reflex of the Universe, embracing the universality 
of things, deducing and connecting them according to some 
rational process, describing their properties and nature, and 
determining the part they play either within their own limited 
sphere or in their relation to the whole, is well nigh, if not 
wholly, impossible. But the difficulty, however great it may 
be, we meet with in the realization of a scheme, is not a test 
against its rationality and usefulness ; and because it is not an 
easy matter to realize a system, it does in no way follow that 
we must not make the attempt, if Science be, as it evidently is, 
a system. On the contrary, the consequence to be naturally 
drawn therefrom is, that the more systematic the investiga- 
tion, the more accurate and complete the result. And it 
ought to be borne in mind, that the difficulty we find in real- 
izing a perfect system may be said to beset all knowledge, 
the knowledge of the most rudimentary and minute object — 
of a pebble, of an insect — so that this argument belongs to 
the category of those which overshoot the mark, or, as lo- 
gicians say, proving too much prove nothing. Indeed, if 
the matter be attentively inquired into, it will be seen that 
the difficulty in explaining the nature of particular beings 
chiefly arises from the absence of systematic knowledge, 



* This is an important distinction ; for, misled by mathematical notions, we 
are apt to represent to ourselves the unity of things as an empty and abstract 
mathematical unity. But the unity of force, the unity of the soul, the unity of 
God, are neither points nor numbers, but are indivisible wholes, containing 1 quality 
and quantity as well as the various attributes that constitute their nature. When 
we say that the soul is — that it possesses sensibility, will, intellect, &c, we count 
its attributes, and in this respect there is quantity in it ; but the connection or 
unity of these faculties and qualities is not a numerical but an essential unity — 
the unity of the essence of the soul. Besides, the unity of thought that thinks, 
and is all things, cannot be the mathematical unit. (See below "§ 3. On 
Thought.") 



48 On Science in general. \ 

which precludes the mind from perceiving their connection 
with collateral beings and with the whole. For the part 
thus singled out and dissevered from the whole is not the 
same being as when connected with the whole. The eye 
which is separated from the body is no longer an eye but a 
dead and useless object; and the dissection and analysis of 
the anatomist, however careful and minute, is unable to repro- 
duce the real eye, the eye that was in union with the whole 
organism, with life, with the mind, and through the mind 
with the Universe. The leaf which has fallen from the tree 
has ceased to be a leaf; and if we continue to call it so, it is 
from the remembrance of its former connection with the 
whole plant. But as soon as this connection is broken, its 
growth, its beauty, and all its other functions and purposes, 
are broken also. Thus it is with Science. Science which 
disconnects and scatters knowledge, and breaks asunder the 
unity of things — the golden chain from which the Universe 
is suspended — converts a full, concrete and living being into 
an unmeaning, lifeless and purposeless object. Moreover, 
by admitting that Science is not a system, we admit that 
knowledge may be gathered at random, and that we are able 
to obtain it without deducing and disposing our thoughts and 
inquiries according to their natural and necessary connection 
— an opinion contradictory to the very notion of science, as well 
as to the universal nature of things, since nothing can either 
be rationally thought or exist which is not a system. The 
beauty, the proportion, the unity, we admire in the Universe 
is nothing else than a systematic arrangement — an arrange- 
ment which is not confined to the general outline and to the 
framework of the structure, but extends to all its parts and 
penetrates into its most minute details, thus filling alike the 
intellect and the imagination with wonder and delight. This 
applies equally to Science ; for, whether Science be consid- 
ered as the representation of the Universe, or the Universe 
as the representation of Science, the conclusion to be drawn, 
in either supposition, is that knowledge must be a sys- 
tem, and consequently that where there is no system there 
must be error, confusion, a medley of inordinate and irrecon- 
cilable elements. For to gather knowledge unsystematically 
is either to take up questions, notions and principles at ran- 



On Science in general. 49 

dom, without defining their nature, meaning and bearing,* 
or to consider a part as if it were a whole,f or the whole as if 
it had no parts and could exist without them^: ; or to bring 
together things irreconcilable, and to separate things neces- 
sarily connected; or to confound things that are distinct by 
mixing their provinces, and forcing the nature of one upon 
that of the other §; or to admit or deny in a certain form the 
the very same things that had been denied or admitted in 
another.] 

* Thus it is. for instance, that we use the notion infinite, applying it indiscri- 
minately to different objects, and saying that God is infinite; that Space is infinite; 
that Number. Beauty. &c, are infinite, without inquiring what an infinite being 
is or can be, nor how these various objects can be infinite. We deal in the same 
manner with other notions, and the mo*t important, as God, Force, Being, Ob- 
ject, &c. For instance, we say. God is a Being. Man is a Bring, the Plant is a 
Being, without inquiring into the meaning involved in the notion Being, or if it 
is the same notion which is applied to these different objects, and. if the same, 
how it can be applied to them. 

f This is the way in which the different parts of Science are generally han- 
dled: Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Psychology, Art, Religion. &c , are considered 
irrespectively of each other, and as if each of them constituted a whole. And 
within the province of each separate branch of knowledge, particular subjects 
are handled in the same manner. Hence exclusive, one-sided theories, as. for in- 
stance, in Psychological Science, the theory that deduces the whole mind from 
sensation; in Morals, the theories which identify all motives either with pleas- 
ure or with interest; in Art, the theories that concentrate beauty either inform 
or in expression; in Politics, all theories which, instead of embracing the various 
wants, tendencies and interests of the socinl body, single out some particular 
want or principle, and violently merge, as it were, the whole body politic into it. 

| When, for instance, we say that the cause is perfect without its effect, or the 
substance without its acciiences. Under the same head may be ranged those doc- 
trines which strip a substance or a principle of its attributes. modes, or qualities 
—matter, for instance, of color, form, weight. &c— the soul of sensibility, will, 
imagination, &c— which they consider as non-essential, pretending that matter 
or the soul could exist without them ; just a«, in another province, some l'oliti- 
cians would banish force, inequality, war from the State, which thej^ consider as 
unessential elements of social life. 

\ This is one of the most common errors, as it is difficult to draw an exact 
line of demarcation between the various beings and spheres of existence. Thus 
it is that we transfer from one being or from one province of knowledge or ex- 
istence to another the qualities, laws, and attributes, which belong only to the 
former. In this respect the inductive and analogical processes are the greatest 
source of inadvertencies and misconceptions. 

|| This inadvertency may be frequently observed in common life, where men 
will admit the very same proposal, opinion, and principle, they had formerly 
rejected, and which they would still reject unless it were put to them in a differ- 
ent form Instances of the same error are not uncommon in science and in the 
most important questions. For instance, there are. doctrines which draw an 



50 On Science in general. 

We say, then, that absolute Science is one, and that it is 
one as a system. 

But to know in the absolute sense of the word is not only 
to think and to apprehend, but to be the object of knowledge. 
In fact Science is neither Thought without Being, nor Being 
without Thought, as neither Thought which involves no real 
object, nor any real object which is not thought, constitute 
Science. Science is therefore the unity of thought and being — 
the object thought — or it is Thought par excellence, thought 
which is become adequate to its object, and in the nature of 
which the object has been so merged and absorbed as to make 
one and the same thing. The unity of the Universe is not to 
be found in the absolute Being, or in the absolute Substance, 
but in the absolute Thought and Knowledge in which the 
Being and the Substance as well as all other principles are 
involved, and attain their highest and fullest existence. Be- 
ing and Substance without Science are like the body without 
the mind, or Nature without the Spirit. 

We say, then, that to know is to be, and I will add that it 
is to be in the fullest acceptation of the word. The difficulty 
we find in perceiving the truth and importance of this prin- 
ciple is mainly due to a deficiency in the training of our 
speculative faculty, which keeps our mind within the bounds 
of sensation, of experience and induction, and conceals from 
its sight other and higher realities — realities without which 
experience itself, and all things appertaining to it, could 
neither exist nor be apprehended. In fact, if we start from 
experience, — holding it as the criterion of reality, the iden- 
tity of knowing and being, is, I admit, inconceivable. For 
to apprehend a tree is not to be a tree, and to apprehend the 
lire is not to be the fire and to burn ; so that here thought 



absolute separation between the substance of God and the substance of the world, 
and then when they come to determine the nature and attributes of the Godhead 
they realize them in conformity with our own, assigning to God our own facul- 
ties — a Personality, a Consciousness, a mode of loving and governing the world 
modelled upon our own corresponding attributes ; so much so, that, according 
to this manner of viewing the subject, the popular dictum, that man is made in 
the image of God, ought to be reversed, and said that God is made in the image of 
Man. It will be observed that formal Logic is unable to supply any rule or cri- 
terion by the aid of which the mind could guard against these or other similar 
errors, as it is only by inquiring into the matter and objective nature of things 
that they can be discovered and avoided. 



On Science in general. 51 

and its object are beings distinct and separable. But if we 
admit, as we must admit, that besides and above the visible 
and experimental there is an invisible and transcendent Re- 
ality, that this latter Reality is the principle of the former, 
and that, being beyond the reach of the senses, it can only 
be apprehended by pure thought — by thought freed from 
sensation and all experimental elements — the difficulty will 
be more easily solved. 

To elucidate this point, let us consider the two propositions, 
God is — This flower is. Here, deceived by the identity of 
the word is, and by the habit of picturing to ourselves all 
reality in a material and sensible form, we apply to the word 
the same meaniDg in both instances, and thus are led to real- 
ize the Being of God as the Being of a flower or of any other 
object falling under the senses. Now, it may be easily per- 
ceived that the meaning involved in the is of the one propo- 
sition is entirely different, nay, the reverse of that which is 
involved in the is of the other. For the Being or the to Be 
of God is not the Being of the flower, and were we to con- 
ceive His Being in any manner similar to that of an external 
and phenomenal object, not only would we distort but sup- 
press at once the notion and existence of God. Consequently, 
when we say that God is, we mean, if we mean anything, that 
He is in a purely intelligible and ideal manner, and that He 
can be apprehended through that faculty which alone is able 
to reach the eternal and the absolute, by whatever name it 
be designated, whether it be called Reason, or Intellect, or 
Speculative Thought. Whence it follows also that the ex- 
istence of God is quite the reverse of the existence of finite 
and phenomenal beings, and that, in order to form a correct 
notion of Him, we must strive to remove from our mind all 
trace of experience, and set its visual power, so to speak, in 
antagonism with it. And these considerations not only apply 
to God, but to all principles, causes, and essences. For nei- 
ther God, nor any principle whatever, can be apprehended 
through experimental process, and it is only by a fallacy 
and delusion of the inductive method that we are led to be- 
lieve that metaphysical science can be founded on experi- 
mental knowledge ; it is from inconsistency, and by leaping 
over instead of filling up the gap — nay, by tacitly and un- 



52 On Science in general. 

wittingly presupposing the very notion and principle it pro- 
fesses to draw from its operation — that experimental method 
concludes the infinite and eternal from the finite and tempo- 
ral. Were it consistent, as phenomena, facts, effects— all, in 
one word, that comes within the pale of experience is change- 
able and perishable — the conclusion ought to be that prin- 
ciples, causes, and essences, are changeable and perishable 
also. Thus, for instance, as motion, force, light, heat, &c, 
when considered in particular phenomena, are continually 
perishing and reviving, the inference would be that the prin- 
ciples of these phenomena are subject to the same alternate 
movement of destruction and revival ; or that the cause, what- 
ever it be, that produces man is mortal, because man is mor- 
tal — and similar examples — which would be simply absurd, 
as nothing could be, nor be restored to life when destroyed, 
if its principles were liable either to alteration or destruction. 
Accordingly, the nature and knowledge — the Being and 
Knowing — of principles and essences, differ from the nature 
and knowledge of their products — facts, phenomena, effects. 
And if we contrast the former with the latter we shall see, 
1°. that, for the very reason that the former are the creative 
essences of things, their nature remains unimpaired and un- 
diminished in the begetting of them ; 2°. that they possess a 
purely ideal and intelligible nature, — indeed they are ideas, 
as we will see hereafter, and as such they cannot be felt, or 
brought within an}^ sensuous shape, or any point of time and 
space, but only be apprehended by pure thought ; 3°. that, 
from their being creative essences, they produce the effect 
without mingling their eternal and impassible nature with it> 
like the hand, or, still more truly, like the mind, that pro- 
duces the work without being reacted upon by it and receiv- 
ing the imprint of it ; thus it is that Death destroys without 
destroying itself, and fire burns without burning itself out;* 
and 4°. that, because of their possessing a pure and intelligi- 
ble nature, thought can think them in their intelligible ex- 
istence — thinking the fire, for instance, the light, the air, as 
well as the G-ood, the Beautiful, &c, and when thinking them 

* This elucidates the theory of the First mover of Aristotle, naaieJy, of the 
Mover who moves All without moving itself, or being moved. 



On Thought. 53 

in their objective and essential nature, being the fire, the 
light, &c, &c, and keeping clear at the same time from their 
effects. 

§ 3. On Thought. 

This will be better understood if we give a deeper insight 
into the nature of Thought, of Science, and their eternal and 
inseparable object — namely, Ideas, and the relation in which 
they stand to each other. 

To know is to think, and it is to think in the highest sense 
of the word. Now thought is not only the faculty from whose 
inexhaustible depths springs all knowledge, but it constitutes 
also the highest essence and the culminating point of exist- 
ence. The old adage that man is a microcosm has only a 
meaning when applied to thought. For thought alone pos- 
sesses the privilege, shared by no other faculty or being, of 
thinking itself and all other things, and of thinking them as 
within itself, and as objects not only cognate to, but identical 
with, its own nature. There is no being, whatever be its 
nature and properties, there is no point of space, actually or 
possibly, without the reach of thought. The infinite and the 
finite, the invisible and the visible world, the numberless 
variety of beings with their numberless qualities, difference 
and opposition, all equally meet in the depths of thought as 
in their common centre. Indeed it is in thought that the Uni- 
verse attains its highest perfection. The external world, by 
being thought and in thought, is made partaker of a dignity, 
beauty, and perfection, it does not possess in itself. For it 
is witliin the mind that Nature attains its ideal and essential 
existence, whilst without the mind Nature's existence is frag- 
mentary, scattered, destitute of inward bond or unity. It is 

* As far as we can conceive God. But this must not be lost sight of, namely, 
that God, like all other things, is only known to us through thought, and that 
beyond thought His being is for us =0. It is one of the popular inadvertencies 
to believe that we can reach God through any other faculty— sentiment, intuition, 
or whatever be its name — but thought, although sentiment and intuition are 
only inferior forms of thought, or thought which is still mixed with sensation, 
and unable to perceive truth in its pure essence. We possess the sentiment of 
God as we possess the sentiment of ourselves, of mathematical truth, and of all 
things in general — which sentiment is a dim perception of these objects, or con- 
fused and imperfect thought, involving inconsistencies and delusion, a mixture 
of light and shade, of truth and error. 



54 On Thought. 

an external juxtaposition of beings unconscious of them- 
selves as well as of their mutual connection. Nor can we 
conceive, either in God or in man, anything more excellent 
than thought. Indeed it constitutes in both the very excel- 
lence of their nature.* In man, his whole being,, so to speak, 
supposes thought, and is thought. Take away thought from 
him and he ceases to be what he is, the most wonderful 
amongst created beings, and he will find himself lowered to 
the level of the brute and inanimate creation. All his activity, 
internal as well as external, flows from thought ; and there is 
no manifestation of it, from the most profound researches and 
the highest soarings of imagination to the most humble occu- 
pation, in which thought stands not foremost and is not the 
motive power of action. Will, imagination, memory, self- 
consciousness, and even the faculty that stands, as it were, 
on the limit of the physical and the spiritual worlds, of the 
body and soul — Sensation I mean — are not merely impelled 
by thought, but thought is their essential element — nay, they 
are different forms or instruments of thought. For there is 
thought in Sensation as well as in any other faculty and 
mental operation, and not only is it through thought that 
sensation is inwardly felt by the soul, but the external ob- 
ject that produces sensation is likewise apprehended by 
it. Thought constitutes, therefore, the unity of the human 
being, of mind and body, and of their connection with the 
universe*; and if it constitutes the highest essence and per- 

* Those who place this unity in the brain as the centre of the nervous system, 
or those who localize the soul by assigning it a particular place, either in the 
brain, like Descartes (glandula pinealis), or in any other part of the body, are 
deceived by external and sensuous representation which lead them to assimilate 
the unity of the soul to something- like the spider feeling in the centre of the 
cobweb the insect that skims over its threads. But quite different is the unity 
of the human being. Here the centre is everywhere and nowhere; and the sen- 
sation is not felt in a central point, but all over the body and in every part of it. 
Moreover, all sensation, however different and opposite — as the sensation of pain 
and pleasure, of light and darkness, of heat and cold, &c. — may be compared and 
brought into a unity, though felt by different senses and in different parts of the 
body. From the fact that we feel thinking in the brain, and that the more in- 
tense is thought, the more it seems to concentrate itself in this part of the body, it 
does not follow that thought has its seat in the brain, and much less that the brain 
is the faculty of thinking, but merely that the brain is the main instrument of 
thought, as the eye is the instrument of vision and the ear of hearing. I say the 
main; for all the senses and organs of the body are instruments of thought, as 



On Thought. 55 

fection, it follows that everything is made for it and is sub- 
ordinate to it; that it is thought that will impart light, vigor 
and life to individuals as well as nations, and that where the 
internal activity of thought is declining there the external 
also will languish or become extinct. Such is thought, the 
most stupendous of beings ! In the presence of Nature, be- 
fore the huge masses that move in space, the vast expanse of 
the water, the sun and the planets, and the bodies innumera- 
ble with which the vault of heaven is studded, we are struck 
with wonder and awe. How much more will thought appear 
worthy of our admiration if we bear in mind, that not only 
these objects but the Universe is concentrated in thought, 
and that the ultimate reason of all that exists and will exist 
is apprehended by thought, and is thought! For thought 
that constitutes the excellence of the human, constitutes also 
the excellence of the divine nature. God is the absolute and 
eternal thought. This is the highest definition of God, His 
preeminent attribute and perfection. The omnipotence, 
the love, the providence, as well as the goodness and justice 
of God are subordinate attributes and modes of His Being. 
All presuppose thought, and it is by coming, as it were, in 
contact with thought, that they attain their highest power 
and perfection. Thus the love of God is the thought of the 
eternal ideas which are His perfection, a love embracing the 
love of Himself and the love of the external manifestation 
of ideas, or the World ; which shows that the love of God 
towards the world cannot be love towards individuals^ nor 
even towards nations, but towards the Whole, and that the 
parts are only loved by God inasmuch as they harmonize 
with the Whole, and contribute to its preservation and the 
fulfilment of the law, which is the eternal thought of God. 
And thus it is that what is wisdom and love in the sight 
of man may be foolishness and hatred in the sight of God. 

it is not the eye that sees, nor the ear that hears, but it is thought that sees and 
hears through the instrumentality of the organ. Besides, any theory attempt- 
ing to explain the unity and nature of thought, or the unity and nature of the 
human being, by some organic function or arrangement, will run aground not 
only against abstract and speculative arguments, but against experience itself. 
For it is a fact that thought apprehends the infinite, the eternal, and the abso- 
lute, and consequently cannot be circumscribed within the boui ds of corporeal 
organs. 



56 On Thought. 

This applies also to His Providence. The providence of God 
is His eternal and immutable thought, which is the law out 
of and according to which all things are made and gov- 
erned. The government of the World is implied in the very 
essence of things, as everything must be made and governed 
according to its special essence. Therefore to think is in God 
to govern and to foresee, and to govern through and to fore- 
see in the immutable essence of things. This is the rational 
notion of the Providence and Prescience of God, the only no : 
tion in conformity with the majesty and excellence of His 
nature. To realize God as actually foreseeing and regulating 
all single and daily events, all transient phenomena and 
accidents, is to degrade and lower Him to the level of finite 
beings. 

Note. — The popular doctrine is that God not only governs the world through 
general laws, but that His Providence extends to all particular events, and to the 
minutest details of this vast and wonderful machinery. For it is agreed, if there 
were events — nay, one single event — that should not be predetermined by God, 
God's Providence would not embrace all things, and consequently God would not 
be All-powerful, which is contradictory to the notion of the Deity. The same 
argument applies to His Prescience. Those who rest their doctrine on this and 
similar arguments do not perceive that they fall, and still more deeply, into the 
difficulty they pretend to avoid; for against this mode of arguing it may be 
retorted, that if it be contradictory to the notion of God that God's Providence 
should not embrace all things, it is much more at variance with the whole of 
His nature that He who is the Absolute and Perfect Being should busy Himself 
with individual beings and particular and transitory events, however unworthy 
they may be of His providential care. But we deal with God in a more off-hand way 
than we are wont to do with our fellow-creatures. For we would think it dero- 
gatory in the sovereign to descend from his high station and perform menial or 
inferior duties, or in the judge to carry out with his own hands the prescription 
of the law; but with God we are not so considerate and reverential, and He must 
have a h md in all our daily affairs, no matter how irreconcilable they may be 
with His majesty and perfections. And this is done to shield Him. as it were, 
from imperfection, and to describe Him in the fulness of His nature and exist- 
ence! The fact is that such representation of God is sheer anthropomorphism; 
nay. it is the heathenish conception oi the Deity, glossed over with a kind of 
nominal Spiritualism. For, in reality, we make Him love, foresee, and govern, 
as we do love, foresee, and govern; and we force upon Him what we call our 
Personality and Consciousness, adding, it is true, that all such attributes and 
faculties are infinite in Him, but taking care, at the same time, not to state what 
an infinite Love, an infinite Providence, an infinite Personality is or can be. In 
fact, if the matter were more closely gone into, it would become manifest that an 
infinite love, an infinite personality, &c, are mere vain and empty words, calcu- 
lated only to mislead the mind, if we realize God's lo>e and personality like 
man's. The heathenish representation of God would then be at least more con- 
sistent. For if love in God be what love in man is, God must love as man does; 



On Thought 57 

and if God's government of the Universe be what man's government is, Jupiter 
must convene his council in Olympus as Agamemnon in the camp, and frown 
when in anger, and drink and eat as man does when impelled by thirst and hun- 
ger, except that he will partake of some unknown and immortal nourishment. 
And what is still stranger in the matter is, that if any one come forward and 
suggest that these and the like'representations of God — namely, all representa- 
tions drawn from experience, analogy, and induction — are not only inadequate, 
but fallacious and at variance with the very nature of God; and that the only 
way by which we can form a correct and true notion of the Deity is through 
purely intellectual and speculative processes, as God is not only a Being that no 
experimental process can reach, but rather the reverse of all we know through 
experience; — if any one, I say, come forward and hold such a doctrine, some will 
object that they do not understand it, and that it is too subtle for their percep- 
tion; others, that they have neither leisure nor taste for such inquiries, and that 
they rest satisfied with the popular and current notions on the matter ; and 
finally, others, that all speculation is the delusion of a visionary brain that 
mistakes its own phantoms for realities, not unfrequently exciting against it 
popular ignorance and prejudice by branding it with the name of Pantheism, of 
Atheism and Infidelity. Surely, if there be Atheism and Infidelity, all doctrine 
that inculcates an irrational and erroneous notion of the Godhead deserves such 
a name; and if there be Pantheism, the doctrine that teaches that God predeter- 
mines and foresees everything, and that there is not a single event in which God 
has not a share, is Pantheism of the coarsest description. That God is All, and 
"that all things are in God. is a sound— nay, it is the only rational doctrine. For all 
things must come from God, if they do not come from nought; but if they come 
from God, were they even created ex nihilo, there must be something of God — a 
spark of the divine essence — in them. Consequently, those who hold that God 
is in the World, and that the World is in God, hold a rational tenet. In fact, 
this parental connexion of God with the World is that which, on the one hand, 
imparts to the World and to everything that is in it whatever being and 
perfection they possess, and which, on the other hand, completes, as it w r ere, 
the perfection of God Himself. For if we separate, substantially and abso- 
lutely, God and the World, we do not only impair and curtail the being of 
the World but that of God also. We curtail the being of the World, by 
separating it from its principle; we curtail the being of God, by admitting 
that the substance of the World is independent of God, and, consequently, by 
admitting twj absolute substances. And the creatio ex nihilo would not fill up the 
gap, as the creatio ex nihilo could not affect the principles and essences of things, 
which under any supposition, must be coeternal with God. But if God be All, 
He is not so in the sense that He is every individual being and every single phe- 
nomenon — so that if I am joyful or sorrowful He should rejoice and grieve with 
me, or that He should be the insect that crawls or the seed that grows upon the 
earth — but in the sense that He is the principle of all things, and that all things 
find their ultimate reason, their essence, in Him. Thus, being the principle, He 
is not %\hat the thing is of which He is the principle. And, being All in this 
high sense of the word, He is not what the individual and fragmentary part is. 
It is because joy and sorrow, as well as life and death, come from Him, that He 
does neither rejoice nor grieve, neither come to life nor end in death. For should 
He come to life or end in death He could give neither life nor death; and if He 
felt joy and sorrow as we do He could be the principle of neither, as they would 
b^ sent to Him as they are sent to us. Besides, being All and the Absolute, He 
is liable neither to want, nor loss, nor to any increase of perfections, which are 



58 On Thought. 

the conditions of joy and sorrow and of all similar modifications and changes 
through which the finite and mortal being must pass. Again, the seed that 
becomes and the seed that is (the essence) are two different seeds. The former 
we see and touch, the latter we think only. But that which we think only, is 
eternal and immortal. God is the Thought, the Idea, the Essence of the Universe — 
this is the highest and absolute definition of God, a definition in which are com- 
prised His Providence, His Love, His Power, and all His perfections. For the 
Thought of God is the Providence of things, and, for the very reason it is the 
essence, it is the Providence of each being particularly. The Providence of the 
plant is its idea, according to which it is born, it grows and dies. And so it is 
with everything. And, knowing and being the idea, God need not extend His 
care to individual beings, as not only the knowledge and being of the latter are 
involved in the knowledge and being of the former, but they find in the former 
their highest and perfect existence. Thus, for instance,- in the knowledge and 
being of the ideal triangle are comprised all material triangles, whatever be their 
size, form, and position, as in the knowledge and being of the ideal man — genus 
or species — are involved the knowledge and being of all men. Consequently, it 
must be laid down as a fundamental principle of metaphysical science that God 
is in the World, and that He is not in the World; that He is All things in their 
idea, and as a Whole, and in the Unity of their existence; and that He is not All 
things individually, or in their particular and fragmentary existence. 



] 



On Ideas. 59 



CHAPTER IV. 
§ 1. On Ideas. 

The universality and unity of Knowledge as well as the 
universality and unity of Being require a principle which 
should extend to all things and embrace all things in the 
unity of its nature. This principle, we have seen, is Thought. 
Viewed in this light the various branches of knowledge may 
be considered as constituting the various branches or stages 
of Thought, and then, according to this notion, Logic would 
represent a special province of Thought. But it will be easily 
perceived that this mode of viewing Logic, though abstract- 
ly correct, cannot convey a concrete and full notion of this 
Science unless we previously define the object of Thought in 
general, the subject-matter; or, to use more familiar expres- 
sions, the principles and laws with which Thought is inva- 
riably and absolutely concerned, as well as their import and 
bearing with relation both- to Knowing and Being. 

This leads us to the fundamental and decisive Problem of 
Science, the Problem which lies, under various forms, at the 
bottom of all others, and constitutes, as it were, the keystone 
of the whole edifice , I mean the Problem of Ideas. The two 
main points we shall have to elucidate on this subject are 

1°. The relation of Ideas to Thought and Knowledge, or what 
has been termed the subjective and psychological Pro- 
blem of Ideas. 

2°. The intrinsic value of Ideas, or the Ideas considered in 
themselves and in their essential existence, i.e. the ob- 
jective and ontological Problem of Ideas. 

It must be observed that these two Problems are but two 
aspects of one and the same thing, and may be comprehended 
in a general query, namely, " Are Ideas at once the princi- 
ples of Knowledge and the principles of Being?" — a point 
which must be constantly kept in view in the course of the 
following investigation. 

If to know is to think, to think is, in its turn, to possess 
the idea of the object apprehended by Thought — Thought 



60 On Ideas. 

and Idea are inseparable. Thought embodies itself in Idea, 
and Idea embodies itself in Thought. Where there is no 
idea there is no thought, and where there is no thought there 
is no idea.* The clearness and fulness of Thought are in 
proportion to the clearness and fulness with which Idea is 
apprehended by it. To possess distinct and complete ideas 
is the natural impulse and the most inward want of Thought ; 
and to evolve them out of the obscure and confused mass of 
facts, images, and sensations, incessantly flowing into the 
soul, constitutes its permanent labor and highest enjoyment. 
Sentiment, heart, feeling, intuition, are, as we have already 
observed, inferior stages or forms of Thought. Here thought 
is still enveloped in nature and sensation, not having reached 
the clear and pure perception of ideas. Yet, even at this 
stage, Idea is present, though dimly, in Thought ; and what- 
ever value and truth the latter possesses, it is from Idea it is 
derived. The sentiment of G-od, of the Beautiful, of the Soul, 
of any internal or external object, is inferior to the clear per- 
ception — the idea — of them. But whatever truth is in it, it is 
Idea that imparts it. Let, for instance, the idea of God be 
erased from the mind, and with the idea all perception and 
sentiment of the Deity will be extinguished.-)- 
But, in order to establish still more incontestibly the inti- 

* Ideas cannot exist in their general form and unity — i.e. as ideas — in nature 
and without Thought. From which will also be seen that those who, like Spi- 
noza or the Materialists, see in Substance or in Matter the universal principle and 
substratum of things, overlook the fact that Substance, Matter, Being, as well as 
the Good and the Beautiful, are attributes or essences subordinate to Thought. 
For Thought comprehends them, whilst it is not comprehended by them. And 
it comprehends them in the twofold manner in which we use the word; for it 
understands them, and, for the very reason that it understands them, it contains 
them in the manner in which Thought contains all things — namely, spiritually 
and ideally — in their highest form and perfection. 

+ It may be said that the progress not only of Science but of Religion is 
nothing else than an evolution of ideas. For instance, all Religions are founded 
on the belief in the existence of God, and in this respect there is no difference 
between them. Consequently they can differ only in the manner in which they 
realize God. And it is immaterial whether it is through Faith or through Sci- 
ence that God is realized: for in both cases there mast be a notion of God; and 
the more correct the notion, the truer the Religion. Those who pretend to found 
Religion exclusively on the Word of God, forget the simple but most glaring fact 
that the Word of God must be apprehended and received by the mind, and con- 
sequently that the mind must possess some notion through which it perceives 
the existence of God and the truths contained in His Word. 



On Ideas. 61 

mate connection of Thought and Ideas, let ns analyze Thought 
in its most rudimentary operation, in that state in which it 
hardly distinguishes itself from the external world — I mean 
sensation. For there are those who will admit that Thought 
cannot think GJ-od, the True, the Beautiful, and other trans- 
cendent objects, save through an idea, but who will not 
acknowledge the idea of sensation. However, it is easy to 
see that the idea of sensation is as necessary to apprehend 
sensation as the ideas of God, of the Beautiful, &c, are neces- 
sary to apprehend God and the Beautiful. For sensation, to 
be felt, must be thought, and thought as something deter- 
mined, and different from any other phenomenon and sub- 
jective modification. Now what determines Thought in 
sensation is the idea of sensation, as the idea of triangle de- 
termines thought in the apprehension of the triangle, and the 
idea of God in the apprehension of God. It may be supposed 
that it is the external object that produces both the organic 
modification — the impression — and the internal apprehension 
of the phenomenon by Thought. But it must be observed 
that the external object as well as the organic modification 
that follows the impression are converted into mental phe- 
nomena by their coming in contact with Thought, and con- 
sequently they are unable to produce an effect which it is 
beyond their nature and faculty to produce. Moreover, the 
very idea by which the mind apprehends the corresponding 
phenomenon must needs be previously contained in Thought, 
and cannot be imprinted in it as an image in wax. For, on 
the one hand, ideas are neither images, nor symbols, nor any 
material representation, bur pure and merely intellectual 
elements, and, on the other hand, not only do they precede 
the impression, but before and after the impression they 
distinguish themselves from it. 

This brings before us the xexata quosstio of the origin 
of Ideas, a question which in our days and since Kant's labor 
has lost much of its importance,* but upon which I have 
deemed it necessary to dwell at some length, as to form a 

* Because since Kant it 'has been more clearly perceived that the main and 
decisive point in the problem of ideas is not to determine whether ideas are in- 
nate or derived from experience, but what is their objective meaning and func- 
tion; in other words, their essential and absolute nature. 



62 On Ideas. 

correct and clear notion of the nature of ideas we must em- 
brace them in their various aspects ; and, besides, the eluci- 
dation of this point will pave the way to the solution of the 
ontological problem. 

If Thought and Ideas be inseparable, either ideas are given 
with and in thought, i.e. are innate, or not only ideas but 
ideas and thought must equally be derived from experience. 
This is the real and rational position of the problem, and 
when considered from this point of view its solution will 
more readily be arrived at. In fact, those who deny the 
inneity of ideas will perceive that they deny at the same time 
the preexistence of the mind to sensation and experience. 
To hold that the mind alone precedes experience, but ideas 
are gradually brought into the mind by it, is in reality to 
hold that the mind is not the mind, if it be true that the essen- 
tial business of the mind is to think and to know, and that 
there is neither thinking nor knowing without ideas. But, 
even granted that the mind and ideas were not so intimately 
connected as to be inseparable, the very fact that the mind 
is capable of forming ideas (a fact which those who pretend 
to draw our mental constitution and activity out of the mate- 
rials furnished by experience are obliged to admit, but which 
they explain by the process — equally possessed by the mind 
— of generalization), this very fact, I say, shows how untena- 
ble the ground is upon which the sensualistic doctrine rests. 
The capabilities of a being constitute its nature, and the 
bringing of them into play constitutes its actual existence 
and operation. The capability of wood is to burn and that 
of powder to explode, and these capabilities are involved in 
their inward and essential constitution. So likewise the capa- 
bility possessed by the mind of forming ideas is nothing else 
than the preexistence in the mind of these very ideas; which 
means, in other words, that to think through and according 
to ideas is what constitutes the mind's whole essence and 
activity.* And we shall arrive at the same result if we 

* The so-called laws of Thought are nothing- else than ideas. For instance, 
the laws of causality , of action and reaction, or that the whole is greater than the 
part, &c., are only ideas and relations of ideas, such as. cause and effect, action 
and reaction, etc., and it is by applying these ideas to phenomena that we name 
and distinguish them. As we handle here the problem of ideas in a general way. 
we will not filter into the question relating to the difference between category 



On Ideas. 63 

examine the manner in which experimental philosophers 
profess to explain the formation of ideas, namely, the well- 
known process of generalization. In fact, generalization 
presupposes ideas; for to generalize is, according to the 
definition of these philosophers, to deduce from individual, 
transient and scattered phenomena a general, fixed and indi- 
visible notion. Now it is plain that this result would be 
unattainable unless the very notion which, it is pretended, 
is brought out by this operation, preexisted in the mind; 
for it is the presence of the notion in the mind that in- 
duces the latter to generalize, and therefore, were the notion 
abolished, the generalizing process would cease with the 
principle that produces it. To speak more correctly, there is 
no generalization at all, and what is called generalization is 
merely the successive and partial application of ideas to sin- 
gle phenomena. Let us take an instance, the general idea of 
man. According to the empirical doctrine this idea would 
be formed in the following manner : "We perceive through 
the senses a certain number of men, we abstract from each 
individual man some common qualities, and these common 
qualities which are scattered in each individual we combine 
and unite so as to compose the general notion, man. This 
process seems very simple, and well-adapted to account for 
the presence of ideas in the mind, whilst it escapes the 
popular argument directed against this inneity, and found- 
ed upon the fact that we are not aware in childhood of 
possessing any general idea, our mind being then exclusive- 
ly occupied with sensations and phenomena of the obscurest 
and most fleeting kind — a fact showing, it is assumed, that 
ideas are subsequently and gradually formed upon materi- 
als furnished by experience. Tnis argument, I say, seems 
very simple, and the more cogent as it is founded upon 
psychological experience ; but it will be seen, upon close ex- 
amination, that it mutilates and perverts the very experience 
from which it is deduced. In fact, if things were to take place 



and idea as established by Kant. It will suffice to say that what Kant calls cate- 
gory is nothing else but the idea, taken only in its abstract form, as a form or 
element of the understanding (Verstand), and not in its concrete and real unity. 
in its systematic existence, and as it is in reason (Ve?-nu?ift), which constitutes 
the speculative idea in the strict Hegelian sense. 



64 On Ideas. 

as it is stated, ideas would come from naught ; for whence 
could ideas be derived, experience supplying only individual, 
fugitive and isolated elements ? And how could these ele- 
ments be collected and so combined as to form a unity, if this 
unity — the idea — do not preexist in Thought? Besides, each 
of these particular elements — sensations, phenomena, and 
representation of material objects — in order to be transformed 
into a general notion, must be singled out, determined, and 
named (the first as well as the second, and the whole series), 
as it is presented to the mind, otherwise it would mean and 
represent nothing, and then the pretended formation of ideas 
could not take place. But to name and discriminate a phe- 
nomenon a preexisting idea is necessary, and the very idea 
to which the phenomenon is referred, let it be a man, a sen- 
sation, a phenomenon of light, of heat, &c. For when we 
generalize the different men, or phenomena of light, heat, 
&c, we do not generalize indiscriminately or in an indeter- 
minate manner, but we refer each successive representation 
to a distinct idea, which for the very reason that it names 
and determines each of these phenomena distinguishes itself, 
as we have already observed, from each of them, and conse- 
quently must need precede them as well as continue after 
they have disappeared. 

With regard to the other part of the argument, namely, 
that ideas cannot be inherent in the mind because we are not 
conscious of their presence in childhood, it comes to this, 
that there is no law regulating our digestive or visual power, 
or any other organic function, because we digest, see, walk, 
without being aware of, or inquiring into, these laws ; and, 
agreeably to this criterion, it ought to be said that these, or 
any other laws, begin to exist only when we become aware 
of them, and not before ; and straining the consequences, that 
they exist for those who are conscious, but not for those who 
are unconscious of their existence. This is the real import 
of the argument, which shows that it is no argument at all. 
In fact, the subjective state of the individual, his conscious- 
ness or unconsciousness does not in any way affect princi- 
ples. Principles, laws, ideas, exist and produce their effects 
whether he be conscious of their existence and operation or 
not. And if it be recollected that this state of unconscious- 



On Ideas. 65 

ness with regard to principles is not confined to childhood, 
but extends to mature age and all periods of life, and that 
this transition from unconsciousness to consciousness, from 
ignorance to science, takes place in some — and these the very 
few — men's minds, whilst others — the greatest number — live 
in a state of unconsciousness and ignorance, the hollowness 
of the argument will become still more apparent. The part 
experience plays in the development and training of the mind 
is to awaken attention and reflection, which in some are 
directed towards the general, the absolute and the eternal, 
whilst in others they do not rise above the particular, the 
relative, and the temporal. But experience produces noth- 
ing ; it does no more produce ideas than the mind, its in- 
stincts, tendencies and faculties, or the body and its func- 
tions. The objection drawn from the fact that without the 
help of experience and of the senses we could not possess the 
physical ideas of color, light, sound, &c, goes so far as to 
prove that experience calls the attention of the mind to 
ideas through the sensuous representation of them, and that 
these representations are apprehended loy the mind through 
the instrumentality of the senses, but not that experience is 
the principle and the source of ideas ; for representation and 
ideas are entirely distinct, though they are generally con- 
founded/'' The sound that I hear is not the idea of sound, 

* It is a confusion generally occurring in the popular and irreflective mind 
which makes use indiscriminately of the word idea to designate the particular 
and the general, the phenomenon and its principle. This confusion is one of the 
greatest obstacles to the right understanding of idealism, and it is of the utmost 
importance that the philosopher should by an appropriate training be enabled 
to avoid the confusion, and to distinguish between representations and ideas. 
Descartes, to mark this distinction, has recourse to the following example: "I 
can," says he. "represent to myself a triangle. I can also realize a pentagon or a 
decagon, though not so distinctly as a triangle. But as the number of sides and 
angles increases, the representations become more and more difficult and indis- 
tinct, until they vanish entirely. For instance, I cannot in any manner represent 
to myself a chiliagon; and yet, although I am unable to realize it, I can define it, 
and determine its properties, as clearly and rigorously as those of the triangle — 
an operation showing that I possess the idea of the chiliagon which I apprthend 
through pure thought" (intellection is the word used by Descartes) "without the 
assistance of any sensible representation." Similar examples may be fourd in 
all departments of knowledge. For instance, we can form sensible representa- 
tions of the rapidity of a horse, or of a small distance, but cannot form sensible 
representations of the rapidity of light or of a long distance, though we can 
equally measure and determine both. However, such examples are not needed 

Be 



66 On Ideas. 

but the image and the symbol of it (we will see hereafter that 
it is its effect and product) ; and when I hear a sound, two 
different events take place in my mind — though both appre- 
hended and distinguished by Thought, i.e. the representation 
of the particular sound and the perception of the idea that 
imparts to the latter, whatever value and meaning it pos- 
sesses — of the idea which, as we have already observed, was 
in my mind before the sound was perceived, and will con- 
tinue in it ready to apprehend all similar phenomena, and 
which has perceived, is perceiving, and will perceive them in 
the minds that were, that are, and that will be. 

We must then admit that ideas are innate, and that, far 
from originating with experience, they are presupposed by 
it, so that were the mind deprived of ideas no experimental 
object could reach the mind, nor be apprehended or named 
by it 

The question now arises whether all ideas be innate, or 
whether only some of them be so. For there are philoso- 
phers who acknowledge the inneity of ideas, but only of 
some of them, and who consequently make a selection, single 
out some of them as innate, and consider the rest as adventi- 
tious (generally dividing them into metaphysical and physi- 
cal or primary and experimental ideas, calling metaphysical 
or primary the ideas of God, of the Infinite, the Beautiful, 
the Good ; or categories, such as the categories of Quantity, 
of Unity and Plurality, of Substance, Action and Reaction, 
&c), and physical or experimental all ideas relating to exter- 
nal objects. Now it will be seen that this distinction is 
founded neither upon speculative nor upon experimental 
grounds. For, if we bear in mind that inasmuch as they are 
all ideas, they must partake of the same nature and flow from 
the same source, we shall come to the conclusion that either 
they are one and all innate, or that none of them are. In 
fact, the difference which distinguishes them bears upon their 



to perceive the distinction between representation and idea, and, though they 
help the inexperienced, they may, on the other hand, mislead him by making 
him believe that we can represent to ourselves the idea of triangle, for instance, 
whilst the fact is that we can no more form a representation of the idea of trian- 
gle than of the idea of the chiliagon or of any other object. What we represent 
to ourselves is a particular triangle, but not the idea of it, which, like any other 
idea, can only be apprehended by pure Thought. 



On Ideas. 67 

objective meaning, i.e. the various aspects or qualities of 
being they express — the Beautiful, Justice, Color, Light, &c. 
— but it cannot in any way affect their origin. Why, for in- 
stance, the idea of the Infinite should be innate, and the idea 
of Light should be acquired ? Are they not both ideas, and 
do they not fill, each in its own sphere, similar functions ? 
When, to prove the dissimilarity of their origin and nature, 
it is argued that the idea of the Infinite cannot be deduced 
from the Finite, as the latter will always remain so what- 
ever be the perfections with which the mind will endow it, 
and consequently that the idea of the Infinite cannot be 
drawn from the Finite, whilst the idea of Light, or any other 
physical idea, is produced by the direct apprehension of cor- 
responding phenomena, — an argument is brought forward 
which rests on the confusion, I have just pointed out, be- 
tween representation and idea, besides overlooking other 
vulnerable points which lay it open to other objections. For 
it will be seen that, in this argument, we have, on the one 
hand, the idea of the Infinite, whilst, on the other, we have 
not the idea but the representation of Light. Had Light 
been considered, like the Infinite, in its idea, it would have 
been perceived, as I have demonstrated, that there cannot be 
such a difference between them, and that we cannot any more 
deduce the general idea of Light, Heat, or Sound, from 
luminous, calorific, and sonorous phenomena, than the idea 
of the Infinite from the apprehension of finite beings. There- 
fore, as the idea of Light bears the same relation to luminous 
phenomena as the idea of the Infinite to the perception of the 
Finite, the argument applies equally to both or to neither. 
But, setting aside all other considerations, the hollowness of 
the argument will be more readily discovered by directing 
the attention to its general purport, and to the principle upon 
which it is grounded. It is there assumed that the idea of 
the Infinite and that of the Finite cannot be traced back to 
a common source because of the impossibility of deducing 
the former from the latter. Now if we grant the impossi- 
bility of the deduction, we must admit at the same time that 
the impossibility affects both terms and their mutual rela- 
tion. If so, the converted proposition will be equally true ; 
I mean that, if it be true that the Infinite cannot be drawn 



68 On Ideas. 

from the Finite, it is equally true that the Finite cannot be 
drawn from the Infinite; for if, by indefinitely enlarging the 
boundaries of the Finite, we would never reach the Infinite, 
and as, on the other hand, we could discover no limit in the 
Infinite, we would equally be unable to descend from the 
Infinite to the Finite. Therefore, both ideas being, in this 
respect, identical, the only inference to be legitimately drawn 
is, that they issue not from a different, but from one and the 
same source. Thus this famous argument upon which eclec- 
tic idealism mainly rests, is found, on close examination, to 
be no argument at all. The fact is that ideas are all innate, 
and they are all innate because of their being all ideas, 
namely, purely intelligible principles constituting the com- 
ponents and indivisible elements of intellect and thought. 
They are also innate because of their being the immutable 
and eternal principles of Knowledge and Being. This leads 
us to the consideration of the other — the objective and onto- 
logical — aspect of the Problem. 

§ 2. 

What we have now to consider is the objective nature of 
Ideas, or Ideas in themselves independent of the subjective 
and accidental state of the individual mind, and the part 
they play with reference either to Knowing or to Being. 
This, I need hardly add, is the highest Problem of Science, 
in whose solution is involved, directly or indirectly, that of 
all others, and compared with which all other inquiries must 
be looked upon as preliminary exercises, a kind of mental 
gymnastic whose object it is to invigorate the mind, that it 
may reach this supreme object of its labors and aspirations.* 

First of all, if, as I have demonstrated (section preceding), 
thought and idea are inseparable, and where there is idea 
there is thought, and where there is no idea there is no 
thought, it follows — 

1°. That the limits of thought and the limits of ideas are 

* See on this point Plato passim in his Dialogues, but more especially in the 
Phedon, the Republic, and the Banquet. Hegel has admirably and sj'Stematically 
described in his Phenomenology of Spirit this metamorphosis of the mind, these 
gradual evolutions which the mind must go through that it may be enabled to 
handle pure ideas and deal directly with them. 



On Ideas. 69 

identical, and that there exists between things and ideas the 
same relation as between things and thought. 

2°. That, as to know is to think, and that where thought 
ceases there knowledge ceases also, knowledge and idea are 
inseparable, and, consequently, 

3°. That there are as many ideas as there are determina- 
tions and objects of thought, and that the more we penetrate 
into the nature of ideas the more we become possessed of a 
clear and adequate knowledge of things; whence it follows, 
also, 

4°. That as, on the one hand, there is no being, virtually or 
actually, beyond the reach of thought, and as, on the other, 
thought can think no being but through or in idea, there 
are ideas for all things, i.e. for all beings, modes or forms of 
existence.* 

Yet, although this is a consequence which necessarily 
flows from the above enunciated principles, we are generally, 
so to speak, less condescending, in this respect, towards 
ideas than towards thought. For we readily admit that 
thought is endowed with the faculty of thinking all things, 
but with regard to ideas we here deal with them as we 
did with regard to their origin ; we make a selection, and 
accordingly reject the doctrine that there are ideas cor- 
responding to all things; admitting, for instance, the ideas 
of Justice, of the Good, of the Beautiful, of God, &c, but 
refusing to admit the ideas of Body, of Plant, Organism, 
Light, &c. It is, as it may be seen, the same eclectic and 
arbitrary process applied to the present question. In fact, 
whatever be the conception we form of ideas, whatever the 
value we assign them — let them be the essence of things, or 
mere subjective forms of thought — either we must admit that 
there is an essence, or an absolute form for the body, the 
plant, the light, as there is one for justice, the infinite, the 
good ; or if we deny it, our denial must extend to both, to the 
latter as well as to the former. 

The reluctance we feel to assign ideas to all things, and 
the difficulty we find in perceiving this fundamental truth, 
are mainly owing to our not being sufficiently impressed with 

* Plato has laid down this principle in the Republic and Parmenides, but he 
has made only a partial and incomplete application of it. 



70 On Ideas. 

the importance of this principle, namely, that the invisible 
and the ideal constitute the essential element of all beings, 
of Nature and Spirit, of body and sou], as well as of their 
mutual relation. In a general and indefinite manner we do 
acknowledge the principle, but, as we do not possess a clear 
perception of it, and do not embrace it in all its bearings and 
relations, when we come to application, either we totally dis- 
regard it, or we apply it in a desultory and arbitrary manner, 
so as to stultify ourselves and fall into the strangest contra- 
dictions. Thus it is, for instance, that we will assert that God 
is a Being immaterial and invisible, and, at the same time, 
that He is the Principle of Nature, for the reason that Nature 
and the visible World cannot contain within themselves the 
ultimate principle of their existence ; which means, and 
cannot but mean, that the reason, the cause, or the ultimate 
essence of Nature, resides in God. But if any one set forth 
the doctrine that Idea is either the principle or an essential 
element of Nature, we will not listen to such a doctrine, on 
the ground that we cannot understand how a purely intelli- 
gible element could be the principle of matter ', space, motion, 
&c, here rejecting what we had formerly admitted in another 
form, and basing our rejection upon the very same ground on 
which we had admitted it. 

We were, then, right in stating that we must deny or admit 
the objective reality of all ideas, and deny or admit them on 
the same grounds. Therefore, if there be the ideas of the 
Good, the True, the Infinite, there will be also the ideas of 
quantity, of quality, of number, light, animal, body and soul, 
life and death,* indeed of beings which seem the most remote 



* Ph\ siologists, for the same reason that they do not generally admit the idea 
of organism (I sajr. generally, for there are some — Bnrdach, for instance — who 
admit it), reject the idea of life and death. And yet they endeavor to give 
a definition of them (see Cnvier, Regne animal. Introd., and Bichat, Recherches 
sur la vie et sur la mort). Now, either the definition possesses a merely nominal 
value, and then life and death would be a compound of words, or it must be 
acknowledged that there is an idea corresponding to each of them. And this is 
what, in reality, they acknowledge themselves by endeavoring to describe the 
conditions and invariable elements which constitute them. It is what, for in- 
stance, Cuvier acknowledges, who, after having defined life as the faculty pos- 
sessed by the body of assimilating to itself, by a fixed and regular process, the 
environing substances, winds up his remarks by saying that the form is more 
essential to the living body than the matter. Now this form is nothing else than 



On Ideas. 11 

from the ideal world ; I mean, matter, phenomenon, and the 
Self. In fact, all Selfs, as well as any other being, possess 
an invariable element, a common essence, and they are snch 
only inasmuch as they are the product of this essence and 
partake of its nature. And the adversaries of Idealism, the 
so-called psychologists who pretend to found philosophical 
knowledge upon internal experience and facts of conscious- 
ness, as they term them, acknowledge, or must acknowledge, 
this principle, namely, that in examining and describing such 
facts it is not as facts belonging exclusively to the indivi- 
dual self that they describe them, but as facts extending to 
all selfs, nay, as constituting their very nature. And this 
only can lend to their inquiries a scientific importance; which 
means that it is this very science — Idealism — which they 
oppose that furnishes them with a leading principle, and im- 
parts a meaning and a value to their own doctrine. 

This misconception of idea in its relation to the Self must 
be chiefly attributed to the incorrect and deceptive notion 
we entertain about this same Self and consciousness. For 
we hold that Self combined with Consciousness, or Self- 
consciousness, is the highest stage and perfection of the hu- 
man being, so that, according to this opinion, truth must be 
apprehended by the Self in Consciousness or Self conscious- 
ness ; and a truth which does not fall under Self-conscious- 
ness is, as far as we are concerned, = 0. Now, even granted 
Self-consciousness to be the highest perfection or faculty of 
the human being, here also it must be admitted that it is not 
the exclusive attribute of single individuals, but that all in- 
dividuals are possessed of it ; which leads us to the same 
conclusion we have just stated, that there is a type, an idea, 
a common essence for self-consciousness, in which idea lies 
the cause and unity of all self-consciousness, and by which 
all self-consciousnesses are linked together and set in mutual 
communication. 

Moreover, the knowledge of my Self rests on the knowl- 
edge of the Self, as the knowledge of my nature rests on the 
knowledge of man's nature. This is the import of the Fvchdc 

the idea, which appeared to Cuvier as a mere form because of his not having 
given the subject sufficient attention. 



72 On Ideas. 

creauTov. For to obtain the real knowledge of my faculties, 
rights, and duties, I must know other men's also. And to 
embrace my Self in the wide range of its relations as a phy- 
sical, social, moral, and religious being, I must know the be- 
ings also with whom I stand in such a relation. And if, in 
examining into my Self, I do not discriminate what belongs 
to it and what belongs to the Self — what is local and acciden- 
tal, the effect of ignorance, caprice and opinion — from what 
is invariable, permanent and absolute in my nature, I shall 
know neither the Self in general nor my individual Self.* 

If we now consider the Self in its relation to truth, we shall 
arrive at the same result. In fact, truth which would be ex- 
clusively my individual Self's truth would prove no truth at 
all. And if I apprehend it as identical with, or inseparable 
from, my Self, I pervert it, or apprehend the shadow and not 
the reality of truth. For the very nature of truth is to be 
universal, and so constituted as to be open to universal ap- 
prehension. Therefore when I say that it is my mind which 
apprehends truth, I use an erroneous expression which cre- 
ates in me the belief that it is really my mind that appre- 
hends it, whilst it is tlie mind that is in me, and with which 
I am in union, that really perceives it. And, far from my 
selfish nature being the organon of truth, all my endeavors 
must, on the contrary, be directed towards vanquishing and 
silencing it, in order to invigorate and give rein to that uni- 
versal nature that lies hidden in the depths of my soul, and 
which alone is able to apprehend the universal and the eter- 
nal. For when I live with and within the narrow compass 
of my individual Self, I live amidst fleeting shadows and de- 
ceptive phantoms which I mistake for realities, and instead 
of enlarging and perfecting my individual nature by raising 
it to the True and the Good, and by actually accomplishing 
my union with the universal and the absolute, I disfigure 

* If any one were to state that man is the Englishman or the Frenchman — or, 
what is the same, that in possessing the knowledge of the Englishman we pos- 
sess the science of man — the Englishman himself would smile at such a state- 
ment. Now those who pretend that the Self is the highest attribute of man, and 
refuse, at the same time, to admit an essence common to all Selfs, hold a still 
stranger opinion. For the error of the former would only be to mistake the 
species for the «enus, whilst the latter substitute the individual for the whole 
genus. 



On Ideas. 73 

and curtail the latter by violently compressing them (if I am 
allowed the expression) into the mould of my individual and 
perishable nature. Consequently, to apprehend truth T must 
abolish my Self-consciousness, and turn it into Unconscious- 
ness, or the Consciousness of Truth. This is the high and 
exclusive privilege of Truth and of the intellect that appre- 
hends it. For in this mutual embrace of Intellect and Truth, 
Truth becomes Intellect and Intellect becomes Truth. Now 
this union and identification is what Thought and Idea alone 
can accomplish. For Thought that has become adequate to 
Idea is Thought not only of my individual Self, but of Con- 
sciousness and the Self, as well as of the Non-self and of all 
things as grasped by the mind in their universal and immu- 
table essence. 

Analogous considerations will lead us to the idea of matter. 
In fact, if there be an essence of matter, this essence must 
need be a merely intelligible principle. Now there is and 
there must be such an essence. For even were we to realize 
the principle of matter in a manner similar to that of Plato's 
and Aristotle's, i.e. as a principle utterly passive and form- 
less (ap.op(pov), as the absolute virtuality or indetermination 
(dcW/^c), it would be this virtuality and this indetermination, 
this absence of all forms, and consequently this capability of 
receiving any, that would constitute its essence. 

The habit of representing to ourselves matter as compound 
and impenetrable is the chief hindrance to our apprehending 
the simplicity and intelligibility of its principle. 

Now, with regard to composition, if by composition be 
meant an accidental and external union, or juxtaposition of 
elements and properties that would not be united by any in- 
ternal, simple, and consubstantial principle; in this case, 
matter is no more compound than spirit. Otherwise we ought 
to hold that spirit is compound also, as it contains, like mat- 
ter, various properties, faculties, and modes of activity. If 
it be said that in matter it is form that links together its 
properties, this would be equally applicable to spirit, and in 
this respect also there would be no difference between them. 
Finally, to realize either Spirit or Matter as a merely ex- 
ternal and fortuitous aggregate of elements, is to fall into 



/ 



74 Ideas the Essences of Tilings. 

atomism and all the impossibilities with which this doctrine 
is beset. 

As to impenetrability, it is not only speculative thought 
but experience itself that shows matter not to be absolutely 
impenetrable; for, if it were impenetrable, how could the 
most essential fact — the fact constituting, so to speak, the 
very life of matter — I mean, its transformation, and the 
mutual fusion and identification of the various material 
substances — be explained ? Besides, if we admit matter in 
itself, matter forming the link of all material substances, we 
must admit also that matter penetrates all these substances, 
or, what is the same, that all these substances penetrate each 
other through the medium of matter. Therefore, what is 
impenetrable is not matter in itself, but matter in its particu- 
lar and fragmentary existence, i.e. bodies. And, consequent- 
ly, we must hold that bodies are penetrable and impenetra- 
ble : penetrable inasmuch as they possess a common nature 
and substance, impenetrable inasmuch as they are distinct 
and separate parts of this same substance. Finally, extent 
and impenetrability, as well as all properties and modes of 
matter, are general and essential properties, and conse- 
quently, like matter itself, merely intelligible elements ; 
they possess, in other words, like matter, a principle, a type, 
an idea. 

§ 3. On Ideas as the Essences of Things. 

If we admit that all things rest on a corresponding idea, 
the next question is whether idea constitutes the essence of 
things, or whether there is above idea a higher principle, of 
which idea would be only the form — a force, the inward na- 
ture of which we are unable to reach, issuing forth from the 
divine essence, or, to speak more accurately, constituting this 
very same essence. This is, I need hardly say, the decisive 
and crowning point of the problem. All those who have 
sufficiently attended to the subject concur in admitting that 
ideas are necessary elements of things, that they are eternal 
and immutable, and that their origin must be traced to the 
Absolute. But are ideas so identical with the Absolute as 



Ideas the Essences of Things. 75 

to constitute Ms whole Being ? Or is there, besides ideas, 
some principle or essence of which ideas would "be only 
forms or attributes f This is the point upon which opinions 
are divided. For, according to some, ideas are only forms, 
modes, or attributes ; according to others, they constitute 
both the form and the substance — the very nature of the 
Absolute. Now, the following are the reasons which, in my 
opinion, establish the second doctrine : 

First of all, if it be true, as we have demonstrated, that 
thought and idea are inseparably connected, so much so that 
they suppose each other; that obscure force, or that un- 
definable substance which is held forth as the source and 
substratum of ideas, cannot be thought but through an idea, 
and an idea which is adequate to it. And, as it is admitted 
that idea is the essential form of things, it follows that the 
idea of this substance will be its essential form, and as ab- 
solute and eternal as the substance itself. The idea of a 
substance is consequently adequate to this very substance ; 
which means that this substance is thought as it is, and can- 
not be otherwise than it is thought. Thus, for instance, if 
gravity be an essential form of matter, this latter must be 
attracted towards the centre, and, if gravity thought, it would 
think itself as necessarily attracted towards the centre. If 
God is the Perfect Being, or the Absolute Spirit, &c. &c, he 
must think himself as such, and, nice versa, he must be as he 
thinks himself. This shows how deeply idea is involved in 
the inward and substantial nature of things. And this con- 
nection will become still more manifest if we consider the 
whole idea — I mean each idea in the whole range of its quali- 
ties and relations ; if we describe and determine, for instance, 
the various and general properties of the triangle, or of organ- 
ism, or of the soul. For one cannot see then what other cha- 
racter or substance may exist besides and above idea. 

The difficulty we find in apprehending the true and com- 
plete nature of ideas is to be attributed, in a great measure, 
to the arbitrary selection I have pointed out'* — a solution 
circumscribing the sphere of ideas, assigning ideas to one 

* See preceding' section. 



76 Ideas the Essences of Things. 

order of beings and withholding them from another, and 
leading thereby to the conclusion that this latter must rest 
on other principles than the former. For example, suppose 
any one admitting the idea of the Beautiful, and that it is 
this idea which imparts to the work of art its beauty, — if he 
do not admit at the same time the idea of matter, this he 
must derive from another source, and in this case the idea 
of the Beautiful will only possess, in his opinion, the power 
of stamping matter with a certain form. Again, it will be 
admitted that the operation of the mind must be performed 
according to certain fixed and invariable laws, i.e. ideas. 
But if we do not admit at the same time the idea of the think- 
ing subject or of the Self, this also must be derived from 
some other principle or essence than idea, and then the laws 
or ideas which govern the mind will be only forms. It is 
the same process and mode of arguing we make use of in 
considering the nature of God ; for we will fain acknowledge 
that ideas are inseparable from God's nature. But here also 
we argue with regard to God as we do with regard to the 
Self. And as we refer the Self and ideas to distinct princi- 
ples, so likewise we separate in God ideas from his being and 
substance. But if there be the idea of the Self, there must 
be also the idea of God, and God cannot be and think him- 
self but according to this idea. And when we endeavor to 
grasp the divine essence, and we think we soar above the 
sphere of ideas by attributing to God Consciousness, Per- 
sonality, Goodness, Ubiquity, &c, we in reality are gather- 
ing merely ideal elements to build up the nature of God. 
Now these and similar elements must represent the real and 
objective nature of God, otherwise we would make up the 
nature of God of mere words and shadows. And, in saying 
that they represent God, I do not mean to say that they are 
only symbols or images, but component parts and elements, 
of his essence. For if we realize the Being of God as differ- 
ing from the Thought of God, we are drawn into the same 
difficulty; and this difficulty does not only affect the human 
but the divine thought also. In fact, if Being and Thought 
be separated in God, or if the idea of God be not identical 
with his essence, the unity of the divine nature will be 



Ideas the Essences of Tilings. 77 

broken, and neither God in thinking himself nor man in 
thinking God will think God, but a shadow of God — in fact, 
anything but God. Consequently, thought in God, or the 
thought of God, is identical with his Being ; it is his Being 
intellectualized, if I am allowed the expression. But if there 
be, it might be objected, as you assert, a stage of existence 
where thought and being become identical, the thought of a 
thing would not differ from its being, and consequently to 
think happiness would be to be happy, to thiiik the Good 
would be to be good, and so forth. Now this is not only at 
variance with language, but with vulgar and daily experi- 
ence, as we think happiness without being happy, and the 
Good without being good. 

This objection, which at first sight seems unanswerable, 
but which we have already implicitly considered, rests on* an 
erroneous notion of the nature of Science and ideas, as well 
as on an inaccurate observation of experience itself. In fact, 
even if we confine ourselves within the limits of experience 
and of subjective thought, we shall see that if the thought of 
a thing is not the whole thing, it is at least its starting-point 
or its essential condition. Thus one is not happy and good 
unless he seeks after happiness and the good, i.e. not unless 
he thinks them ; so that by abolishing the thought of them 
we would abolish the seeking after them, and consequently 
their possession and the sentiment attached to it. 

However, this is not the proper way of viewing the question ; 
for the essential and decisive point is whether there are ab- 
solute thoughts or absolute ideas of good and happiness, 
and whether these ideas be the principles from which the 
imperfect and individual good and happiness are derived. It 
little matters, then, that such individual should think happi- 
ness without being happy, or that happiness should assume 
different forms and vary with the different individuals, or 
that it be realized only in a certain number of individuals 
and in a certain sphere of existence. For from the fact of 
there being an idea of happiness, it does not follow that all 
must be happy, or that all must be equally so, no more than 
it does follow that all must possess beauty because there is 
an idea of the Beautiful, or that all bodies must be luminous 
because there is the idea of Light. It is rather the contrary 



78 Ideas the Essences of Things. 

that must take place, and this because ideas determine each 
other, and can each of them fill up only a limited province 
and sphere in the whole system. 

But here the difficulty principally arises from the mistake 
created by the confusion of individual and subjective with 
universal and objective thought, or of thought accidental 
with thought necessary and absolute. To think accidentally 
the triangle or the solar system is not to be either the trian- 
gle or the solar system. But the essential point is to know 
whether, besides the idea, the eternal and objective thought 
of the triangle or of the solar system, there can be another 
and higher essence of these beings. And if, to establish this 
latter opinion, we appeal to individual consciousness and 
experience, we do not only place ourselves without the pale 
of Science, but we are necessarily led to a result contrary to 
that which we aim at. In fact, we will not admit that ideas 
constitute the ultimate principles of things, and we raise 
above ideas being and essence, apparently on the ground that 
the notion* we form of the Absolute surpasses the region of 
ideas, and then we transfer to this essence the data of psy- 
chological experience, and make absolute consciousness in 
the image of individual consciousness. Now, to form such a 
conception of the Absolute is to deny it. For if God thinks 
as I do think in the capacity of a finite and individual be- 
ing — if my individual consciousness is the type according to 
which I must represent to myself absolute consciousness, — 
God is finite and imperfect like myself. And it will be in 
vain for me, in order to reach the absolute, to combine such 
imperfect elements, to add to or to subtract from them, or to 
enlarge them indefinitely, so as to make up by their aggre- 
gate the notion of God ; for I shall not be able to overstep 
the limits of the finite and the imperfect. Consequently, the 
principle to be laid down is not that God is such a thought, 
or such a will, or such a personality, but thought, will, and 

* This shows the inconsistency involved in all doctrine rejecting- Idealism. 
For when we pretend that ideas are not the essences of things we must base our 
opinion on some rational ground, and this rational ground must need be some 
notion we have formed of essences and principles; which means that in rejecting 
ideas we make use of them, and that the very arguments and reasonings by 
which we pretend to overthrow idealism rest on some idea from which they de- 
rive whatever value they possess. 






Ideas the Essences of Things. 79 

personality, or the idea of thought, of will, and person- 
ality. 

Again, the argument which is put forth to prove the dis- 
tinction of idea and being, namely, that we possess the 
consciousness of thinking — of thinking light, for instance, 
without the consciousness of being light — nay, that we feel 
conscious that the being of light is totally different from the 
thinking of it ; this argument, I say, is to no purpose. For, 
as we have already observed, either there is a consubstantial 
connection between the thought and the being of light, or 
taere is none. If we admit the latter position, we may say 
that in the thought of light there is no apprehension of real 
light but a mere delusion. Moreover, we ought to bear in 
mind that here the question does not turn upon individual 
existence, or any contingent and particular phenomenon, but 
upon essences and principles — a point which we lose sight of 
wien we appeal to observation, self-consciousness, and sen- 
tinent. For essences, let them be ideas or any other princi- 
ples, can be thought, but cannot be felt. And, far from their 
coining within the apprehension of sentiment, we must rise 
above the sphere of sentiment, of observation, and individual 
consciousness, to contemplate them in the purity and reality 
of !:heir immutable and eternal nature. Thus, for instance, 
when we inquire into the nature of the" soul, it is not a soul, 
bu; the soul we purpose knowing ; and we do not think we 
possess the science of the soul until we have attained such a 
knowledge. And having attained it, it is not necessary that 
we should be such or such individual soul, or that we should 
fed so, to apprehend its being and qualities. On the contrary, 
the sentiment of the individual soul would dim the perception 
of :he soul, depriving thereby the mind of the criterion by 
wtich the individual soul itself can be known. Thus to think 
the soul, the triangle, light, organism, &c, is, in the highest 
acceptation of the word, to think and to be all these objects. 
And this identity of idea and essence will be more clearly 
perceived by considering the nature of God. In fact, we hold 
that God is the ultimate principle of things, of Nature as 
well as of Spirit; of matter, light, &c, as well as of justice, 
liberty, good, &c. Now, either these words are destitute of 
all meaning, or they mean that God is all beings in general 



80 Idea tlie Ultimate Reason of Things. 

without being any individually, and consequently that es- 
sences are merely intelligible elements, principles that pure 
and speculative thought alone can reach, and transcending 
the region of sentiment, of self-consciousness, and experience. 

§ 4. Idea as the Ultimate Beason of Things* 

If ideas and essences are, as we pretend, identical, it fol- 
lows that ideas contain the wliy and the ultimate reason of 
things. Why are there organic beings, or such a function or 
property in organism ? Or, why do bodies move ? and, what 
is the reason why they cannot move but in time and space, 
swiftly or slowly, or in a certain direction? Why such a 
phenomenon, or such a sensation ? Or, what is the ultimate 
reason of the union of the soul and the body ? The answer 
to these and similar queries will be derived from ideas, 
namely, that the body and the soul are united because thejre 
is the idea of such a union, and that they are united con- 
formably to such idea ; or that there are organic beings, phe- 
nomena, movements, because there are ideas of organisfri, 
phenomena, and motion. Such a doctrine, 1 know, we ire 
unwilling to admit, and this for the same reason we object 
to assigning ideas to all things. Here also we are wont to 
make a solution, and explain one order of facts and beiijgs 
by ideas, and another by some other principle. When asked, 
for instance, why such an action is good, or such a concep- 
tion right, or such a thing beautiful, we answer that they ire 
so because they are conformable to certain ideas of justice, 
truth, and beauty ; which means that whatever justice, trjith 
and beauty is in them they borrow from these ideas. But if 
any one hold that the ultimate reason of sensation, of organ- 
ism, of the union of the body and the soul, lies in ideas, ^ve 

will not listen to him, and will reject his doctrine as possessing 

_ — , ^ — 

* I need not remind the reader that in this and the preceding section I hive 
considered all questions relating to ideas in their abstract and general form, and 
confined myself to showing in a general manner the necessity and nature of ideas 
without determining the nature of any particular idea, and this because such an 
inquiry belongs to particular branches of Philosophy. For instance, the idea of 
Religion belongs to the Philosophy of Eeligion, as the ideas of time, space, light. 
&c, come within the province of the Philosophy of Nature. Moreover, the value 
and meaning of ideas cannot be apprehended unless each idea is systematically 
deduced. 



Idea the Ultimate Reason of Tilings. 81 

no meaning, and substituting mere and empty words for real 
and substantial causes. It is, as we may say, the same in- 
consistency we fall into. For if we give as ultimate reason 
of the justice of actions the idea of justice, we must also ac- 
knowledge idea as the ultimate reason of the union of the body 
and the soul; or, if we reject the latter, we must reject the 
former also. Therefore, for the very reason we admit other 
ideas, we must admit the idea of the soul and the idea of the 
body, and then the idea of their mutual communication. All 
the explanations contrived on the subject — the hypothesis of 
a plastic mediator (Cud worth), or that of physical influx 
(Euler), or that of occasional causes (Cartesius), or that of 
^reestablished harmony (Leibnitz) — are but various expres- 
sions of one and the same conception, namely, that there is 
an intermediate principle or essence by and according to 
which the soul and the body are united. The theories of 
^reestablished harmony and of occasional causes, which seem 
to point to another solution inasmuch as they seem to place 
the principle of this union in the power and will of God, rest, 
when attentively examined, on no other foundation. In fact, 
the divine will is not an arbitrary and contingent will, but 
finds its rule and guidance in the laws of God's nature, which 
are nothing else than the very essence of things. And this 
is proved by the fact, that even those who would attribute to 
God a contingent will and liberty — a liberty of choice or of 
indifference, as they name it — are compelled by a rational 
necessity to place above these attributes the nature itself of 
God, and acknowledge that God acts, and cannot but act, 
according to the laws of his nature. Therefore, it would be 
no explanation, or at least it would not be to give the ulti- 
mate reason, to say that the soul and the body are united 
because God has willed it; but we must go beyond this, and 
say that he has willed it because this union is conformable 
to the laws of his reason and wisdom, and that he has willed 
it but in conformity with these laws : which means, in other 
words, that there is in God's nature a certain idea, a certain 
essence, where the two substances are eternally and abso- 
lutely united, which ideal union is the ultimate reason of 
their actual communication. In fact, the ultimate reason of 
a thing is that internal and ideal necessity which makes the 



82 Idea is Force. 

thing what it is, and that it cannot be otherwise than it is ; 
and this is its essence. And it must be remarked that when 
we have attained that degree of knowledge, we cannot pro- 
ceed further and inquire for a higher reason. Thus, for in- 
stance, it would be illogical to ask why bodies fall, should it 
have been demonstrated that gravity is their essence. And 
all attempts to answer the question would prove vain, or 
would lead to the begging of the question. This explains 
also why it is irrational to ask the reason of the existence 
of God. For God is essence and absolute necessity ; and in 
this respect what can be said of him is, that God is because 
Tie is. 

These remarks may be easily applied to other ideas. Let us 
take life, for instance. All physiologists tacitly admit the idea 
of life : for when they investigate the laws of living nature 
and strive to determine their essential character and condition, 
it is in reality the idea of life they aim at, as it is this very 
same idea looming, so to speak, before them that guides 
them through their inquiry. But being unaccustomed to 
pure speculation, and unable to set their mind free from 
images and material representations, they expect to derive 
from observation and experience that which from specula- 
tion alone can be derived, thereby obtaining facts and 
consequences which they mistake for causes and principles. 
They are thus led to materialize ideas, and to seek the 
principle of life, some in animalcules (infusoria), a kind of 
material types by which are engendered all living beings ; 
others, like BufTon, in an organic substance spread from eter- 
nity through the Universe, and stamped in succession with 
limited and individual forms. In reality, what they have in 
view is idea — a purely intelligible principle by which all 
living beings are produced, as all particular good emanates 
from the Good, and all particular beauty from the Beautiful. 
Of this principle they possess a presentiment, a glimpse as 
it were ; but they are unable to reach it in their real and ab- 
solute existence. 

§ 5. Idea is Force. 

This is a consequence naturally flowing from the preced- 
ing considerations. For, if idea be essence and the ultimate 



Idea is Force. 83 

reason of things, it is also force, and the force the most irre- 
sistible, which may be called also necessity. The force that 
produces the plant, and according to which the plant grows 
and dies, is its idea. The real and absolute germ is not the 
individual and external germ we touch and see, but the idea 
by which the external germ is created and endowed with the 
necessary force for its growth and preservation. The force 
which every being is possessed of, as well as the form or law 
according to which it acts and displays its powers, lies in its 
very nature, i.e. in its idea. The difference of forces is owing 
to the difference of ideas. Matter is a force, and the soul is 
a force, and, as forces, they are the product of one and the 
same idea, and both produce similar effects ; for instance, 
the soul moves the body, and a body moves another body. 
Their difference is to be found in their specific elements, or 
in what constitutes their special idea: for instance, space 
and time, extent, attraction and repulsion, &c, for matter ; 
imagination, will, thought, &c, for the soul. Or, to quote 
another example, matter in its mechanical and matter in its 
chemical state are both force, which are only diversified by 
their specific typical structure. As idea is force, and the 
source of all forces, so the permanency and preservation of 
force do not rest on any quantitative (mathematical) formula 
or conception, such as, for instance, the quantitative absorp- 
tion and reproduction of force, but in the permanency and 
immutability of its principle. For instance, with regard to 
the falling of bodies we may ask the question, whence comes 
the force that makes the body fall, and what becomes of the 
force that has been thus expended in producing the fall? 
Perhaps it will be said that the force is inherent in the body 
that falls, and that the amount of force that body employs 
in falling is absorbed by other bodies, which in their turn 
reproduce it, thus forming a circle — an alternate movement 
of absorption and reproduction, in which, the loss and the 
gain being balanced, there would be no actual deperdition of 
force. Now this explanation, even were it correct, does not 
reach the real and ultimate source of the permanency of gra- 
vity. The absorption and reproduction, the quantity of force 
absorbed, and the quantity of force reproduced, are subordi- 
nate states or forms of force, and are depending on its very 



84 Idea is Force. 

nature and essence. Let us suppose the whole of the force 
of gravity in the Universe to be = 1,000, and this sum to be 
equally divided among say 100 masses, and this in such a 
way as, when one of these masses expends its 10th part, this 
is to be absorbed and preserved by the others ; and, as we 
may suppose also that each mass is continuously supplying 
its share of force, there would be in the whole system an un- 
interrupted reciprocation of forces, absorbed and reproduced. 
Now it is clear that the permanency of the fact rests on the 
permanency of the principle that produces it, and that if 
there be no diminution in the quantity of force it is because 
its principle — its idea — is liable to no deterioration. 

Mathematical formulae symbolizing the law of gravity, or 
any other law, possess a real and rational value, in their ab- 
stract and general form, on the condition only that they are 
the expression of an absolute idea, independent of all phe- 
nomena of gravity, and to which these very phenomena owe 
their existence. When we say that force is inherent in 
matter, we use an expression which conveys a correct idea 
neither of matter nor of force ; for it represents -matter and 
force — or the force that is in matter — as things separable, 
whereas they are inseparable. Such is, in fact, the ordinary 
mode of viewing matter and force. We place matter on 
one side, so to speak, and force on the other, realizing the 
former as complete of itself, or as possessing its being and 
its essential qualities without the force of gravity, and the 
latter as something extraneous and superinduced ; and this 
on the ground that we can conceive matter without such a 
force, from which we draw the consequence, or rather the 
assumption, that matter would not cease to exist even were 
the force of gravity subtracted from it. According to this 
view, gravity becomes a mere law of matter, as it is called ; 
-a certain form imprinted, as it were, upon matter, but neither 
matter itself nor an essential and component element of it. 
Now, if we give the subject the proper attention, we shall see 
that Being and Force are inseparable ; that Being destitute 
of Force is no Being, and that Force possessing no Being is 
no Force. By Being I mean here that which constitutes a 
thing, and without which it could neither exist nor be con- 
ceived. What to an inaccurate observer often appears as an 



Idea is Force. 85 

accidental or external form, is in reality an integral element 
of a being's nature, as integral as its substance, and conse- 
quently is itself a force. For instance, thought and the forms 
of thought are inseparable, so that thought could neither be 
or act without forms, nor could these be or act without 
thought. So likewise in the body form and matter are so 
interwoven that whatever force is in it springs from the 
association of both ; so much so, that, were either of them 
annihilated, being and force would be at once annihilated in 
the body. And so it is with all things. Consequently, gra- 
vity, attraction and repulsion, motion, &c.,are not forces and 
forms added to, but essential elements of, matter; they are 
not forces acting upon the molecules, as one is wont to real- 
ize them, but forces that constitute the molecules and matter. 
The doctrine that resolves matter into atoms or indivisible 
molecules, representing the latter as coalescing under the 
action of an additional and extraneous force,* cannot be sup- 
ported on any experimental or speculative grounds. In fact, 
experience nowhere shows the existence of such elements ;. 
indeed, according to experience, matter would be indefinitely 
divisible, and there would be no suoh indivisible principles. 
Nor is the atomistic doctrine more justifiable on theoretic 
grounds ; for either atoms are absolutely formless, or they 
possess a form — polarity, or weight, or volume, &c. In the first 
hypothesis, they are phantoms of the imagination, or rather 
empty words, as nothing could be affirmed or thought of them ; 
not even that they are indivisible, indivisibility being a 
manner or form of being. If they are endowed with a form, 
this form constitutes with their substance, and as well as 
their substance, their inward and inseparable force. Whence 
it follows — 1°. That force is not superinduced, but is one of 
their constitutive elements. In fact, if we consider extent,, 
or the filling up of space in matter, we shall see that it pre- 
supposes both attraction and repulsion, and that it presup- 
poses them as generating principles of matter; for if we 
suppress attraction there will be nothing to repel, and if we 
suppress repulsion there will be nothing to attract. 2°. That 
force and form, be it extent, or weight, or whatever it may 

* Molecular forces. 



86 Idea is Force. 

be, are the common properties of all such pretended atoms, 
or of all parts of matter ; which means that there is a com- 
mon principle — an idea — from which all parts of matter bor- 
row whatever force or any other quality they possess. 

If I have dwelt at some length on the idea of matter to 
show that idea is force, it is to have the opportunity of 
pointing out the inconsistencies and errors into which the 
Philosophy of Nature is necessarily drawn, the arbitrary 
and artificial theories to which it is obliged to resort when 
it attempts to explain Nature, its forces and laws, by any 
other principles than ideas. Yet such is the aversion of the 
Natural Philosopher to ideas, that he will prefer inconsisten- 
cies, or any irrational and untenable theory to Idealism! He 
must use ideas, for he cannot advance a step without their 
assistance, and he must use them to prop up his own theo- 
ries ; but he will look with suspicion, nay, with contempt, 
upon any doctrine teaching that ideas are realities, forces, 
and principles. Thus, for instance, instead of acknowledging 
the ideas of organism and generation, he will have recourse 
to hypotheses such as the engrafting of organism upon organ- 
ism (epigenesis), or to the concentric envelopment of germs 
(emooitement cles germes), or to spontaneous generation 
(generatio primarla, spontanea), or perhaps to the will of 
God. Now these and similar hypotheses explain nothing, 
or, if there be any meaning in them, this they draw from 
some idea, and consequently they are rational and correct 
inasmuch as and to the extent in which the idea is so. In 
fact, the will of God, when set forth as the ultimate reason 
of things, is the Deus ex machina, which, for the very reason 
that it may be used for all purposes, in reality demonstrates 
nothing. For a principle which may arbitrarily and indis- 
criminately be brought forward to explain the motion of my 
arm as well as the motion of the Sun, or any other order of 
phenomena, is no principle at all, and no Science can be 
founded upon it. Moreover, the will of God, as we have 
already observed — and the will of God more absolutely than 
any other will — must be ruled by law, and by an absolute 
law, which law is at once the essence of things and a part of 
God's nature. 

As to spontaneous generation, if by spontaneous it is 



Idea is Force. 87 

meant that things — phenomena, individuals — are produced, 
or do produce themselves, without any previous and inde- 
pendent cause or principle that produces them, this is equal 
to saying that they come from nought. In any other sense, 
spontaneity presupposes a preexistent principle, and there- 
fore explains nothing. The same applies to epigenetic 
generation, and to the collateral hypothesis of the concentric 
involution of germs ; for, even granting that the germ be 
endowed with an inexhaustible power of begetting similar 
individuals, or that it should contain, like some infinitesimal 
quantity, an infinite number of germs, such hypotheses will 
explain neither the initial germ, nor the unity of the species, 
nor even the grown up and complete individual. For the 
complete individual is not the germ, and though it may be 
supposed to be potentially involved in the germ, as the whole 
picture is involved in its outline, yet there are additional ele- 
ments, properties, and processes, through which only its full 
growth can be accomplished. Besides, the germ cannot con- 
stitute the species, for the production as well as the relation 
of germs can only be explained by a distinct and separate 
principle. To say that the various germs or individuals are 
issuing from a common stock, and then to realize this com- 
mon stock as an individual — the various plants from an in- 
dividual plant, for instance, or men from a primitive man — 
is to say that this individual being is at once the individual, 
the species, and the genus. Now let us suppose the fact to 
be so ; let us suppose that there was a primitive germ or 
individual from which all subsequent germs or individuals 
have sprung. It is evident that there would have been two 
natures involved in the nature of such individual, namely, 
its own individual nature coupled with the common and gen- 
eral, i.e. the species. Now, if we suppress in the supposed 
individual its individual, limited, and perishable nature, 
what will be left in it is the common and universal nature, 
or the generating principle of all subsequent and similar 
individuals. And if we add to this that the supposed indivi- 
dual must be itself the product of a principle which embraces 
both the individual and the common nature, we shall arrive 
at the conclusion that here also idea constitutes the common 



88 Idea is Force. 

stock, and the ultimate principle to which the individual, 
the species, and the genus, owe their origin and existence. 

The fact is, the Natural Philosopher, if consistent, cannot 
escape Idealism ; for he cannot even think force in general, 
or any particular force, such as gravity, light, &c, without 
ideas. And, when he comes to consider the objective nature 
of forces, if he rejects Idealism, he will be obliged to adopt 
Nominalism, and to realize force either as an empty word — 
flatus vocis — or, like Kant, as a merely subjective form of 
thought; or to divide force and scatter it into infinitesimal 
divisions, i.e. to adopt Atomism ; or to substitute mathema- 
tical quantities and formuhe for physical forces; — which 
means, in other words, that the Natural Philosopher, by re- 
jecting Idealism, raises insurmountable difficulties, nay, he 
contradicts himself, and brings about a result opposite to 
that which he is aiming at. For he rejects Idealism on the 
ground that idea, in his opinion, is not a real principle, an 
essence, a force, and then he builds up forces and beings 
with merely subjective elements, with empty sounds, or with 
mathematical formulae ; in other words, with materials either 
destitute of all reality and force, or deriving from ideas all 
the reality and force they may possess.* 



* Has vires (attraction and repulsion), says Newton, non Physice sed Mathe- 
matice tantum considero. (Phil. Nat. Princ. Math., Delin. VIII.) — These words 
show that, in the opinion of Newton, there are two essential elements of which 
gravity consists, namely, the Physical and the Mathematical. It is not my 
object to examine here the purport of this division, or whether it is conformable 
to a strictly rational and scientific method to divide a being:, substance, or force, 
into two parts, to consider one and to leave off the other. Here, confining' 
myself to the present subject, I will only observe that if the Natural Philoso- 
pher admit that the mathematical element is an integral part of force, he cannot 
without inconsistency reject Idealism, as the pure mathematical element is noth- 
ing but idea. If, on the contrary, he consider force as independent of mathema- 
tical notions, his formulae and combinations possess no value whatever, nay, 
they are delusive and fallacious, as they create the belief that mathematical no- 
tions constitute a real element of force, (See on this question my Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Nature, of Hegel, vol. 1.) 



Idea in itself and without itself. 89 



chapter v. 

§ 1. Idea in itself and ivithoiit itself 

If idea be the essence and the ultimate reason of things, it 
necessarily follows that it exists in itself and without itself, 
or, to use another expression, that it exists in thought and 
out of thought in Nature, and that it does not exist out of 
itself and in Nature as it exists in itself and in thought. 
However startling and irrational this proposition may ap- 
pear at first sight, it will be perceived, when properly con- 
sidered, that it must be admitted under any supposition, and 
from whatever point of view we look upon the subject; nay, 
that we admit it in many instances, only we admit it, in 
another form, unconsciously and in a desultory and unscien- 
tific manner. 

The popular sayings that God is the principle of the 
World, but that he is not in the World ; or that idea and its 
realization, theory and practice, though connected by a close 
relation, are distinct and cannot become identical; or that 
the artist perceives idea, but is unable to embody it in all 
its beauty and perfection ; or that Nature and the visible 
world are but images and symbols of the invisible, — all these 
and similar propositions are but various expressions of one 
and the same principle, namely, that idea is in itself and 
without itself in the things of which it is the idea, and that 
it is not in the things as it is in itself. For when we say that 
God is the principle of the World, but that he is not in the 
World, we do not mean to say that there is no consubstan- 
tial connection between God and the World — there is no 
proposition more untenable and more absurd than this — but 
that God, who is the principle of the World, exists in a two- 
fold manner, namely, in himself and without himself, and 
that he does not exist in the latter as he exists in the former 
manner. So likewise in saying that the visible world — the 
world of phenomena — is only the image of the invisible one, 
we mean that the latter manifests itself but imperfectly 
through the former, as sound or any outward sign is una- 
b 7 



90 Idea in itself and without itself. 

ble to represent thought in the clearness and fulness of its 
meaning, though both sound and thought are linked together 
in the same subject. 

What language is to ideas in general, the external world 
is to Art. Languages as well as works of Art are symbols, 
imperfect and obscure adumbrations of ideas. They embody 
ideas, or, to speak more correctly, ideas embody themselves 
in them ; but as the body both manifests and veils the soul, 
so ideas, by giving themselves an external existence, must 
need create Nature, or bring themselves in contact with Na- 
ture, and consequently dim the purity and transparency of 
thought, and conceal the unity, the infiniteness and immuta- 
bility of this essence. For Nature is time, space, and mo- 
tion ; it is the field of perpetual change, of ever-recurring 
renovation and destruction ; where everything is not only 
dissimilar to another but to itself at each moment of its ex- 
istence ; where beings and forces form mere aggregates, and 
are merely juxta-posited, without being internally connect- 
ed, and conscious either of themselves or of the relation in 
which they stand to each other. 

Therefore the Being that either creates Nature, or uses 
Nature as a means, or stands in any relation to Nature, must 
needs partake of it, and adapt itself to its laws and constitu- 
tion. Thus what in itself is one and undivided must become 
plural and divided, what is immutable and eternal must 
become mutable and temporal, and what is beneficial and 
harmonious must be made to appear hurtful and inharmoni- 
ous. This is the relation in which ideas and Nature stand to 
each other, a relation involving a contradiction, an affirma- 
tion, and a negation. 

It may be said of God that he affirms Nature inasmuch as 
he is the principle of it, and that he denies Nature inasmuch 
as Nature cannot contain him. And so it is with thought 
and ideas — God, Thought, and Idea, being identical in the 
highest sense of the words. Consequently we stand, like 
God, to Nature in a similar relation. For inasmuch as we 
are thinking beings, and bear an ideal world within us, Na- 
ture cannot contain us ; so that we also affirm Nature — we 
live in it, we adapt it to our wants and purposes, and asso- 
ciate it with all our works and enterprises, and all our enjoy- 



Idea in itself and without itself. 91 

ments and sufferings ; and then we destroy it as a useless 
and unmeaning instrument, and as a hindrance to the 
furtherance of other purposes and the attainment of other 
enjoyments. The inward and inextinguishable yearning 
after something better, absolute perfection; the feeling of 
discontent and weariness which is inseparable from all hu- 
man things, however accomplished they may be ; progress, 
reforms, revolution — history, in one word — is the work of the 
ideal world that is in thought, and which the external world 
is unable to express and realize. The working of thought is 
unceasing ; nay, it is the very life and essence of History : 
and the appearing and disappearing of individuals, nations, 
and civilization, are but its actual results — the only results 
visible to the external eye, and to the inattentive mind to 
which the latent causes are hidden — by whose incessant and 
combined action events are brought to maturity. 

This alternate movement of life and death, of renovation 
and destruction, of adaptation of Nature to the requirements 
of Spirit, and of annihilation of Nature, is the work of ideas 
and thought, which, like the double-edged weapon of the 
Greek hero, inflicts the wound and heals it ; showing thereby 
their infinite and irresistible power, before which Nature 
is something like nought — an instrument they create and 
annihilate at will and according to their purposes. This 
power may be seen at work incessantly, and in every part of 
time and space ; but never is it more visible, or surrounded 
with more tremendous attributes, than in those great histo- 
rical changes and revolutions when the times are full for 
humanity to advance another step in the consciousness of 
itself and in the path of truth. Then we see the world 
thrown into, as it were, a state of disruption and confusion. 
We see beauty becoming ugliness, wisdom folly, truth un- 
truth, patriotism and heroism sterile and powerless virtues, 
and institutions upon which had been bestowed the thought 
and labor of centuries and generations, and which in former 
times had proved a source of strength, of glory and triumph, 
now turning into a source of weakness, defeat, and humili- 
ation. 

The middle ages are looked upon as times of barbarism. 
And it must be owned that when compared with the Greek 



92 Idea in itself and without itself. 

and Roman civilizations, with their extraordinary men and 
achievements, and the imperishable monuments raised by 
them — monuments from which we derive, even now, the high- 
est instruction and the purest enjoyment, nay, which will 
live as long as there will be a human mind to admire and 
revere them ; — when compared, I say, with these high civili- 
zations, the middle ages are rightly called times of darkness 
and barbarism. For if we consider them separately and apart 
from the general movement of history, — if we consider their 
institutions, their languages, and the moral, social and intel- 
lectual state of their societies, even taking Christianity into 
account, we are perplexed to see what humanity had gained 
by the overthrow of the ancient world. And yet the middle 
ages prevailed against ancient civilization, and they pre- 
vailed because the new spirit of the world was with them. 
As life begets death and death life, as the organic being 
must fall into a state of inorganism and corruption to bring 
forth a new organic being, so ancient civilizations — their 
forms, their creeds and institutions — what in other times 
they held as true and holy, what had inspired their bards 
with immortal strains and had been the main-spring of great 
actions — all must be broken and dissolved. 

The middle ages are the new-born infant whose birth is 
death to its parents ; they are the plant and the flower that 
break to a new life through the rotten seed and feed upon 
rotten matter. The darkness that surrounds them is the 
darkness that precedes the new morning light, and the state 
of violence, instability and confusion into which societies 
were thrown at that period, is the chaotic state that must 
precede all new birth and formation ; it was the crucible in 
which were melted the elements of the old world, to be 
mixed afresh and purified by the breath of the new Spirit. 
And so it is, under various forms and in various degrees, 
everywhere, in all points of time and space, and at all peri- 
ods of history. Everywhere there is life and everywhere 
there is death, everywhere there is darkness and everywhere 
there is light springing out of it. What is the darkness and 
light of to-day is the light and darkness of the morrow, and 
what is or is not to-day shall not or shall be to-morrow. 
This perpetual change in Nature, these evolutions and invo- 



Idea in itself and witliout itself. 93 

lutions of forms and beings, this passage from being into 
nought and from nought into being, visibly demonstrates 
both that idea — the Absolute and the Eternal — is in Nature 
and that it is not in it. For idea alone can work the change 
either in destroying or in producing the being, and it can only 
work it from its being itself impervious to all change, dimi- 
nution, and destruction. "Whence it follows also that the 
Absolute exists and can be apprehended but imperfectly in 
Nature, and that it is as pure thought only that it exists, 
and through pure thought that it can be apprehended in the 
reality and fulness of its essence. 

In the above remarks, if properly applied, will be found 
the elucidation of objections directed against Idealism from 
a sensualistic point of view. It is said, on the one hand, that 
ideas do not possess any positive, but a merely negative, value 
and existence, and, on the other, that they cannot be recon- 
ciled with the infinite variety of beings, institutions, creeds, 
and opinions. How is it, it is objected, that if there be one 
and the same idea for one and the same class of beings, ideas 
vary with individuals, times, and external conditions ; that 
Europeans and Chinese, for instance, form different notions 
of beauty ; or that different peoples take different views of 
right, of justice, and religion; nay, that individuals belong- 
ing to the same community and nursed in the same doctrines 
hold conflicting opinions upon one and the same subject? 

With regard to the first obj ection, it may be easily per- 
ceived that it is founded on the assumption that the only 
positive (which here means real) beings are those that fall 
under the senses, which is the sensualistic assumption, and, 
consequently, that ideas possess no reality — the meaning we 
must attach here to the word negative. In fact, if we start 
from the principle that nothing save that which falls under 
the senses posseses reality, then idea would possess no positive 
existence. But to assume that ideas do not possess any posi- 
tive and objective reality because we cannot picture them to 
our imagination, or embody them in any external form, is to 
assume that the only real beings, forces, or principles, are 
those that can be apprehended through the senses. For the 
argument does not only apply to ideas, but to all principles 
in general, as there is no principle, whatever be its nature, its 



94 Idea in itself and without itself. 

object, and the notion we form of it, that can be brought un- 
der the senses and imagination ; indeed, it is contradictory 
to the very nature of principle to be sensibly representable. 
For as soon as a principle falls within the limits of experi- 
ence it is no longer a principle. And we may observe, by the 
way, that it is on this erroneous view and assumption that 
not only the sensualistic, but the Kantian doctrine also, is 
founded ; the real and main purport of Kant's theory being 
that we are not rationally allowed to affirm metaphysical 
and transcendental realities, because we do not meet in the 
held of experience with any being or phenomenon which we 
can bring these transcendental realities to coincide with. 
Thus, for instance, according to Kant's argument, we cannot 
demonstrate the existence of God, or of the Perfect Being, 
because the objective reality of the Perfect Being is not con- 
tained in the notion of the Perfect Being ; which means that 
the notion or the Idea of the Perfect Being possesses no ob- 
jective or actual reality. As the precedent inquiries show 
the untenableness of this and similar positions, I will not 
enter again into a lengthened discussion of the question, but 
I will confine myself to a few remarks. 

The sensualistic as well as the Kantian doctrine starts, as 
we have just observed, from the assumption that the only 
realities are those that come within the reach of the senses 
and imagination ; from which the inference is drawn, that, 
as ideas can be neither felt nor imagined, ideas possess no 
reality. But then the question arises as to what ideas may 
be ; and how it is, if ideas are equal to nought, that the ex- 
ternal world cannot be apprehended save through ideas, and 
that there is no being which our mind, or any mind we may 
possibly conceive, can apprehend without ideas. Must we 
say that the phenomenal world which is apprehended 
through ideas is the highest, nay, the only reality, whilst 
ideas by the aid of which the latter is known would be des- 
titute of all reality ? But it would seem that it is the con- 
trary we ought to admit. For to ideas, through which not 
only a single individual being, but all similar beings are, and 
can possibly be, thought and known, must need appertain a 
higher nature than these beings themselves. Besides, it will 
be acknowledged, under any supposition, that phenomena 



Idea in itself and without itself. 95 

are manifestations and effects of principles, and that these 
principles mnst be possessed of a higher reality than their 
effects. Now, principles, whatever they may be — let them 
be called God, or the Absolute, or the Infinite — cannot be 
made the object of sensible perception any better than ideas, 
as we have demonstrated. In fact, the highest reality is the 
invisible reality, which is the highest for the very reason 
that it does not fall under the senses and the conditions to 
which all external reality is necessarily submitted. There- 
fore, to hold that ideas possess no reality because this reality 
is not proved by experience, is to hold that the Infinite does 
not exist because it does not exist like the Finite, or because 
the reality of the former is not the reality of the latter. 

As to the other objection, drawn from the variety of opin- 
ions, customs, and institutions, as well as the products of 
Nature, it will be observed that the difference does not affect 
idea, but its external manifestation. Viewed in itself and in 
its essential existence, idea is one and the same, and is not 
liable to either alteration or division. It is only as Idea in 
Nature that it assumes various forms, and that its unity ap- 
pears as broken and as a plurality. And yet even variety 
reveals the unity and the infiniteness of ideas. For the 
numberless individual forms and the ever-changing scene of 
external objects show the inexhaustible activity of this 
principle, whilst the invariableness and community of their 
essential character show its unity. It is one and the same 
thought that stamps Nature with different marks, it is one 
and the same mind that manifests itself in the variety of its 
works. The difference between Chinese and European, or 
between ancient and modern Art, does not reach this princi- 
ple. For were they sprung from different sources there 
would be no relation between them, nor could they be com- 
pared ; nay, one of them could not even come within the same 
denomination. And so it is with laws, institutions, and 
languages. This difference begins with their external mani- 
festation — the temporary, limited, and local forms in which 
they are necessarily embodied. As one and the same sun 
produces different effects according to different latitudes and 
to the different elements with which it is combined — as one 
and the same object multiplies with the points from which it 



96 Idea in itself and without itself. 

is viewed and the eyes that view it — or as one and the same 
voice awakens different feelings in different ears and differ- 
ent hearts, — so likewise, and in a still much higher sense, 
idea, in its contact with Nature, splits itself into infinite forms 
and numberless beings.* 

The most striking illustration of this self- diversifying power 
of ideas is supplied by language. Of all external manifesta- 
tions of ideas, language is one of the most perfect. Its affin- 
ity to thought is so intimate, that some have been led not 
only to confound them, but to see in language the origin of 
thought.f In fact, language is the most immediate offspring 
of the ideal world ; it is the echo which externally reverber- 
ates the internal sound and breath of Spirit. In other stages 
of its existence Nature is dumb and silent, and where it 
possesses a voice it is a voice whose meaning is obscure, un- 
defined, and destitute of all connection and unity. Thus it 
may be truthfully said that we are the organs of Nature, and 
that Nature speaks through us a language superior to its 
own essence, attaining thereby, even externally, a perfection 
which it does not possess in itself. The roaring of thunder 
has no meaning for the thunder, or for Nature in general, so 
long as it has not reached the region of Spirit, and has been 
marked with an external sign conveying the internal signifi- 
cation of the phenomenon. Likewise the roaring of thunder, 
the whistling of wind, the flashing of lightning, &c, are 
scattered and isolated sounds that find their connection and 
unity in the voice of Spirit. Even the animal — the brute 
creation — though possessing a soul and a voice to give utter- 
ance to its internal wants, is refused a language ; and this, 
because the animal, though the product of the same principle 
as man, does not bear it within itself, and consequently does 
not perceive it or feel a desire for it. Being thus debarred 

* u Et erat Lux vera quce illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum." 
Now this light which embraces man, though one and the same light, does not 
illumine him in the same manner, but adapts itself to space and time and to local 
requirements. Even within the pale of Christianity, this inward and eternal 
light is externally broken up into fragments, sects, and denominations, which 
represent as many aspects of one and the same thing. 

f Hence the superficial theories of Condillac and M. de Bonald, summed up in 
the well-known propositions, " Penser c'est parler" (to think is to speak J), and 
"La science est un langage bien-fait" (Science is a well-made language). 



Idea in itself and without itself. 97 

from the contemplation of the ideal world, the animal is 
invariably kept within the bounds of Nature and of a limited 
number of physical wants, for the manifestation of which a 
limited number of inarticulate sounds are required ; and as 
Nature is by its very constitution the field of uniformity, of 
unchanging, ever-recurring and self-repeating wants, the ani- 
mal's wants as well as the mode of expressing them must be 
invariable. But the being that possesses thought — and the 
thought of the Eternal and the Absolute, and of the Unity 
of the Universe — must also possess a means adequate to the 
outward expression of this internal world. And this is lan- 
guage. The highest and final object of language is not to 
associate men;' for language is like ideas, the double-edged 
weapon which associates and dissociates men, engenders 
both peace and war, and creates and overthrows societies ; 
but to give utterance to the internal world of thought, or to 
express ideas, and, by expressing ideas, to unite and disunite 
men, to found and overthrow societies, according to the re- 
quirements of truth. Now, as language is the most imme- 
diate and direct product of thought, it must imitate thought ; 
or if it must imitate Nature, it is Nature as it reflects itself 
in thought. Indeed thought transfers at will, and according 
to its own perceptions and purposes, the internal world into 
the external and the external into the internal ; for in this 
double sense language is metaphorical. But the creative 
power of thought in language is mainly shown by this, that 
words cannot represent things except through thought ; that 
they possess no other meaning, or being, but that which 
thought imparts to them ; that it is from thought they derive 
their beauty, their power, and duration ; and that as soon as 
thought retires from them they become a dead letter, a soul- 
less body.* Thus the same sounds which in former times 

* The less language is representative, the more correct, faithful, and appropri- 
ate to the free and full manifestation of thought. Even in poetry, figures and 
images must be made subservient to ideas. They must not be the literal, but 
the ideal, transfer of a natural phenomenon to the thing we want to describe; 
so much so, that, if a literal construction were put upon the words, the intention 
of the poet would be perverted or become unintelligible. If, for instance, we 
were to take literally the words /3o^tzyc, zwva, dpyocpoTroo^^ & c ., Greek god- 
desses, nymphs, and heroes, would become unseemly or ludicrous objects. The 
letter of the word must, then, be idealized, i.e. must be diverted from its natural 
sense to that of the ideas the poet intends to express through it. 



98 Idea in itself and without itself. 

had delighted the ear, had stirred the soul, and been the 
incentive to mighty deeds, lie now unmeaning and powerless ; 
or, if they still retain some of their former substance, it is 
because they enshrined thought, or because we ourselves 
infuse into them a breath of the living Spirit. Here we can 
see the common source of all languages, as well as the 
cause of their diversity. 

In fact, if thought is the soul of the word, the internal 
verbum by which the external is created, thought is the prin- 
ciple of all languages, and it is because languages all flow 
from this same source that thought is able to understand 
them all. Therefore, the unity of languages does not lie in 
any primordial language, but in the unity of thought and 
ideas expressed by words. Whatever explanation may be 
contrived of the origin of languages, it is towards this 
common centre that all suppositions and inquiries must ulti- 
mately converge. For, either man has taught himself, or he 
has been taught to speak. In the first hypothesis, language 
is evidently the product of man's thought and ideas. If, on 
the contrary, language was communicated to him, in what- 
ever manner the communication was made it must be admit- 
ted that the being that made the communication thought 
what he communicated, and that the communication was the 
product of thought and in conformity with it ; and, on the 
other hand, that the being which received the communication 
possessed thought, and thought consubstantial with that of 
the being by which the communication was transmitted, and 
that he spoke also in consequence of that thought and in 
conformity with it. In other words, he who teaches and he 
who is taught must possess a common nature; and the 
higher the teaching, the more intimate and inseparable the 
connection must be ; so that, if I teach either to speak or to 
think, my teaching would be of no avail ; in fact, it would 
be no teaching unless the being I teach possesses the very 
same faculty of thinking and speaking I use in teaching 
him. But if he possess this faculty, my thought and his 
thought, my and his vocal organs, flow from one and the same 
principle, from one and the same essence. This is the idea 
of language — an idea in which the internal and the external, 
thought within and thought without itself, are intimately and 



Idea in itself and without itself. 99 

immediately connected. For to speak is neither thought with- 
out voice, nor voice without thought, but thought and voice 
penetrating each other and forming an indivisible whole. As 
the body is the external form and instrument of the soul, so 
the word is the external form and instrument of thought. Thus 
viewed, language appears as the highest form of external ex- 
istence, as the highest degree to which Nature can attain. The 
other powers and functions of the body are limited in time and 
space, and mainly intended for the satisfaction of physical ap- 
petites or inferior wants of the soul ; whilst language, being in 
immediate intercourse with thought and issuing directly from 
it, strives to become identical with it ; and as thought is abso- 
lute, eternal, and immortal, so there is in language an inward 
effort, a longing after perfection, eternity, and immortality. 
Yet it is a longing which shall never reach its object. For 
the word being a sound and an image of thought, and not 
thought itself, i.e. falling within the sphere of Nature, must, 
like all images, be limited, perishable, and deceptive. Hence 
the dispersion of thought in various languages. Hence the 
necessary transformation and dissolution of languages. 
Hence also the errors of which language is the source. 

In fact, as there are two elements involved in the voord, 
the internal and the external, the idea and the sound ; and as 
the sound, which is imperfect and finite, cannot render idea, 
which is infinite, in the unity and fulness of its essence, — it 
follows that thought creates another sound, other vocal forms 
and combinations, to express this very same idea; which 
forms and combinations, being themselves necessarily lim- 
ited, prove inadequate for the expression of thought, and call, 
in their turn, for other forms, which fall under the same con- 
ditions as the former, and so forth. Now, if we contrast the 
various languages, we shall see that, for the very reason that 
they are limited and external embodiments of thought, each 
of them must represent a different aspect of one and the same 
thought, different relations and combinations of one and the 
same idea ; so that what one expresses, the others will be 
unable to express, or to express in the same manner, with 
the same degree of clearness, accuracy, and perfection — a fact 
we experience in translating. For not only is a translation 
always dissimilar or inferior to the original, although both 



100 Idea in itself and without itself. 

the original and the translation spring from one and the same 
thought, but it frequently happens that both the original and 
the translation are utterly inadequate to the rendering of 
thought ; so that here we can discern, and feel, as it were, 
thought in itself in the unity and perfection of its existence, 
and thought without itself in the limited form in which it is 
externally clothed. This fmiteness of languages, which, by 
stamping limited forms with ideas and by concentrating 
thought in a limited number of sounds, is, on the one hand, 
the source of their power and beauty, and, on the other, 
the source of their transformation and decay. For, in con- 
sequence of their inability to embrace and express the infi- 
niteness of thought, they must either modify and transform 
themselves, or, if they do not possess the necessary vitality 
and aptitude to embody the new developments and wants of 
Spirit, they must disappear and make room for other and 
more appropriate organs of truth. * For this same reason 

* Ut silva? foliis pronos mutantur in annos. 
Prima caduut : ita verborum vetus interit aetas ; 

mortal ia facta peribunt, 
Kedum sermonum stet honos et gratia vivax. — Hor. Ars Poet , 

As a general criterion, it may be laid down that as soon as a language ceases 
to be spoken it ceases to be a living being — the representative of the living Spirit. 
Yet a language, although inwardly dead, may continue to be spoken bj r keeping 
up a kind of factitious and galvanic life, within which the soul of the present and 
living spirit of the world does not beat. The Eastern languages, the Chinese, 
and the Hindoostanee, may, ih this sense, be considered as dead, though still 
spoken by millions and hundreds of millions of human beings. Indeed, in the 
eyes of History, they are more dead to Science and civilization than Latin and 
Greek, which we inhale, as it were, from the cradle with our native tongue. 
They are to Greek and Latin what Oriental history — i.e. Philosophy, Science, 
Art, Law — is to Greek and Roman history in general. The study of Oriental 
languages possesses, like any other study, its usefulness and importance, and 
may also be required for political or commercial purposes. But it could never 
be a substitute for Latin and Greek, and it would be irrational and anti-historical 
to make Chinese and Hindoostanee the basis of classical education in the room 
of Greek and Latin. 

In considering the history and present state of the Eastern nations, it must be 
borne in mind, that, though still in existence, they in reality belong to the past, 
to the ancient world, where they were far outshone by the two great luminaries 
of that period. Since that time, whilst the European and Occidental nations, 
inheriting the spirit of their forefathers, have been fighting the battle of civiliza- 
tion, promoting the common interests, and raising the common level of mankind, 
the Oriental nations have stood immovable, and kept aloof from the movement 
of history. So they are, in substance, what they were two thousand years since, 
and as, two thousand years since, we have seen a handful of Europeans conquer 



Idea in itself and loithoitt itself. 101 

language is a source of error and delusion, and may become 
a hindrance to the progress of science and truth. Language 
is fallacious, not only when false representations are embo- 
died in words, but even when words — single or combined — 
express right notions and real objects. For from the fact of 
the words being limited and disconnected symbols of things, 
they represent a part of a thing instead of the whole thing, 
or as divided and plural what is united and one*; so that the 
mind, which is guided by the literal and conventional signi- 
fication of the word, considers as a whole what is only a 
part,f or as divided what is united.:}; 

them and hold them in subjection. Therefore, their language and institutions 
possess only an interest for the antiquarian and the historian. 

With regard to the Greek and Koman languages, it is a remarkable fact that 
they continued to be written and spoken long after the Greek and Eoman na- 
tionalities had ceased to exist. This is owing to Christianity having adopted the 
two languages as organs of its doctrines and teaching. The unsettled state of 
the world in the middle ages, the absence of any newly constituted nationality 
and language, coupled with the high degree of perfection to which the Greek 
and Latin languages had been brought, made it necessary for the Church to 
adopt them. And as, on the other hand, the Church, especially the Latin, was 
at that time the representative of the new Spirit — a spirit embodied in a Code 
upon which the nationalities tl en in a state of formation were to be founded — 
and, moreover, as Science and Law were so intertwined with Theology as to be 
inseparable from it— the veiy fact of the Church having adopted them must have 
prolonged their existence. For the Church constituted, in some manner, their 
centre and nationality. Then came the Renaissance, which infused again into 
them some of their native vigor. However, as the new nationalities, and the 
languages sprung up with them, were develc ping themselves, assuming a fixed 
and individual shape, and attaining maturity, Greek and Latin became more and 
more dead languages. The Eeformation, the popular use of the Bible, Science 
asserting its independence of the Church and using the vulgar tongue, the daily 
press, the necessity of a more rapid intercourse between men and nations, new 
discoveries and wants, physical and mental habits requiring new signs and forms 
of expression, — all these causes must have made and are making ancient lan- 
guages more and more foreign to our mental and social requirements, however 
beautiful — nay, even superior, in some respects, to those by which they have 
been superseded — ancient languages may be. 

* Or vice versa. 

y For instance, the expressions, " My hand presses upon the table," "That 
body adheres to that other body," "The Sun attracts the Earth," when taken 
literally and according to the usual representative n of the meaning involved in 
them, convey to the mind the notion that by representing to ourselves the hand 
pressing upon the table, or body A adhering to body B, or the Sun attracting the 
Earth, we conceive and embrace the whole phenomenon or law, whilst we per- 
ceive only a part of it. For in the phenomena of pressure, adhesion, and attrac- 
tion, not only the hand presses but is pressed upon, not only A adheres to B but 



102 Idea in itself and without itself. 

But what chiefly brings about the decline and dissolution 
of languages is that a time arrives when not only they are 
unable to accomplish the object for which they are insti- 
tuted, namely, to express truth and to spread and promote 
science, but they become the most stubborn opponents of 
truth and science. The language of a nation is part and 
parcel of its being. The long usage and elaboration of a 
language bring this result, that, whilst they evolve all their 
native vitality and beauty, and create a more perfect instru- 
ment for mental operations, they gradually petrify the mind 
by encompassing it within fixed sounds and forms, so that 
the words and thought become identified, and local, limited 
and imperfect truth becomes the universal and absolute 
truth. The god of the Romans was not the invisible and 
eternal God, but the Jupiter optimus maximus, seated in 
all his majesty and glory on the Capitolium, surrounded 

is adhered to bj T B, not only the Sun attracts but is attracted also by the Earth; 
so that the right perception of the whole object is not in the perception of either 
term considered singly and apart from the other, but in the perception of both 
considered singly as well as in their mutual connection — the two conditions of 
pressure, adherence, &c, and without which such phenomena could not take 
place. " The whole is made up of parts" is another expression producing a 
similar error, as it makes one believe that in possessing the parts one possesses 
the whole, whilst, in reality, the whole and the parts are different, though in- 
separable. Similar expressions can be easily found. 

J The natural tendency of language is to separate what is united, thereby^ 
preventing the mind from perceiving the internal unity of things. Words, being 
images and external representations of thought, resolve themselves into sensa- 
tions; and as the natural tendency of sensation is to divide and to circumscribe, 
in time and space, both the subject that receives the impression and the object 
that produces it, so it is with words. Thus, unless the mind — disregarding the 
word, so to speak, and going beyond it — directs its attention towards the ob- 
jective and invisible connection of things, the Universe will appear as made up 
of fragments, of units or atoms. For instance, the words luminous, opaque, Sun, 
Earth, motion, rest, cause, effect, general, individual, will, imagination, reason, 
taken singly, or even united in propositions, such as "The Sun is luminous." 
"The Earth is opaque," " The cause is not the effect." "The effect is not the- 
cause," "The general is not the individual," &c, offer to the mind a series of 
merely opposite or disconnected beings. It has been already observed by Con- 
dillac that language is an analytical process — un moyen d'analyse. In reality, if 
we consider The word — the external sign of thought — in itself, language is nei- 
ther an analytical nor a synthetical process, as it is thought that divides and 
unites. But, from the very fact that the word is a limited and particular repre- 
sentation of ideas, it has a tendency towards distinguishing and analyzing; so 
that the mind, from inadvertency or from an inadequate philosophical training,, 
misled by the word, is apt to overlook the connection of things. 



Idea in itself and without itself. 103 

with the Dii majores and all the attributes and formulae 
which constituted the Roman religion. So likewise morality, 
justice, glory , eloquence, were for the Roman inseparable 
from the words and sounds that expressed them and the na- 
tional meaning affixed to them, nor would any other sound 
move his heart or captivate his ear. Consequently, when by 
the inward and incessant working of thought a new Spirit 
breathes upon the world, and new wants and aspirations 
issue forth from the depths of the mind, the old sounds and 
formulae in which are embodied the institutions, the wisdom 
and life of a nation stand up in formidable array to oppose 
them as false, pernicious, and impious. And it may happen 
that the higher the civilization of a people, the more obsti- 
nate the opposition. For glory and power beget pride and 
stubbornness, harden the heart, and blind the mind, and lead 
gradually a nation to the belief that she is the representative 
of the absolute truth. In this delusion mainly lies the cause 
of her decline and dissolution. For in this contest between 
the limited and mortal spirit of a nation and the spirit of the 
world — which is the Spirit and Providence of God — the for- 
mer must either follow or succumb. It must either become 
the apostle of the new doctrine and the organ of the new 
truth, or, if it be unable to utter the new sounds and spell the 
new words, it must withdraw from the contest and yield up 
the arena to a more youthful, more vigorous, and God- 
inspired race. 

Since language, which is the most direct and faithful exter- 
nal manifestation of thought, is unable to render it in all the 
depth and fulness of its meaning, it follows that thought can 
only be apprehended by thought and idea by idea ; and that 
words, images, representations, whatever they may be, are 
but imperfect and deceptive adumbrations of truth. If, there- 
fore, in listening to words, the mind, instead of fixing its 
perceptive power upon their objective and internal value, let 
itself be captivated by the sound and by its outward form 
and beauty, it will mistake the shadow for the reality, the 
image for the thing, and the perishable for the eternal being. 
For the Absolute is unutterable, and there is no language 
that can adequately express it save the internal and silent 
language of thought, a language which is the reverse of the 



104 Idea in itself and without itself. 

former, and that can only be spoken by Mm who is able to 
forget his native and mortal and learn the universal and im- 
mortal tongue through the contemplation of ideas as per- 
ceived in the reality of their nature and existence, i.e. in their 
unity and as a system. For this is speculation, or specula- 
tive thought, in the strict Hegelian sense ; as speculative 
thought is not the thought which apprehends abstract ideas, 
ideas in their isolated, partial, and fragmentary existence, 
but thought that apprehends ideas as they are in the abso- 
lute idea, which is absolute for the very reason that it is a 
systematic unity without which nothing can either rationally 
be thought or exist. 



1_ ,k Volumes 



OF THE 



Joui.ial of Speculative Philosophy. 



The eight volumes already published can be obtained of the Editor or of the 
Agencies advertised on the title page, at $2 per volume in numbers, or $3 per 
volume bound in muslin. In order to be able to supply all orders, the second 
and fourteenth numbers have been reprinted. 

That a set of the " Journal" constitutes in some measure a Library of Philo- 
sophy in itself, will appear from the following list selected from the contents of 
the seven volumes : 

LEIBXITZ— (1) The Monadology; (2) On the Nature of the Soul; (3) On Pla- 
tonic Enthusiasm ; (4) New System of Nature ; (5) On the Doctrine of a 
Universal Spirit; (6) Abridgment of his Theodicy. 

DESCARTES— (1) The Meditations (complete). 

KANT— Exposition of his Ethical System, with Commentary; (2) Trans- 
lation of First Part of the Critique of Pure Reason, with Commentary and 
Criticism; (3) Exposition of his " System of Transcendentalism"; (4) Right 
to Lie from Motives of Humanity. 

FICHTE — (1) Introduction to the Science of Knowledge; (2) Criticism of 
Philosophical Systems ; (3) The Sun-clear Statement of the Science of Knowl- 
edge; (4) New Exposition of the Science of Knowledge; (5) The Facts of 
Consciousness. 

SCHELLLXG— (1) Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature ; (2) Introduction 
to Idealism ; (3) The Practical Effects of Modern Philosophy. 

HEGEL — (1) Benard's Analysis of the ^Esthetics ; 4 (2) Phenomenology of 
Mind, three chapters translated, with Commentary and Analysis; (3) Out- 
lines of the Logic ; (4) Outlines of the Subjective Logic; (5) Outlines of Science 
of Rights, Morals, and Religion; (6) On the Philosophy of Plato ; (7) On 
the Philosophy of Aristotle ; (8) From the ^Esthetics: Chivalry— (a) Honor, 
(6) Love, (c) Fidelity. 

GOETHE— (1) Essay on Da Vinci's Last Supper, original statement of his theory 
of colors ; (2) On the Laokoon. 

ROSEXKRANZ — (1) Critique on Second Part of Goethe's Faust; r2) Cri- 
tique on Goethe's Social Romances ; (3) Letter on Hoffmann and Baader; (4) 
Critique on Goethe's Story of the Snake ; (5) Introduction to Hegel's Ency- 
clopaedia; (G) On Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit; (7) On Hegel's Logic; 
(8) On Hegel's Philosophy of Rights ; (9) On Hegel's Philosophy of History; 
(10) On Hegel's Psychology ; (11) Pedagogics as a System; (12) On Hegel's 
Esthetics; (13) On Hegel's Philosophy of Religion; (14) On Hegel's His- 
tory of Philosophy. 

YVTNCKELMANN— (1) On the Torso of Hercules ; (2) On the Laokoon; (3) De- 
scription of the Apollo Belvedere. 

SCHOPENHAUER— (1) Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul; (2) Doctrine 
of the Will; (3) Thoughts on Philosophy and its Method ; (4)Thoughts on 
Logic and Dialectic; (5) Thoughts on Ideas, j 



MICHELET— Review of Von Hartmann on the Dialectic. 

VON HARTMANN— Reply to Miehelet. 

MARX— Beethoven's F Minor Sonata. 

HERDER— The Book of Job considered as a Work of Art. 

TRENDELENBURG— On the Logical Question in Hegel's System . 

PARMENIDES— Translation of his celebrated Poem, and Commentary on it. 

PORPHYRY— Sentences. 

TREN TO WSKI— Introduction to Logic. 

LOTZE— On Idealism and Realism . 

HOFFMANN— Theism and Pantheism. 

VERA— (1) Introduction to Speculative Philosophy and Logic; (2) Critique of 

Trendelenburg. 
STIRLING— (1) Critique of Professor Fraser's Berkeley; (2) Lectures on the 

Philosophy of Law. 
HERBAKT— Rational Psychology. 
DIONYSiOS TIIRAX— Greek Grammar. 



PHILOSOPHY OF AKT. 

The ''Journal" has devoted a large space to criticism and interpretation of 
WORKS OF ART. Besides the articles before named from Goethe, Winckel- 
mann, Hegel, Rosenkrauz, and Herder, the following original articles on the 
various phases of Art are to be mentioned : (1) Letters on Faust, by H. C. Brock- 
meyer; (2) New School of Music, and (3j Dialogue on Music, by E. Sobolewski; 
(4) Raphael's '-Transfiguration," (5) Music as a Form of Art, and (G) Michael An- 
gelo's "Last Judgment," by the Editor ; (7; Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, by 
C. C. Chapman ; (8) Beethoven's Third Symphony, by C. L. Bernays ; (9) Mil- 
ton's Lycidas, and (10) Bion's Ode on the Death of Adonis, by Anna C. Brack- 
ett; (11) Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, (12) Tragedy of Julius Csssar, (13) 
Hamlet (three Essays;, (14) "As You Like It," (15) u The Midsummer Night's 
Dream," (Hi) "The Tempest," by D. J. Snider. 



INTRODUCTORY (to the Study of Philosophy), 

BY THE EDITOR. 

I. An Introduction to the Study of Speculative Philosophy, giving an expo- 
sition of the more important ideas necessary to an understanding of the works 
of original Philosophers. This was completed in ten chapters, published in the 
first and second volumes. 

II. 1 series of articles applying the ideas unfolded in the foregoing Introduc- 
tion to special themes: — The Speculative ; Herbert Spencer's First Principles ; 
The Alchemists; Paul Janet and Hegel ; Statement of the Problem ; Nominal- 
ism and Realism; Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology ; What is meant by "De- 
termined"; Notes on the Outlines of Hegel's Logic, and his Philosophy of Rights, 
Morals, and Religion ; The True First Principle; Hegel's First Principle; Pre- 
face to Volume III.; The Freedom of the Will; The Immortality of the Soul; 
Book Classification ; Philosophemes ; Contributions to Philosophy ; The Con- 
crete and the Abstract; Theism and Pantheism; The Philosophy of Nature ; 
The Metaphysical Calculus ; Is Positive Science Nominalism or Realism ? Do 
the Correlationists Believe in Self-Movement i 



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